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ABSTRACT 
 
EMV (Europay, MasterCard, Visa), commonly termed “Chip & PIN”, is becoming the dominant card 
based payment technology globally.  The EMV Chip & PIN transaction protocol was originally 
designed to operate in an environment where the card was physically inserted into the POS terminal / 
ATM and used a wired connection to communicate.  The introduction of EMV contactless payments 
technology raises an interesting question “has usability been improved at the cost of security?”.  
Specifically, to make contactless payments more convenient / usable, a wireless interface has been 
added to EMV cards and PIN entry has been waived for contactless payments.  Do these new usability 
features make contactless cards less secure? 
This PhD thesis presents an analysis of the security of the EMV contactless payments.  It considers 
the security of the EMV contactless transaction protocols as stand-alone processes and the wider 
impact of contactless technology upon the security of the EMV card payment system as a whole. 
The thesis contributes a structured analysis methodology which identifies vulnerabilities in the EMV 
protocol and demonstrates the impact of these vulnerabilities on the EMV payment system.  The 
analysis methodology comprises UML diagrams and reference tables which describe the EMV 
protocol sequences, a protocol emulator which implements the protocol, a Z abstract model of the 
protocol and practical demonstrations of the research results.  Detailed referencing of the EMV 
specifications provide a documented link between the exploitable vulnerabilities observed in real 
EMV cards and the source of the vulnerability in the EMV specifications. 
Our analysis methodology has identified two previously undocumented vulnerabilities in the EMV 
contactless transaction protocol.  The potential existence of these vulnerabilities was identified using 
the Z abstract model with the protocol emulator providing experimental confirmation of the potential 
for real-world exploitation of the vulnerabilities and test results quantifying the extent of the impact. 
Once a vulnerability has been shown to be exploitable using the protocol emulator, we use practical 
demonstrations to show that these vulnerabilities can be exploited in the real-world using off-the-shelf 
equipment.  This presents a stronger impact message when presenting our research results to a non-
technical audience.  This has helped to raise awareness of security issues relating to EMV contactless 
cards, with our work appearing in the media, radio and TV. 
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Glossary of Terms 
 
3-DES Triple DES – is the common name for Triple Data Encryption Algorithm which 
applies the  Data Encryption Standard (DES) three times to each data block.  3-DES is 
a 64 bit block-cipher 
AAC  Application Authentication Cryptogram – is the application cryptogram generated by 
an EMV card indicating that the transaction has been cancelled. 
AC Application Cryptogram – the EMV protocol utilises 3-DES encoded cryptograms as 
a secure method of communication between the EMV payment card and the Issuing 
Bank.  There are four different types of cryptogram; TC (transaction approved), AAC 
(transaction declined), ARPC (request online approval from the Issuer) an ARPC 
(Issuer authorisation decision). 
Acquirer Refers to the bank that holds the destination bank account for the transaction, which is 
typically the bank that issued the POS terminal to the merchant.  Also referred to as 
the “acquiring bank”. 
AFL Application File Locator – a list of records on the card that contains all of the data 
required by the POS terminal to complete the transaction.  Included in this data are 
the RSA keys required for the POS terminal to validate the transaction. 
Aic Acquirer implicit certificate – from our work on POS Authentication Chapter 8, the 
Aic is an ECQV implicit certificate used to generate the acquirer public key during 
the POS authentication process. 
Aid Acquirer identification data – from Chapter 8, the Aic is the data used to uniquely 
identify the acquirer, which is encoded into the acquirer’s ECQV implicit certificate 
(Tic), consisting of the acquirer ID, expiry date and a sequence number. 
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit – the APDU is the messaging structure used by ISO-
7816 compliant smartcards such as EMV payment cards. 
Apk Acquirer public key – from Chapter 8, the Aic is generated by the card from the Aic. 
ARPC Authorisation Response Cryptogram – in the protocol sequence for transactions that 
require online authorisation, the card generates an Authorisation Request Cryptogram 
Glossary of Terms 
xiii 
to signify that it wishes to complete the transaction online.  The Issuer responds with 
and ARPC, which encodes the Issuers authorisation response to the transaction 
request.  The ARPC is 3-DES or AES encrypted using the Issuers private key which 
allows the card to ensure that the card to validate that the response came from the 
Issuer and has not been altered. 
ARQC  Authorization Request Cryptogram – is generated by the card to indicate that it wants 
to complete the transaction online (see ARPC). 
Ask Acquirer private key – from Chapter 8, the Ask is generated by the Certificate 
Authority and stored by the acquirer. 
ATM Automatic Teller Machine – commonly termed cash machines, they allow bank 
customers to withdraw cash from their bank account. 
CA Certificate Authority –  in EMV each of the card scheme providers Visa, MasterCard, 
American Express, JCB, Discover and Union Pay act as the Certificate authority for 
their own branded cards. The CAs generate the Issuer’s RSA private keys thereby 
allowing the Issuers to generate RSA public private key pairs for their cards.  ATMs 
and POS terminals can validate the cards RSA signature using the CAs public key. 
CAind Certificate Authority public key index – from Chapter 8, an EMV POS terminal 
supports multiple CA public keys.  The card indicates the CA public key that it 
supports using the CA public key index. 
CApk Certificate Authority public key – from Chapter 8, the POS terminals and ATMs use 
the CA public key as the know starting point to validate the Issuer public key, the card 
public key and the digital signature. 
Cardholder This is a generic term for the person with an EMV credit or debit card who is making 
a payment in a shop / restaurant or is withdrawing cash from an ATM.  The term also 
implies that the person has a bank account to which the card is attached. 
CAsk Certificate Authority private key – from Chapter 8, the CA private key is used to 
generate the Issuer public private key pairs. 
Chip & PIN The common name used in the UK to refer to EMV payment system.  The EMV 
specifications defines the operation of the payment cards, POS terminals and ATMs. 
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography – is a public key cryptography system.  It is termed ECC 
because the cryptography algorithm utilises the discrete points along an elliptic curve, 
described by the equation y2 = x3 + ax + b.  
Glossary of Terms 
xiv 
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm – a method of generating digital signatures 
based on the elliptic curve cryptography system. 
ECQV Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone 
EMV Europay MasterCard Visa is a global standard for card payments (commonly termed 
“Chip & PIN”).  The standard ensures the interoperability of EMV payment cards, 
ATMs and POS terminals across different banks and in different countries. 
EMVCo Is the organisation that controls the EMV specifications.  It is a collaboration between 
the card scheme providers American Express, Discover, JCB, MasterCard, UnionPay 
and Visa.  It also includes associate members (government bodies, banks, payment 
providers, retailers and utilities) who add to the technical and operational issues. 
ISO-14443 International standard governing contactless (proximity) smartcards.  ISO-14443 the 
operation of describes ISO-7816 smartcards with a contactless interface. 
ISO-7816 International standard governing the physical characteristics, operation and messaging 
protocol of integrated circuit smartcards. 
Issuer The bank that issued the card used in the transaction and holds the source bank 
account for the transaction. 
ITSO card NFC enabled travel card. 
NFC Near Field Communication 
nonce  A cryptographic nonce (Number ONCE) is a term given to random or pseudo random 
number which changes each time an authentication protocol is performed.  The nonce 
is used in cryptography to protect cryptographic hash functions and digital signatures 
against the known plaintext attacks. In EMV the nonce is an unpredictable number 
which is used as the challenge sent by the card to the POS terminal.  The POS 
terminal digitally signs the unpredictable number thereby preventing replay attacks. 
Oyster card NFC enabled travel card. 
PAN Primary Account Number; the PAN is the universal ISO 7812 compliant 16 card 
number which identifies each individual payment card.  The PAN is printed on the 
front of the card and is encoded into the smartcard interface data which is transmitted 
to the POS terminal for payment. 
Payment card This is a generic term for credit and debit cards.  In this thesis credit and debit cards 
are considered to be operationally the same as they perform the same transaction 
protocol and are subject to the same card payment scheme clearing processes. 
Glossary of Terms 
xv 
PDOL Processing options Data Object List – A flexible list of data fields requested by the 
card.  The POS returns the requested data fields in the GetProcessingOptions() 
message. 
PKI Public Key Infrastructure, is a mechanism by which a trusted 3rd party (the Certificate 
Authority) can validate the identity of the parties in a cryptographic exchange.  
POS Point of Sale terminal; the device used in shops and restaurants to make card 
payments.  A POS terminal may also describe an unattended vending machine such as 
a parking meter with a card payment interface. 
RSA Is an asymmetric public key cryptosystem named after its three co-inventors Ron 
Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman.  RSA is used to encrypt / decrypt 
messages and to produce digital signature.  EMV credit and debit cards use RSA to 
produce digital signatures which can be used to validate that the card is genuine. 
SAM  Secure Access Module – Tamper proof storage module used by POS terminals for 
cryptographic key storage. 
SDAD Signed Dynamic Authentication Data – In the current EMV system the card 
authorised the transaction data by signing the transaction data with its private key to 
produce the SDAD. 
SFI Short File Indicator – The storage on EMV cards is in blocks of 16 records, each 
block is referenced by a unique SFI. 
TC Transaction Certificate – Response code from the card that indicates that the 
transaction has been successful. 
Tic Terminal implicit certificate - ECQV implicit certificate used to generate the terminal 
public key during the POS authentication process. 
Tid Terminal identification data – Data to uniquely identify the terminal, which is 
encoded into the terminal’s ECQV implicit certificate (Tic), consisting of the terminal 
ID, expiry date and a sequence number. 
Tpk Terminal public key - Generated by the acquirer and stored on the POS terminal’s 
Secure Access Module. 
Tsk Terminal private key - Generated by the acquirer and stored on the POS terminal’s 
Secure Access Module. 
UPN UnPredictable Number – This is a nonce generated by the card and included in the 
SDAD signed transaction data. 
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Chapter 1.! Introduction 
 
Card payments have become ubiquitous, we pay for our everyday items in store, we make online 
purchases and we can even transfer money to our friends and family, all using our credit / debit cards. 
EMV is the smartcard based payment technology chosen as the global electronic card payment 
technology.  EMV has already replaced magnetic stripe in 76 countries, including most of Europe, 
and is currently being adopted in the United States of America, China and India [1] [2] [3].  This will 
make it the dominant card payment technology globally 
EMV smartcard technology introduces significant security improvements over the magnetic stripe 
payment cards that they replace. It has made the cards difficult to copy, but, because they also need to 
deal with the complexities of the technologies they are superseding, that security can be put at risk. 
From our research it is contended that contactless payments technology adds to the security issues of 
the EMV protocol. 
In 2008 EMV contactless payments were introduced into the UK, they are a more convenient method 
of payment for purchases under £20 (May 2015).  This convenience is achieved by fundamentally 
changing the way in which EMV payment cards are used.  Where previously the cardholder needed to 
insert the card into a POS terminal and enter their PIN to make a transaction, now contactless 
payments can be made wirelessly by tapping the card on the POS terminal and the cardholders PIN is 
not required. 
1.1! Aims and Objectives  
This thesis aims to answer the question “has usability been improved at the cost of security?”.  
Specifically do the features which make contactless payments more convenient and user friendly 
impact the security of the EMV payment system: 
•! does the wireless interface enable new categories of wireless attack that were not previously 
possible with the Chip & PIN cards? 
•! what is the scope of the impact of the removal of the PIN verification step, are there any 
unforeseen vulnerabilities created? 
•! contactless introduces seven new protocol sequences, with varying authentication processes, 
how does this increased complexity impact security? 
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To answer these questions, I have performed a structured analysis of the EMV contactless transaction 
protocol to identify any potential vulnerabilities.  I have also created a functioning emulation of the 
EMV contactless protocol, which demonstrates the practical security impacts of the introduction of 
contactless technology upon the existing EMV payments system. 
1.2! Thesis Contributions 
The work carried out as part of this PhD research has contributed to the subject of payments security 
research in the following ways: 
•! Development of a structured analysis methodology for EMV contactless transaction protocols 
which identifies flaws, demonstrates they exist in the real-world and links the vulnerability to 
its origin in the EMV specifications. 
•! Implementation of a protocol emulator which can execute protocol scenarios which target 
specific contactless protocol vulnerabilities and thereby allow us to quantify the resulting 
security impact. 
•! We have published research identifying two previously undocumented vulnerabilities in the 
EMV contactless transaction protocol. 
•! A literature review which analyses the wider impacts of contactless payments upon the 
security impact of the EMV payment system, outside the protocol analysis presented in this 
PhD thesis. 
1.3! Publications 
This thesis presents a body of PhD research which incorporates contributions which have been 
previously published as conference papers and as technical reports:  
•! Emms M, Arief B, Freitas L, Hannon J, and van Moorsel A, “Harvesting High Value Foreign 
Currency Transactions from EMV Contactless Credit Cards without the PIN,” in 21st 
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2014), Phoenix AZ, 2014. 
•! Emms, M., Arief, B., Little, N.J., Van Moorsel, A, “Risks of Offline Verify PIN on 
Contactless Cards.,” in 17th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data 
Security, Okinawa Japan, 2013. 
•! Freitas, L. and Emms, M, “Formal specification of EMV protocol. (TR 1429),” Newcastle 
University - School of Computing Science Technical Report Series, 2014. 
•! Emms M, Freitas L and van Moorsel A,, “Rigorous Design and Implementation of an 
Emulator for EMV Contactless Payments (TR 1426),” Newcastle University - School of 
Computing Science Technical Report Series, 2013. 
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•! Emms M, Arief B, Hannon J, van Moorsel A. “POS Terminal Authentication Protocol to 
Protect EMV Contactless Payment Cards (TR 1386)”. Newcastle University - School of 
Computing Science Technical Report Series, 2013. 
•! Emms, M., “Impacts of Data Leakage from Contactless Payments Cards” a lightning talk at 
Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2013), Newcastle UK, 2013 
•! M.  Emms, “Practical Attack on Contactless Payment Card,” in Human Computer Interaction 
(HCI 2011) Workshop - Health, Wealth and Identity Theft, Newcastle UK, 2011. 
The security of contactless payments affects everyone who carries a contactless card in their wallet.  
Our practical attack scenario implementations help us to convey a security message in a way that is 
accessible to the general public.  We have used the media to carry this message to a wider audience 
warning of potential security vulnerabilities. 
Our work has also featured in media reports on TV, Radio and in news articles.  This helps to 
communicate our security research to the general public who, as EMV cardholders, are potentially 
impacted by the vulnerabilities identified.  
•! BBC News 24, “BBC Tyne - Visa card glitch could lead to fraud,” 01 November 2014. 
•! BBC Radio 4, “Money Box - Card payment glitches at contactless terminals,” 19 May 2013.  
•! Sky News, “Contactless Cards: App Reveals Security Risk,” 04 June 2013.  
•! BBC Radio 4, “Today,” 03 June 2013 
•! BBC Radio 5 Live, “Saturday Edition,” 18 May 2013 
•! BBC Radio 4, “You & Yours - Portas towns and contactless card payments,” 30 May 2013. 
•! BBC Radio 2, “Drivetime,” 30 May 2013.  
•! Info Security Magazine, “UK customers charged twice with contactless payment cards,” 20 
May 2013 
•! Mail Online, “How 30million 'wi-fi' credit cards can be plundered by cyber identity thieves 
exploiting contactless payment technology,” 01 June 2013 
•! The Week, “Contactless debit and credit cards: what are the risks?,” 30 May 2013 
•! The Times, “Amazon customers at risk over contactless payments,” 04 June 2015.  
•! gulli.com, “NFC: Irrtümliche Zahlungen erfolgt,” 22 May 2013.  
1.4! Structure of Thesis 
Chapter 2 describes the global payment system and each of the card payment methods.  It 
describes contactless payments and where they fit into the global payment system as a whole.  
This chapter briefly examines the relationship between the different card payment 
technologies and card fraud committed in the UK. 
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Chapter 3 describes the EMV transaction protocol, setting it in the context of the EMV card 
payment system.  This chapter provides a comparative analysis of the different transaction 
authorisation methods used for contact “Chip & PIN” payments and contactless payments, 
highlighting the strength and weaknesses within each protocol.   
Chapter 4 looks at the published research relating to contactless payments.  The focus being 
on (i) analysis of transaction protocols (ii) exploitable vulnerabilities in transaction protocols 
(iii) exploitable vulnerabilities in the contactless technology. 
Chapter 5 describes the analysis methodology developed for this PhD research.  The 
methodology identifies flaws in the contactless transaction protocol and, by means of a 
protocol emulator, demonstrates the existence of the flaws as exploitable vulnerabilities in 
EMV cards and/or POS terminals. 
Chapter 6 describes the foreign currency flaw in the contactless transaction protocol which 
was identified using the analysis methodology described in Chapter 5.  Our research found 
that all EMV cards (Chip & PIN and contactless) have the foreign currency flaw.  However, 
it is the usability features, i.e. the wireless interface and no PIN that makes this flaw 
exploitable on contactless cards. 
Chapter 7 describes the contactless verify PIN protocol flaw, which again was identified 
using our analysis methodology.  This chapter demonstrates that the wireless interface 
directly impacts on one of the existing security features of EMV Chip & PIN cards  
Chapter 8 describes a potential solution for the vulnerabilities identified in the contactless 
transaction protocol by confirming that the transaction device is authentic. The solution aims 
to prevent unauthorised access to the contactless payment card which is at the root of many of 
the vulnerabilities identified by our research. 
Chapter 9 describes the nature of the research, involving real EMV contactless cards and 
terminals, and favoured a practical approach in developing our software and analysis tools.  
This chapter contains groundwork experiments required for this PhD thesis. 
Chapter 10 contains the conclusion to my PhD research.  It draws upon the results of my PhD 
research to evaluate the question “Contactless payments: usability at the cost of security?”. 
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Chapter 2.! Context of Electronic Payments 
 
This chapter gives an overview of the EMV (Europay, MasterCard, Visa) payment system, to give the 
reader an understanding of the global payments environment in which contactless payment cards 
exist.  The thesis focuses on EMV payment transactions (i.e. card purchases), this section, therefore, 
does not cover the details of other EMV transaction types; chargeback (refunds), referral (telephone 
payments) and pre-authorisation (hotels and rental cars).   
It will also discuss some of the latest developments in payments technologies as applicable to the 
research presented in this thesis.  First, it will introduce several terms used throughout this thesis 
which refer to the different parties involved in an EMV card payment. 
 
Figure 1 - Card Payment Operation 
Figure 1 illustrates the card payment process, it shows the relationship between the entities involved 
in a payment and the information flow between the entities. 
•! Customer / Cardholder, predominantly referred to as the cardholder in this thesis  
•! Issuing Bank is the customer’s bank  
•! Merchant is a shop or restaurant with a POS terminal,  
•! Acquirer Bank, is the merchant’s bank 
•! Card Payment Network is operated by the card payment schemes; MasterCard, Visa, 
American Express, JCB, Discover and UnionPay. 
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Customer / Cardholder: The cardholder is the person making a card payment in a shop or restaurant.  
The cardholder has a payment card issued to them by the bank which holds their account.  The 
customer uses their card at the POS terminal make a payment. 
Merchant:  refers to a shop, restaurant or business which has a POS terminal to receive payments 
from its customers.  The merchant must have a merchant account at the acquirer bank.  In the UK, 
merchant accounts were traditionally subject to more rigorous checks than customer / cardholder 
accounts. However, this has changed with the introduction of iZettle and PayPal mobile payment 
terminals (see section 2.6.2). 
POS Terminal: communicates with the customers EMV payment card to request a payment to the 
Merchant.  The card can authorise the payment immediately, in offline mode, or request additional 
online authorisation from the Issuing bank.   In online mode the POS terminal relays messages 
between the card and the Issuing Bank, which facilitate online authorisation of the transaction. 
Acquirer Bank: provides banking services to the merchant, including collection of payments from 
the POS terminal.  The acquirer bank performs initial checks to verify that the card is not lost or 
stolen.  The transaction is then routed to the appropriate Issuing Bank using the Primary Account 
Number (PAN), which is the 16 digit number printed on the front of the card, and the service code 
from the card data. 
The Acquirer bank is responsible for formatting the transaction data and sending it to the payments 
network which will forward it on to the Issuing Bank.  In the formatting process the acquirer bank will 
add many data fields which are captured by the POS terminal and are required by the Issuing Bank to 
complete the transaction. 
Card Payment Network: is the infrastructure which routes transaction requests from merchant, via 
the acquirer bank, to the issuer bank and returns the transaction approval / decline response from the 
issuer.  The EMV card payment network consists of several networks run by the card scheme 
providers, Visa, MasterCard, American Express, JCB, Discover and Union Pay.  Transactions for 
each card type are routed through the network of the associated card scheme provider, for example all 
Visa card transactions are routed through the Visa Network. 
Card Issuing Bank: The issuing bank holds the customer’s account and issues them with a payment 
card.  When the issuer receives a transaction request: 
•! the cardholder's account is checked to see if there are sufficient funds  
•! the cardholder's account balance is debited by the transaction amount 
•! a payment authorisation is forwarded through the card payment clearing system to the 
acquirer bank 
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The card Issuing Bank must deal with any disputes from the customer and is responsible for fraud 
losses where neither the cardholder nor the merchant is deemed to be at fault. 
2.1! EMV Smartcard Payment Technology 
EMV is a global specification for smartcard based payments, commonly termed “Chip & PIN”.  EMV 
represents a step forward in security from the magnetic stripe technology it replaces.  The improved 
security is based on the “Chip” which is capable of generating a cryptographic signature to validate 
transactions.  It also relies on the “PIN” which is used by the cardholder to authorise transactions and 
is harder to forge than the signature authorisation previously used with magnetic stripe cards. 
There are two distinct payment technologies covered by the EMV standards, contact Chip & PIN 
payments and contactless payments.  EMV is primarily an interoperability standard, it aims to ensure 
that all EMV payment cards are compatible with all ATMs and all POS terminals worldwide.  The 
objective is that the customer should always be able to use their card anywhere in the world, which is 
very convenient for the customer.  It also maximises the transaction fees generated for the acquirer 
and Issuing Banks. 
In addition to interoperability the EMV standards introduced significant security improvements over 
the magnetic stripe technology that preceded it.  As the Chip & PIN moniker suggests, EMV utilises a 
smartcard chip technology that provides significant security improvements over magnetic stripe cards.  
Key to these security improvements is the smartcard's ability to dynamically authorise transactions 
and provide proof of authorisation in the form of a cryptographic signature.  Magnetic stripe cards 
authorise transactions using static authorisation data [4], which can be easily copied as described in 
section 2.5.1. 
EMV Standards: The EMV standard defines the protocols, technology and information standards 
that the payment cards, ATMs and POS terminals must comply with to guarantee interoperability 
among various cards, POS terminals and ATMs.  The EMV standards also cover interoperability with 
magnetic stripe cards, ATMs and POS terminals. 
Global Deployment of EMV Technology: Figures released by EMVCo in May 2013 [5] report that 
globally there are 1.62 billion EMV payment cards in circulation and 23.8 million terminals (POS 
terminals, ATMs and vending machines).  The purpose of the EMV standards [6] [7] is to ensure that 
EMV payment cards work everywhere that the cardholder may wish to use their card.   The EMV 
standards also ensure that EMV payment cards and terminals are interoperable with magnetic stripe 
cards and terminals.  Magnetic stripe is the card payment standard which preceded EMV and it is still 
in operation in many countries such as the USA and China (at time of writing, May 2015). 
The EMV protocol standards must therefore incorporate competing (and sometimes conflicting) 
requirements from the card scheme providers, MasterCard, Visa, Amex, JCB, Diners, Discover, 
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UnionPay, the card Issuing Banks, the merchant acquirer banks as well as the financial regulators in 
each of the countries in which EMV operates.  Consequently, the EMV protocol standards are 
complex and contain many features to facilitate backward compatibility. 
Magnetic Stripe Compatibility: The EMV smartcard payment system is being adopted worldwide, 
replacing magnetic stripe.  This process has been a gradual migration with both payment systems 
supported in parallel.  Even in countries like the UK where there is 100% adoption of EMV cards, 
ATMs and POS terminals magnetic stripe must be supported (i) to allow visitors from other countries 
with magnetic stripe cards to use UK ATMs and POS terminals (ii) to allow UK cardholders to use 
EMV cards whilst visiting countries that use magnetic stripe technology. 
Backward Compatibility Legacy Data: The payment network that supports the new EMV payments 
technologies (Chip & PIN, contactless and mobile phone payments) is essentially the same payment 
network that supported the magnetic stripe payment cards.  As such, for a transaction to be 
successfully processed by the payment network EMV retains many data structures from magnetic 
stripe (e.g.  Track 2 equivalent data, service code and PVV) which would otherwise be redundant in a 
purely EMV smartcard environment. 
2.2! EMV Payment Cards (smartcards) 
The design imperative of the EMV payment cards is usability, to make it as convenient as possible for 
the cardholder to make the payment in all possible situations.  This is achieved by using the four 
payment methods identified in Figure 2; (1) Chip & PIN payments, identified here by the contact chip 
present on the card (2) contactless payments, cards with contactless payment capability display this 
logo (3) magnetic stripe payments, EMV cards have a magnetic stripe on the rear of the card for 
backward compatibility with countries, such as the USA, where EMV has not been adopted (4) online 
payments and telephone payments (termed card-not-present payments), are made using the card data 
printed on the front of the card and the CVV2 printed on the back. 
 
Figure 2 - EMV Card Payment Methods 
(1) Chip & PIN payments: the card is inserted into a POS terminal or ATM and communication with 
the card is established via the exposed contacts on the surface of the card.  In countries where EMV 
has been adopted, Chip & PIN is the preferred method of payment in shops, restaurants and at ATMs.  
Chapter 2.  Context of Electronic Payments 
9 
When Chip & PIN was introduced it brought two significant security improvements.  The smartcard 
chip was harder to clone than the existing magnetic stripe cards.  The PIN made it harder for criminals 
to use lost / stolen cards where previously a signature could be easily forged. 
(2) Contactless payments: utilises a wireless connection (NFC) to establish communication with the 
card.  Contactless payments are intended to be a faster and more convenient way to pay for small 
purchases than the existing Chip & PIN, whilst still retaining many of the security features.  
Contactless transactions share the same chip technology on the card and have a very similar protocol 
sequence to the Chip & PIN transactions.  The main difference is that the cardholder is no-longer 
required to input their PIN to authorise the transaction. 
(3) Magnetic stripe payments: the POS terminal / ATM reads the static card information from the 
magnetic stripe on the back of the card.  Magnetic stripe was the first electronic payment technology 
and is still (May 2015) the most widely used payment technology worldwide.  The information 
contained in the magnetic stripe includes the 16 digit card number, cardholder name, card expiry date, 
the PIN Verification Value (PVV) and the routing information for the payments network.  This data is 
in a specific format detailed in ISO-7813 [4] 
(4) Card-not-present payments: the information printed on the card (i.e. 16 digit card number, 
customer name, card expiry date and card CVV2) are used to make online payments and telephone 
payments.  The information is printed / embossed in accordance with ISO 7811 [8] 
2.3! EMV Smartcard Security Features 
EMV is based on smartcard technology, which has the processing power to support much more 
complex security features than the previous magnetic stripe cards.  The essential difference between 
an EMV smartcard and a magnetic stripe card is that the chip on the smartcard allows the EMV card 
to actively participate in the transaction process, by generating a non-repudiable cryptographic 
transaction approval.  This is not true of magnetic stripe cards where the POS terminals and ATMs 
simply use the static data contained in the magnetic stripe to approve the transaction. 
EMV cards are considered to be harder to clone than the magnetic stripe cards they replaced, because: 
•! EMV smart cards cryptographically approve transactions by generating an Application 
Cryptogram.  The cryptogram validates the transaction data and proves that the card which 
authorised the transaction is a genuine card. 
•! EMV smartcards provide secure, “tamper proof”, storage for the card’s private cryptographic 
keys and for the card’s PIN.  This means that although the data can be skimmed from an 
EMV smartcard, the private keys required to authorise a transaction cannot be copied, thereby 
preventing the EMV card from being cloned.  
Chapter 2.  Context of Electronic Payments 
10 
•! The technology required to skim the data from the smartcard chip on Chip & PIN cards 
Figure 3 is much more sophisticated than magnetic stripe skimmers Figure 7 
•! Magnetic stripe skimming devices Figure 7 would typically be placed externally on an ATM, 
Chip & PIN skimmers Figure 3 need to be placed inside the POS terminal which are now 
being made tamper proof to stop them being opened. 
•! In the early years of EMV the programmable smartcards required to create the clones were 
expensive and hard to obtain. 
•! Programming the smartcard functionality is more technically challenging than simply copying 
the data in magnetic stripe. 
 
Figure 3 - Chip & PIN Skimming Device [9] 
Figure 3 show the front and rear of the Chip & PIN skimming device.  What is notable about the Chip 
& PIN skimmer is the complexity of the circuitry and the fact that the circuit must be wafer thin to fit 
in the gap between the card and the electrical contacts in the POS terminal. 
2.4! Evolution of Card Payments 
The first universally accepted credit cards appeared in the 1950s, prior to which the larger merchants 
each had their own card payment scheme and the cards were not accepted anywhere else.   During the 
1960s and 1970s the number of outlets accepting card payments and the number of customers 
carrying credit cards steadily grew. 
 
Figure 4 - Card Imprinter 
 
Figure 5 - Card Imprint Slip 
Card payments were originally a paper-based transaction; a carbon paper impression of the card was 
taken using a card imprinter, Figure 4.  The raised printing (embossing) [8] on today’s credit and debit 
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cards (customer name, 16 digit card number and expiry date) allows transactions to be recorded by 
card imprinting.  The imprinter presses the carbon paper down onto the raised printing on the card 
leaving a copy of the card details behind.  
To complete the transaction the merchant also fills in the transaction details (item description, amount 
and date) and asks the customer to sign the card imprint slip, Figure 5.  The slips are posted to the 
bank for processing and the money would follow some days to a week later. 
In the 1980s and 1990s global electronic payment networks were developed to support the 
introduction of ATMs and electronic POS terminals.  Electronic payment gradually replaced the 
paper-based system, bringing benefits to customers, merchants and payments providers. 
! Electronic Payments 
When electronic payments were introduced they used magnetic stripe technology to allow payments 
cards to be read electronically by ATMs and by POS terminals.   
Electronic payments had the following major advantages over the paper-based payments: 
Cheaper: It cost the banks less to process each payment.  This in turn benefitted merchants who were 
charged less commission by the banks.  Finally it benefitted customers because more merchants were 
willing to accept card payments and in the case of some merchants who had a surcharge for card 
payments this was dropped. 
Faster: Merchants received their payments in minutes / hours rather than days / weeks.  This again 
encouraged more merchants to adopt card payments, thereby benefitting both customers and banks. 
More secure: In an online environment every transaction could be automatically checked for lost / 
stolen cards and accounts with insufficient funds.  This could be done in real-time whilst the customer 
was still in store.  Previously this could only be done by making a telephone call to the Issuing Bank, 
which was becoming increasingly impractical as the volume of credit card transactions increased. 
! Magnetic Stripe Technology 
Magnetic stripe was the first electronic payment technology.  It is also the simplest.  The magnetic 
stripe on the payment card contains two static data blocks “Track 1” and “Track 2”.  The two tracks 
store all of the data elements required (in a prescribed format) to authorise the transaction and route it 
to the appropriate Issuing Bank for payment [4]. 
2.5! Card Fraud Overview 
In this section I will give an overview of card fraud as it affects the global payments system.  Figure 6 
shows UK card fraud statistics from 1995 to 2014 [10] [11].  The statistics reveal that ratio between 
the different types of card fraud changes year on year.  In Figure 6 the blue line represents face-to-
face forms of card fraud, where stolen and counterfeit cards were used in shops and at ATMs.  The 
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red lines represent remote (card-not-present) forms of card fraud, where stolen card details were used 
to purchase goods over the telephone and online.  From the statistics it can be seen that the type of 
fraud has changed significantly since 1995.  In 1995 face-to-face fraud was the predominant form of 
fraud representing 92.3% the total UK card fraud and card-not-present fraud represented just 5.5%.  In 
2014 card-not-present fraud has increased to be the most common from of fraud representing 69.2% 
of total UK card fraud and face-to-face fraud has reduced to just 24.6%.  The green line depicts one 
particular type of card fraud, fraud committed abroad.  These statistics have been included as they 
illustrate a sharp increase in overseas card fraud in 2007 and the Issuing banks’ response to stop this 
particular type of fraud. 
 
Figure 6 - UK Card Fraud by Type (£millions) [10] [11] 
Figure 6 also shows the introduction of three significant security improvements to the card payments 
system (listed below) and their resulting impact on fraud patterns.   
(1)! EMV Chip & PIN cards introduced into the UK replacing the existing magnetic stripe cards.  The 
introduction of Chip & PIN cards was phased, starting in 2004 with the majority of cards replaced 
by the start of 2006. 
(2)! 2009 reported the first year on year decrease in total card fraud reported in the UK, this decrease 
is mainly attributed to adoptions of sophisticated fraud screening detection tools by the Issuing 
banks [12] 
(3)! In the UK the EMV Static Data Authentication (SDA) cards were replaced by Dynamic Data 
Authentication (DDA) and Combined Data Authentication (CDA) cards which perform additional 
cryptographic authentication, making them more secure than the original SDA cards [13] 
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Figure 6 illustrates that each time a new security feature is introduced to the card payment system the 
pattern of card fraud changes. It also shows that when a new security feature is successful in reducing 
card fraud in one particular area, in the following years, card fraud will increase in other areas.  The 
overall result being that the total value of card fraud has continued to steadily increase, despite a 
number of significant improvements in EMV card security during the period 1995 to 2014. 
For example, prior to 2004 magnetic stripe payment cards were vulnerable to cloning because of the 
magnetic stripe, section 2.5.1, and cards authorised by signature were very vulnerable to being lost in 
the mail before the customer had signed the card.  After 2004 the type of fraud committed moved 
towards cloned magnetic stripe cards being used overseas and “card not present” fraud (e.g. telephone 
payments).  Both of these fraud types side-stepped the new Chip and PIN security features of EMV by 
taking advantage of weaknesses in non-EMV payment streams.   
! Magnetic Stripe Card Cloning 
Magnetic stripe cards are extremely vulnerable to card cloning attacks  
•! the authorisation data on a magnetic stripe card is static 
•! magnetic stripe skimmers are small, cheap and easy to build into a malicious skimming 
device such as an ATM skimmer, Figure 7 
 
Figure 7 - ATM Magnetic Stripe Skimmer [14] 
Figure 7 shows an ATM card skimming device which includes both a magnetic stripe reader and a 
pinhole camera to capture the cardholder’s PIN.  The device can therefore capture all of the data 
required to create a cloned magnetic stripe card.  Figure 7 also illustrates that the skimmer is invisible 
to the untrained eye when in place on the ATM.  
This type of skimmer could also be used to capture the data for card-not-present fraud.  Capturing the 
the magnetic stripe data and using the pinhole camera to capture the 3 digit CVV2 from the reverse of 
the card. 
Chapter 2.  Context of Electronic Payments 
14 
! Future Trends of Card Fraud 
It is hard to predict what, where and how card fraud will occur.  As discussed in 2.5 the adaptable 
nature of fraud means whenever the banks act to implement a solution that prevents a given type of 
card fraud the criminals will immediately focus their attention on another weak point in the system 
and start exploiting that.   
A good analogy would be evolution through natural selection [15], where both sides are constantly 
evolving, new security measures from the banks and new fraud opportunities by the fraudsters.  It also 
follows from this analogy that there are periods when there is relatively little innovation from the 
banks there will be relatively little innovation from the fraudsters.  The converse is also true when the 
banks introduce a step change in security measures such as the introduction of EMV at which point 
there will be a corresponding explosion in innovation by the fraudsters to find new fraud revenue 
streams to replace the ones lost to the new security measures; this is analogous to a major extinction 
event in nature when all manner of new creatures arise to fill the void after the extinction event. 
Just such an extinction event is coming in the immediate future, with the phasing out of magnetic 
stripe cards, in those countries where it is still used.  Removing magnetic stripe will create an 
environment in which the fraudsters are forced to innovate, as they seek out a new type of fraud which 
produces the maximum return for the minimum risk and effort. 
! Phase-out of Magnetic Stripe 
The security features built into EMV make it difficult to use lost, stolen and counterfeit EMV 
payment cards in EMV compliant POS terminals and ATMs.  The majority of card fraud in the UK 
targets the magnetic stripe on the EMV cards, which bypasses the security features provided by the 
EMV smartcard technology.  The Magnetic stripe is present on EMV cards to support compatibility 
with countries where all of the ATMs and POS terminals are not EMV compliant (such as the USA). 
There is a global push by the leading card scheme providers MasterCard and Visa [3] [2] [1] to 
replace magnetic stripe technologies with smartcard based technologies such as EMV.  However, in 
countries where there has been a large investment in magnetic stripe technology the change to EMV 
represents significant investment in infrastructure, which has to date slowed the introduction of EMV 
into the USA, India, China and Brazil.  In all of these countries the process of introducing EMV has 
now started with a prediction that magnetic stripe will disappear over the next 5 years (to 2020). 
Once this process is complete and the magnetic stripe is removed from UK cards, as discussed in 
section 2.5, card fraud will adapt quickly to exploit next easiest target in the payment system.  The 
research presented in this PhD thesis demonstrates that contactless payment cards have security 
weaknesses, i.e. the wireless interface and no PIN, which potentially make contactless cards the next 
“low hanging fruit” for card fraud in the UK. 
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2.6! Future of Payments Technologies 
Payments technologies are traditionally very slow to change.  This is because the introduction of any 
new payment technology affects the global payment network; requiring changes to the back-end 
payment systems at thousands of card issuing banks and changes to the payment procedures and 
technology at millions of shops and restaurants (merchants) accepting card payments.  This makes it 
extremely expensive and complex to make any changes.  Table 1 compares the relative lifespan of the 
different card payment technologies as the primary global card payment technology.  It shows that (i) 
the rate of change is traditionally slow (ii) the speed of change is increasing (iii) there is typically a 
changeover period where one technology is phased out and replaced by another. 
Table 1 - Card Payment Technology Life Span 
Payment Technology Operational Years  Duration 
Emboss cards with imprinter and paper receipts 1950s to 1990s 40 years 
Magnetic stripe credit cards 1980s to present 30 years 
EMV smartcards (Chip & PIN) 2004 to present  10 years 
Contactless smartcards 2009 to present 5 years 
Mobile payments 2013 to present 2 years 
 
In contrast there are currently (2015) a number of emerging payment technologies which are either 
being introduced / piloted or are being proposed for introduction.  The model by which payment 
technologies are introduced is changing.  Traditionally the payment network in collaboration with the 
card Issuing banks, have designed and introduced new payment technologies in a top-down manner, 
with the merchants and consumers having very little influence on the process. 
New mobile phone payment technologies are being created by technology providers such as Google, 
Apple, PayPal and Square.  The technology companies are also working directly with merchants to 
build the payment networks required to support the new payment systems.  This fundamentally 
changes the way in which new technologies are introduced.  Instead of a top-down introduction of a 
single choice technology, there is now a competition between multiple technologies which can 
coexist, creating a race for acceptance by consumers, the merchants and the banks.  The technologies 
currently competing for acceptance can be categorised as shown in Table 2.  Some of these 
technologies will gain popularity and will be adopted while others will be less popular and will 
disappear. 
The following sections will discuss some of these technologies, look at technologies with a strong 
chance of being adopted and look at some interesting technology which may influence the future of 
payments. 
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Table 2 - Emerging Payment Technologies 
Category Example of the 
Technology 
Description 
Mobile Payment Google Wallet 
and 
ApplePay 
Google Wallet and ApplePay are in-store mobile 
payment technologies which allow you to put your 
existing credit / debit cards into a mobile phone 
based wallet.   
 Zapp Zapp is a mobile payment app which provides in-
store payments and peer 2 peer payments.  Several 
leading UK banks are integrating Zapp payment 
technology into their mobile banking apps 
Wearable 
Payment Tokens 
Barclays Festival 
Wristbands 
These are wearable devices which embed the 
functionality of an EMV contactless payment card. 
The Barclays wristbands are waterproof and shock 
proof, perfect for festivals where carrying money 
and/or cards is not convenient.  The wristband can 
make payments just like a contactless card.  The 
band is prepaid so minimises the risk if lost and 
can be recharged with cash or over the Internet. 
The wireless interface in contactless payments 
allows payment technology to be integrated into 
just about any wearable object. 
Mobile POS 
terminals 
PayPal mobile POS 
and 
iZettle mobile POS 
These are POS terminals that use a mobile phone 
as the connection to the payments network.  The 
mobile POS allows mobile traders to take card 
payments wherever they are, e.g.  the customer’s 
premises (plumbers, builders etc.) or at trade fairs.  
This is a significant step forward as it enables small 
traders to accept card payments where previously 
they could only accept cash or cheques. 
Peer 2 Peer 
Payments 
PayPal Bump This is a mobile App that allows payments to be 
made through the existing PayPal network.  The 
bump technology allows two mobile phones to pair 
and thereby initiate the payment.  This was the first 
app to popularise the concept of “split the bill”. 
 Barclay PingIT This is a mobile online banking app with added 
functionality that allows peer to peer payments 
between two users identified by their mobile phone 
numbers  
Mobile Banking Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds 
TSB, NatWest, 
Santander, Nationwide, 
Cooperative Bank etc.  
Many issuing banks provide a mobile app.  
However, these are essentially mobile access 
online banking services and not a payment app.   
Biometric 
Authentication 
MasterCard heartbeat 
authentication 
Each person has a unique ECG pattern, which the 
Nymi wristband to authenticate the wearer’s 
identity [16] [17].  Once authenticated the 
contactless payment can be made. 
 Iris, finger-print and 
face recognition. 
Smartphones allow payment apps to integrate 
various biometric authentication technologies.   
Continuous 
Authentication 
ePet movement 
authentication [18] 
Research has been carried out into monitoring a 
user’s gait and movements throughout the day to 
determine the users identity. 
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! Mobile Phone Payment Devices 
The vast majority of electronic payments are currently still card based.  However, mobile payments 
are gaining popularity in countries such as the United States, Japan and South Korea where there have 
been large scale user acceptance and national roll outs of mobile payment solutions.  Europe is 
lagging behind by a number of years following a number of pilot schemes which had limited user 
acceptance. 
Even in countries like the US where mobile payments are gaining user acceptance this is still very 
slow.  For instance card payments in the US had a total value of $4,520 billion [2] in 2013, in 
comparison the total value of mobile payments in the US 2013 was only $24 billion [19] which is 
0.5% of the total card transactions.  The worldwide total for mobile phone payments in 2013 was only 
$235 billion [19] which is a small total of worldwide card payments with the Gartner Group 
predicting that the largest growth in mobile payments will be in the area of money transfers rather 
than “in-store” payments [20]. 
The big players for mobile “in-store” payments in the United States are currently ApplePay and 
Google Wallet [19], with PayPal being the established player in person to person money transfers.  
For “in-store” payments both ApplePay and Google Wallet use NFC technology to emulate a 
contactless payment card.  This allows the mobile payment App to be fully backward compatible with 
existing POS terminal technology.  Unfortunately, adopting card emulation for compatibility does 
leave the mobile payment application open to the same vulnerabilities as the original card payments.  
Google Wallet and SamsungPay (LoopPay) payment Apps implement the magnetic stripe contactless 
transaction protocol which is the protocol used by contactless POS terminals in the United States.  
However, it should be noted that the EMV contactless transaction protocol [7] supports contactless 
magnetic stripe compatibility mode which in theory should allow European EMV POS terminals to 
accept payments from Google Wallet and ApplePay mobile devices. 
Visa and MasterCard are pushing for merchants and issuing banks in the United States to adopt EMV 
smartcard technology, replacing magnetic stripe starting in 2015 [1] [3] [2].  This would mean that 
Google Wallet and ApplePay would should support the EMV protocol, thereby speeding up its 
introduction into Europe. 
! Mobile POS Terminals 
Previously if a small merchant wanted to accept card payments, the only options was a POS terminal 
provided by a high street Bank or payments provider such as WorldPay.  The merchant would be 
subject to credit checks, the merchant had to guarantee a minimum value of card transactions per 
month and there was a monthly fee for the rental of the POS terminal.  All of which made it an 
expensive commitment to operate a POS terminal.  
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Traditional POS terminals require a landline telephone connection to the payments network, and for 
security reasons the POS terminal would be restricted to a single physical location by the bank 
restricting the POS to only connecting via a specific telephone number.  This business model works 
well for shops and restaurants which have a permanent address and predictable income but is less well 
suited to mobile trades-people and small independent businesses. 
Mobile POS terminals such as those offered by PayPal 
and iZettle, Figure 8, are much cheaper to purchase and 
operate than a high street bank issued POS terminal, with 
no monthly fees.  This makes them a viable alternative 
for small traders, such as builders, plumbers and 
electricians, to accept credit / debit card payments at the 
customer’s home.   
The mobile POS terminal consists of a dedicated 
hardware module which communicates with the EMV 
card to processes the payment, and an App on on the 
merchants mobile phone which communicates with the 
bank to authorise the payment.   
 
Figure 8 – Mobile POS Terminal (iZettle) 
 
2.6.2.1! Hardware Security 
The current implementations by iZettle and PayPal provide strong security because a dedicated 
hardware device provides a “trusted” hardware platform for all of the communications with the 
payment card and the cardholder.  This means that the cardholder’s PIN is not entered into the 
merchant’s mobile phone, which is treated as an “untrusted platform”.  The mobile phone provides 
data communications between the POS and the Issuing Bank and provides a user interface into which 
the merchant enters the transaction amount.   
Additional security is provided as the communications between the POS and the Issuer are encrypted 
meaning that the communications cannot be intercepted by the mobile phone or an internet man-in-
the-middle. 
2.6.2.2! Account Vetting Security 
The merchant vetting process to obtain a POS terminal from the high street banks was relatively 
comprehensive; they required (i) that the merchant held a business bank account with the bank (ii) 
background checks were performed on the merchant (iii) the merchant must show a business history 
that justified the requirement of a POS terminal.   
However, for our research we have applied for and received both an iZettle and a PayPal POS 
terminal, the application and vetting process was much simpler than the process enforced by the 
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banks.  We only had to supply details for a valid personal bank account, making this type of terminal 
vulnerable to criminal gangs using the bank accounts of money mules. 
! Peer-2-Peer Payments 
The traditional payment model is a payment requested by a merchant who is providing goods or 
services to a customer.  Peer-2-peer payments allow payments between individuals, such as splitting a 
bill in a restaurant, where previously cash would have been used. 
This technology is extremely convenient but does require all of the participants to have the same 
payments App on their mobile phone.  Popular peer-2-peer payment apps include PayPal Venmo, 
Google wallet, Dwolla and Square Cash. 
! Mobile Banking 
Mobile banking apps are provided by most of the high street banks in the UK and the US and provide 
functionality to allow customers to make payments such as bill pay and money transfer.  However, the 
mechanism used to make the payments utilises the online banking service back end.  The mobile app 
can be considered purely as a UI for the online banking service rather than an active participant in the 
payment activity and as such we are not considering it as part of this thesis. 
! Biometric Authentication 
An accepted security axiom is that good user authentication is based on “something you are, 
something you know, something you have”.  Biometric authentication satisfies “something you are” 
with the PIN number being “something you know” and the embedded secure element in the mobile 
device or smartcard providing the “something you have”.   
Payment applications based on smartphone can utilise the smartphone’s various built-in sensors 
(camera, accelerometer, microphone and touch sensors) to perform biometric authentication.  Face, 
Iris and fingerprint recognition are popular but the accuracy depends heavily upon the quality of the 
hardware built into the particular model of smartphone.  For example the fingerprint readers which 
read the ridge pattern on the finger are much easier to compromise than fingerprint readers which use 
the vein pattern in the fingertip to authenticate the user. 
Biometric authentication is an important step forward in payments security however, 
•! no single biometric has proven itself to be both accurate and hard to compromise 
•! authentication is heavily reliant on additional hardware, not available on all mobile devices or 
payment tokens 
! Wearable Tokens 
In the UK contactless payment technology has been incorporated into wearable payment tokens such 
as wristbands [21] and MasterCard have piloted contactless wristband payments technology which 
also incorporates continuous biometric authentication [16] [17].  These wearable payment devices will 
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help to promote the expansion of contactless payments, particularly in situations such as events and 
festivals where card payments or cash are not convenient.   
! Continuous Authentication 
User authentication in payments is currently very weak being only a 4 digit PIN which is extremely 
easy to acquire by “shoulder surfing” the cardholder at an ATM or by coercing the cardholder into 
revealing their PIN.  Biometric technologies can help by introducing “something you are” to the 
authentication process. However, biometric can suffer from accuracy issues if used in a mode where 
the technology is asked to authenticate right now from a single comparison.   
Continuous authentication expands the use of multiple biometrics to continuously asses the identity of 
the user so that when the technology is asked to authenticate it has multiple data points upon which to 
base its decision.  This greatly improves the accuracy and gives the opportunity for the authentication 
algorithm to compensate for individual poor quality biometric readings. 
Multimodal continuous authentication uses several complementary biometric measurements to 
increase the accuracy of the authentication process.  For instance, a mobile phone can use the 
accelerometers to continuously monitor the users gait and periodically (when the user turns the screen 
on) use the forward facing camera to perform face recognition.  The results of the two biometric 
measures would then be combined; the influence of each periodic face recognition being high when it 
is captured and decaying over time until the next face recognition is performed, the accelerometer gait 
recognition providing a measurement that is continually topped up. 
MasterCard have already run a trial with the Nymi heart monitor wristband that uses the wearers 
unique ECG for authentication [16] [17].  The MasterCard application uses contactless technology to 
communicate with the POS / ATM and make the payment.  It uses multimodal authentication by 
requiring the user to make a specific movement to activate the payment process, at which point the 
wristband decides to authenticate the payment or decline based upon the most recently collected ECG 
data.  The movement based activation process provides the secondary biometric data upon which the 
authentication will be based. 
Multimodal Continuous authentication techniques also have the option of asking the user to provide 
PIN authentication for the payment covering “something you know”.  In the case of a payment 
wristband the wristband itself becomes the “something you have”, to do this the wristband must have 
a secure element / uniquely identifiable chip, embedded into it.  
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2.7! Conclusion  
Contactless payments are the first of many new payment technologies being introduced to the EMV 
payment system.  By analysing the vulnerabilities that contactless payments have introduced we can 
better understand how those vulnerabilities impact the patterns of card payment fraud in the future.  
The new technologies, described in this section, will both combat fraud and create new opportunities 
for fraud, as shown by Figure 6. 
In the following sections I analyse the EMV transaction protocol and identify vulnerabilities 
introduced to the protocol by the new contactless payment technology.  I outline an analysis 
methodology that can be used to analyse future changes to the EMV protocol required for the 
introduction of subsequent payment technologies and identify potential vulnerabilities. 
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Chapter 3.! EMV Transaction Protocol 
 
This chapter describes the operation of the EMV transaction protocol.  The protocol is a sequence of 
messages exchanged between a POS terminal / ATM and an EMV card, requesting payment 
authorisation from the EMV payment card.  The transaction protocol sequence consists of a number 
of operations; selecting the card, requesting the payment, checking that the card is valid, checking that 
the cardholder is authorised to use the card and authorising the payment. 
The EMV specifications [6] [7] comprise 2392 pages and describe the data and operations required to 
perform the transaction steps.  However, the specifications do not contain a single definitive 
description of the EMV transaction protocol sequence.  Rather they contain a number of optional 
protocol sequence elements which can be tailored to the banking regulations in different countries and 
proprietary requirements of the different card types (MasterCard, Visa, American Express, JCB, 
Discover and UnionPay). 
3.1! Variants of the EMV Transaction Protocol 
There are nine variants of the EMV transaction protocol sequence in the EMV specifications 
dependent upon the card type and the payment method (Chip & PIN or contactless Figure 2):  
•! contact “Chip & PIN” transaction protocol  
•! kernel 1 - Visa contactless transaction protocol with online transaction authorisation support 
•! kernel 2 - MasterCard contactless transaction protocol  
•! kernel 3 – Visa fDDA contactless transaction protocol for offline only transactions 
•! kernel 4 - American Express contactless transaction protocol, 
•! kernel 5 – JCB contactless transaction protocol 
•! kernel 6 - Discover contactless transaction protocol 
•! kernel 7 – UnionPay contactless transaction protocol. 
•! contactless magnetic stripe transaction protocol 
These variants can be markedly different, for instance kernel 3 (Visa) fDDA is designed to always 
complete the transaction without requiring authorisation from the issuing bank whereas the kernel 2 
(MasterCard) always requests authorisation from the card issuing bank but may complete if the 
Issuing bank is unavailable.  The differences between the two transaction protocols has a direct 
impact on the security of Visa contactless cards.  The high value contactless foreign currency flaw, 
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described in Chapter 6, is only applicable to the kernel 3 fDDA protocol.  Kernels 1,2,4,5 and 6 would 
detect the attack when the protocol requests online transaction authorisation from the Issuing bank. 
3.2! Structure of EMV Transaction Protocol 
All transaction protocol sequences comprise three stages;  
•! card authentication 
•! cardholder verification 
•! transaction authorisation 
Each of the three stages has a number of options dependent on the capabilities of the of the card and 
of the POS terminal / ATM.   
Card Authentication: in the EMV transaction the POS terminal / ATM authenticates the card by 
requesting a digital signature from the card.  EMV supports three methods of generating the signature 
Static Data Authentication (SDA), Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA) and Combined Data 
Authentication (CDA).   
Cardholder Verification: during the transaction the POS terminal / ATM confirms the identity of the 
cardholder.  The method used to verify the cardholder is dependent on the type of card and the type of 
transaction being performed.  The options are, the cardholder enters their PIN, the cardholder provides 
a signature on paper or, in the case of contactless transactions, there is no cardholder verification. 
Transaction Authorisation: on completion of the transaction the card generates an Application 
Cryptogram (AC) which encodes the final authorisation decision, accept or decline, along with the 
details of the transaction.  There are two options for transaction authorisation, online and offline.  
Offline authorisation is performed by the card alone.  During online authorisation the POS / ATM 
connects to the Issuing bank, authorises the transaction by producing an Issuer Application 
Cryptogram, which the card then countersigns to confirm Issuers transaction authorisation.  
The options in transaction protocol allow the EMV protocol to support interoperability between the 
smartcards, POS terminals and ATMs across the 76 countries currently operating EMV payments.  
The options also allow the card scheme providers to include proprietary functionality specific to their 
cards within the transaction protocol. 
Figure 9 shows the three stages of the transaction protocol sequence and the options available within 
each  stage, the diagram illustrates the complexity of the transaction protocol sequence.  One of the 
assertions of this PhD thesis is that this complexity can lead to reduced security in the EMV 
transaction protocol. 
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Figure 9 - EMV Transaction Protocol 
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3.3! Card Authentication 
EMV supports three distinct card authentication methods, Static Data Authentication (SDA), Dynamic 
Data Authentication (DDA) and Combined Data Authentication (CDA) [6] [22].  All of which use an 
RSA digital signature to authenticate the card.  The POS terminal / ATM authenticates the digital 
signature provided by the card using its own copy of the Certificate Authority (CA) public key 
applicable for that card type, see Figure 10 and Figure 11. 
The choice between the different authentication methods, SDA, DDA and CDA, has, to a certain 
extent, been driven by the processing power available on the card to perform the cryptographic 
authentication process necessary for the different authentication methods: 
SDA the cards return a static RSA digital signature, generated by the Issuer and written to the card 
during manufacture, which requires no cryptographic processing by the card.  SDA cards only 
support plaintext PIN verification, which does not require any cryptographic processing. 
DDA the card dynamically generates an RSA digital signature of the transaction data.  DDA cards 
support both plaintext and enciphered PIN verification.  The PIN is RSA enciphered by the 
POS terminal / ATM using the card’s own public key. 
CDA the card dynamically generates an RSA signature of the Application Cryptogram (AC).  CDA 
cards support both plaintext and enciphered PIN verification. 
All three card types (SDA, DDA and CDA) support the cryptographic processing required to generate 
and validate Application Cryptograms in the Transaction Authorisation phase.  The Application 
Cryptograms are an 8-byte Message Authentication Code (MAC) generated over the transaction data 
using either the 3-DES or AES algorithm. 
In the UK the earliest EMV cards, issued in 2004, were SDA cards which required the least 
processing power.  By 2009 the processing power of smartcards had increased and the cost had 
decreased which allowed SDA cards to be replaced by DDA cards and CDA cards.  In the UK, since 
2009, the majority of cards are DDA, however, in countries such as Poland SDA cards are still very 
common. 
! Static Data Authentication (SDA) 
The POS terminal authenticates an SDA card by verifying the RSA digital signature provided by the 
card.  Figure 10 shows the SDA card authentication process.  The SDA card has a static signature 
which is generated by the Issuer, signed using the Issuers private key, and written to the SDA card 
during manufacture.  The Issuer public key / private key pair are generated by the CA using the CA’s 
private key.  The SDA digital signature is validated using the CA public key stored on the POS 
terminal / ATM and the Issuer public key provided by the card.   
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Figure 10 – SDA card authentication process 
See section 3.3.4 for further details of the RSA Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) used for SDA, DDA 
and CDA cards. 
Vulnerabilities of Static Data Authentication (SDA) 
SDA payment cards are the simplest and the cheapest card variant supported by EMV, it is also 
considered the least secure.  The SDA cards are considered to be an improvement on the magnetic 
stripe cards they replaced because of the physical security features explained in section 2.3.  However, 
SDA cards, have a static authorisation signature which is used to approve every transaction, this 
makes SDA cards vulnerable to cloning in attacks such as the YES card attack [23].  
! Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA) 
DDA cards generate a unique RSA signature (SDAD) for each transaction.  The digital signature 
encodes the transaction data and an unpredictable number generated by the POS terminal / ATM for 
each transaction, Table 3.  This prevents an attacker from recording the SDAD signature and creating 
a cloned card because the SDAD changes for each new transaction.  Encoding the transaction data in 
the digital signature also serves to ensure that transaction data has not been changed from that 
requested by the POS terminal / ATM, thereby preventing man-in-the-middle attacks changing 
transaction data, such as amount. 
Table 3 details minimum recommended data which should be included in the DDA digital signature.  
Issuers may include additional fields.  However, in our experiments (Chapter 5, Chapter 6, Chapter 7 
and Chapter 9) the majority of cards tested were kernel 3 DDA cards, which produced SDAD 
signatures with only the fields detailed in Table 3. 
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Table 3 – SDAD minimum recommended data fields 
Data Field Purpose of the Data 
Transaction Amount  Ensures that the card is validating the correct value of 
transaction 
Transaction Date  Ensures that the card is validating the correct date of 
transaction 
Unpredictable Number (POS / ATM)  Random data to prevent cloned cards using pre-recorded 
digital signatures in pre-play attacks 
Unpredictable Number (card) Random data inserted by the card to prevent plaintext 
oracle attacks on the card’s private key. 
 
Figure 11 illustrates the process of validating the DDA signature.  The POS terminal / ATM uses its 
own copy of the CA public key to validate the Issuer public key certificate provided by the card.  The 
resulting Issuer public key is used to validate the card’s public certificate.  The card’s public key is 
used to validate the DDA authentication signature (SDAD). 
 
Figure 11 – DDA card authentication process 
See section 3.3.4 for further details of the RSA Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) used for SDA, DDA 
and CDA cards. 
Vulnerabilities of Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA)  
The data included in the DDA dynamic signature, Table 3, changes for each transaction.  This protects 
DDA cards from cloning attacks and pre-play attacks.  There are theoretical attacks on DDA signature 
generation, Degabriele et al. (2012) [24] describes and attack on the RSA cryptography and Bond et 
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al. (2014) [25] describes an attack on and the random number generation.  These attacks are possible 
but are impractical and therefore unlikely to be exploited, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
DDA cards are vulnerable to a number of attacks which down grade the transaction authorisation 
options described in Figure 9.  For instance, Murdoch et al. (2010) [13] identifies a security weakness 
which exploits the options available in the cardholder verification stage.  The POS terminal is tricked 
into believing that the card has verified the cardholder’s PIN and the card believes that the cardholder 
has been verified by signature on paper.  Having multiple options of cardholder verification options 
allows a man-in-the-middle to skip the cardholder verification stage by manipulating both sides of the 
transaction (POS and card) into believing the step has already been performed. 
! Combined Data Authentication (CDA) 
CDA authentication is a variation of DDA authentication.  Just like DDA, the CDA cards generate a 
dynamic signature which is different for each transaction.  CDA improves upon DDA by encoding the 
Application Cryptogram (AC) into the signature rather than the transaction data.  This links the 
SDAD signature used by the POS terminal / ATM to verify the transaction, with the AC used by the 
Issuer to verify the transaction. 
The process of authenticating a CDA digital signature is exactly the same as the authentication 
process for DDA cards, Figure 11, only the data encoded in the signature is changed.  The data 
included in the CDA signature includes the AC, it may also include the transaction data fields 
included in the DDA digital signature Table 3, thereby providing an additional security check. 
Vulnerabilities of Combined Data Authentication (CDA)  
CDA is designed to prevent a specific category of offline “wedge” attacks which exploit the fact that 
in a DDA transaction, the issuer validates the AC while the POS terminal validates the SDAD, neither 
validates both the CA and the SDAD together.  However, CDA would still be vulnerable to down 
grade attacks such as Murdoch et al. (2010) [13] and Roland and Langer (2013) [26]. 
! RSA Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for SDA, DDA and CDA cards 
Validating the RSA digital signatures, generated by SDA, DDA and CDA cards, relies upon a three-
tier PKI; CA => Issuer => card.  The CA is the card scheme provider, Visa, MasterCard, American 
Express, JCB, Discover or UnionPay, of the card.  The CA signs the Issuer’s public key / private key 
pair, which then allows the Issuer to generate SDA digital signatures and RSA public / private key 
pairs for DDA / CDA cards.  The card’s private key is used to validate the RSA digital signature. 
SDA card authentication, Figure 10, and DDA / CDA card authentication, Figure 11, both start with 
the POS terminal / ATM authenticating the Issuer public key provided by the card.  The POS / ATM 
uses it own copy of the CA public key to ensure that the key provided by the card is issued by a 
recognised issuing bank. 
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In SDA card authentication the Issuer public key is then used to validate the SDA digital signature. 
In DDA / CDA the issuer public key is used to validate the card’s public key, which is then used to 
validate the DDA / CDA digital signature. 
The issuer public key and card public keys have expiry dates encoded into them which limit the 
lifespan of the keys.  The card public key includes the 16 digit card number (PAN) and the Issuer 
public key contains the Issuer Identifier, which allows the POS terminal to compare these values to 
the plaintext equivalent provided by the card.  This ensures that the card data matches the digital 
signature used to authenticate the card. 
3.4! Cardholder Verification 
Cardholder verification is governed by the capabilities of the card, the capabilities of the POS 
terminal and upon the type of transaction being performed.  The card publishes a list of its capabilities 
in the Cardholder Verification Method (CVM).  The CVM list also specifies the order of priority in 
which the POS terminal should select the cardholder verification method to be used. 
The options for cardholder verification are  
•! PIN entry by the cardholder 
•! cardholder signature on paper 
•! no cardholder verification (used for contactless payments). 
! Cardholder verification by PIN 
This is the preferred method of verifying the cardholder in contact “Chip & PIN” transactions.  The 
cardholder enters their PIN into the PIN pad on the POS terminal / ATM.  The PIN can be validated 
by the Issuer (online) or by the card (online). Note; this is independent of the online / offline 
transaction authorisation described in section 3.5. 
Online PIN verification performed by the issuer; the POS terminal / ATM transmits the PIN 
entered by the cardholder to the Issuer for verification.  The PIN is RSA enciphered prior to 
transmission to the Issuer using the Issuer public key provided by the card.  Online PIN verification is 
the preferred method for SDA cards as this prevents the YES card attack.   
Offline PIN verification performed by the card; the PIN is sent to the card for verification.  The 
PIN can be transmitted in plaintext or RSA enciphered using the card’s public key. The card responds 
with PIN OK or, if the PIN was incorrect, an error code which includes the number of PIN attempts 
remaining. 
Plaintext PIN; the EMV specification does not allow online PIN verification, as this would mean that 
the PIN was transmitted over public networks unencrypted.  SDA cards only support plaintext PIN 
verification as the card does not support RSA encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify functionality. 
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Enciphered PIN; the PIN is RSA enciphered for both online verification by the issuer and offline 
verification by the card.  SDA cards do not support enciphered PIN.  DDA and CDA both support 
enciphered PIN.  
Contactless cards do not require PIN verification functionality as contactless transactions do not 
require cardholder verification.  Contactless transactions should always use the no cardholder 
verification option in Figure 9.  However, our research in Chapter 7 shows that many Visa cards 
support contactless PIN verification.  This demonstrates that the multiple options in protocol can be 
exploited to produce undesired functionality [27]. 
! Cardholder verification by signature 
Cardholder verification by PIN is an option available on SDA, DDA and CDA cards.  The CVM list 
on the card determines if the card supports verification by signature.  The CVM list is structured in 
such a way that if the card and terminal support PIN verification this will always take priority over 
verification by signature. 
Verification by signature is only available at attended POS terminals.  The process involves the POS 
terminal printing the merchant receipt, the cardholder signs the receipt, the attendant checks the 
signature and presses a button on the POS terminal to indicate that the signature is approved. 
! No cardholder verification 
Contactless transactions do not require the cardholder to be verified by PIN or by signature.  The 
trade-off being that contactless transactions are restricted to low value transactions.   
“No Cardholder Verification” is intended for contactless transactions only, therefore, contact “Chip & 
PIN” transactions should not be able to select this option in Figure 9.  No cardholder verification is 
always the lowest priority option in the CVM list and therefore the last to be selected if no other CVM 
options are available. 
3.5! Transaction Authorisation 
Transaction authorisation is achieved in a bidirectional exchange of Application Cryptogram between 
the card and the Issuer, with the POS terminal / ATM acting as the communication channel between 
the card and the Issuer.  The Transaction Authorisation stage in Figure 9 shows the sequence and flow 
of cryptograms between the Issuer and the card. 
The cryptograms encode the outcome of the transaction authorisation decision.  There are a number of 
different types of cryptogram which can be generated by the card or the Issuer:  
TC Transaction Certificate, is generated by the card, indicating that the transaction is approved.  
The TC is a cryptographically secure token which the POS / ATM sends to the Issuer as 
proof that the transaction was approved by a genuine card.  The TC is sent along with the 
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transaction details allowing the bank to validate the transaction data supplied by the POS / 
ATM against the transaction approved by the card. 
ARQC Authorisation Request Cryptogram, is generated by the card to request online confirmation 
of the transaction by the Issuer. 
APRC Authorisation Request Cryptogram, is generated by the Issuer in response to ARQC 
produced by the card and indicates the Issuer’s authorisation decision to approve or decline 
the transaction. 
AAC Application Authentication Cryptogram, is generated by the card to indicate that the 
transaction was declined.  
The POS / ATM sends a Generate AC command to the card to request that the card generates a 
cryptogram.  The command includes the type of cryptogram being requested TC, ARPC or AAC to 
indicate the desired response from the card. 
The card’s response is dependent on the type of cryptogram being requested and the order of 
precedence (TC => ARQC => AAC).  The card will only return a cryptogram of the same or lower 
precedence than that requested by the POS / ATM.  The card will respond as detailed in Table 4 
Table 4 – First Generate AC - Application Cryptogram Request / Response Mapping 
Cryptogram requested by POS / ATM Response of the card 
TC the POS terminal / ATM request final 
transaction authorisation 
TC transaction approved, no further action. 
ARQC the card request that requests online 
completion of the transaction. The 
ARQC also encodes the transaction data 
to be send to the Issuer. 
AAC transaction is declined, no further action. 
ARQC the POS terminal / ATM requests 
online completion of the transaction. 
ARQC the card generates an ARQC cryptogram 
encoding the transaction data to be send 
to the Issuer. 
AAC transaction is declined, no further action. 
AAC the POS terminal / ATM requests a 
transaction declined cryptogram.  
AAC the card generates AAC transaction 
declined to send to the Issuer. 
 
The transaction authorisation stage Figure 9 includes two Generate AC commands.  In the second 
Generate AC command the POS terminal / ATM sends the ARPC generated by the Issuer to the card.  
The ARPC encodes the Issuers transaction approve / decline decision. The card decrypts the ARPC 
and responds with the appropriate cryptogram, TC if the Issuer approved the transaction and ACC if 
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declined. The second Generate AC command therefore has a limited set of possible requests and 
possible responses as detailed in Table 5. 
Table 5 – Second Generate AC – Application Cryptogram Request / Response Mapping 
Cryptogram requested by POS / ATM Response of the card 
ARPC the POS terminal / ATM send the 
ARPC generated by the Issuer.  
TC transaction approved.  
AAC transaction is declined. 
AAC the POS terminal / ATM requests a 
transaction declined cryptogram.  
AAC the card generates AAC transaction 
declined to send to the Issuer. 
! Transaction Authorisation Modes 
Transaction Authorisation has two modes.  In offline mode the card alone authorises the payment.  In 
online mode the card issues an ARQC cryptogram to request authorisation from the Issuer, the issuer 
responds with the ARPC authorisation decision cryptogram which the card confirms returning the 
final transaction authorisation cryptogram TC or AAC to the POS terminal / ATM. 
Figure 9 illustrates that both the POS terminal / ATM and the card are involved in the decision to 
complete the transaction in online mode or offline mode.  The POS terminal / ATM can request online 
completion in which case the transaction will be completed online.  If the POS terminal / ATM 
requests offline completion the card can override the request by requesting online completion, in 
which case there is a negotiation between the card and the POS terminal / ATM.  
Offline mode transaction authorisation 
In offline transaction authorisation the POS / ATM requests a final authorisation decision, TC 
cryptogram, from the card on the first Generate AC request.  If the card is willing to authorise the 
transaction offline, it generates the TC cryptogram and the transaction is complete.  In this, fully 
offline case, the Issuer is not involved in authorising the transaction. 
Online mode transaction authorisation 
Online transaction completion can be requested by either the POS terminal / ATM or by the card.  The 
POS terminal / ATM requests online completion of the transaction by sending ARQC in the first 
Generate AC command.  If the POS terminal / ATM requests offline completion of the transaction, 
the card can request online completion by replying to the POS terminal / ATMs first Generate AC 
command with an ARQC cryptogram.   
Whether requested by the POS / ATM or by the card the ARQC produced by the card is sent to the 
Issuer.  The issuer verifies the ARQC produced by the card and responds with an ARPC containing 
the Issuers final accept / decline decision.  The POS terminal / ATM passes the Issuer ARPC to the 
card in the second Generate AC command.  The card will then produce either a TC if the Issuer 
accepted the transaction or an AAC if the Issuer declined. 
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! Application Cryptogram Data and Encryption 
The cryptograms (ARQC, ARPC, TC and AAC) which pass between the card and the Issuing Bank 
are 3-DES encoded using a shared symmetric key [28].  The POS / ATM simply passes the messages 
from the card to the Issuer and back, the POS / ATM cannot read or even verify the authenticity of the 
cryptograms as this requires the symmetric key which only the card and the Issuer possess. 
The 3-DES encoded cryptograms are 8 bytes in length and contain the transaction data, Table 6, and 
the type of the cryptogram either ARQC, ARPC, TC or AAC.  Encoding these fields into the 
cryptogram ensure that the details of the transaction cannot be changed from those approved by the 
Issuer / card.  As with the SDAD the AC contains unpredictable / random data to prevent card cloning 
and pre-play attacks. 
Table 6 - Application Cryptogram Minimum Recommended Data Fields 
Value Source Comment 
Transaction Amount POS / ATM The 3-DES encoding of the AC by the card ensures that 
the transaction amount cannot be altered by a man-in-
the-middle from that approved by the card. 
Amount Other POS / ATM Amount other is typically used for cashback at POS 
terminals (e.g.  groceries “transaction amount” = £43.27 
and cashback “amount other” = £20.00) 
Terminal Country POS / ATM Location of the POS / ATM. 
Terminal Verification 
Results (TVR) 
POS / ATM The TVR contains a record of the authorisation 
processes performed by the POS / ATM.  However, the 
TVR only records failure conditions it does not record 
the steps which were successfully carried out. 
Transaction Currency POS / ATM Currency can be different from country  
Transaction Date POS / ATM  
Transaction Type POS / ATM  
Unpredictable Number  POS / ATM The transaction data includes a 4 byte random number 
which prevents replay attacks 
Application Interchange 
Profile (AIP) 
ICC (card)  
Application Transaction 
Counter (ATC) 
ICC (card) The inclusion of the card’s transaction counter prevents 
the cryptogram from being used to authorise multiple 
payments. 
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3.6! Contactless Transaction Protocol 
The EMV contactless payment specifications [7] include seven variants of the contactless transaction 
protocol; kernel 1 - Visa, kernel 2 - MasterCard, kernel 3 - Visa fDDA, kernel 4 - American Express, 
kernel 5 JCB, kernel 6 Discover and kernel 7 – UnionPay fDDA). 
Within these seven variants there are two distinctly different protocol sequences;  
•! kernels 3 and 7 use the fast Dynamic Data Authentication (fDDA) protocol which is an 
offline only transaction authorisation protocol.  fDDA is designed to minimise the time 
required to process the transaction and thereby minimise the time the card must be present in 
the POS terminal1 NFC field. 
•! kernels 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 contactless transaction protocols more closely follow the generic EMV 
transaction protocol sequence, Figure 9, used in “Chip & PIN” transactions.  They support 
online and offline transaction authorisation and CDA and DDA card authentication. 
For brevity I will refer to two kernels which are typical examples of the different protocol sequences; 
kernel 3 (Visa) to represent the fDDA protocol and kernel 2 (MasterCard) to represent online / offline 
capable transaction protocols. 
Both protocol sequences, kernel 3 and kernel 2, follow the structure of the transaction authorisation 
sequence described in Figure 9, having a card authentication stage, a cardholder verification stage and 
a transaction authorisation stage. 
Card Authentication 
Kernel 3 supports DDA card authentication only, whereas, kernel 2 supports both DDA card 
authentication and CDA card authentication.  
Cardholder Verification 
Contactless payments are designed for speed and convenience, therefore do not require the cardholder 
to spend time entering a PIN or signing for the transaction.  Both kernel 2 and kernel 3 support this 
using the “no cardholder verification” option in Figure 9. 
Transaction Authorisation 
This is where the differences between kernel 2 and kernel 3 are most significant.  The transaction 
authorisation process used in kernel 2 is the same at that described in Figure 9.  Kernel 2 has full 
support for both online and offline transaction authorisation.  The kernel 2 protocol includes two 
                                                      
 
1 Contactless payments valid for purchases at POS terminals only, ATM cash withdrawals are not currently part 
of the EMV contactless specification. 
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Generate AC commands which allows the full exchange of Application Cryptograms between the 
card and the Issuer. 
Kernel 3 fDDA only supports offline transaction authorisation.  The card will either approve the 
transaction offline or decline the transaction based on the value of this transaction and the cumulative 
value of the offline transactions performed by the card since the last online transaction.   
Kernel 3 simplifies the protocol down to a single command, Get Processing Options, which passes the 
transaction details to that card.  Kernel 3 combines the card authentication stage, producing the 
SDAD, and the transaction authorisation stage, generating the final TC (transaction approved) 
cryptogram into this single command. 
If a kernel 3 card responds by generating ARQC (online request) or AAC (transaction declined) the 
kernel 3 fDDA transaction is ended and the POS terminal must run a “Chip & PIN” contact 
transaction.  There is no option in kernel 3 fDDA for online completion of the transaction. 
! Comparison between “Chip & PIN”, kernel 3 and kernel 2 protocols 
In this section the diagrams compare the Chip & PIN transaction protocol, Figure 12, kernel 2 
transaction protocol, Figure 13, and kernel 3 transaction protocol, Figure 14.   
The Chip & PIN transaction protocol implements all three stages of the generic EMV transaction 
protocol, card authentication, cardholder verification and transaction authorisation.  Figure 12 shows a 
Chip & PIN transaction with the online transaction authorisation . 
 
Figure 12 - Chip & PIN Transaction Protocol (online) 
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The kernel 2 contactless protocol sequence, Figure 13, closely follows the Chip & PIN transaction 
protocol.  The only significant difference between being that PIN verification process is not required 
in the contactless transaction protocol.  In Figure 13 the messages involved in PIN verification are 
greyed out to indicate that they are not present in the kernel 2 transaction protocol. 
 
Figure 13 - Kernel 2 Contactless Transaction (online) 
The kernel 3 fDDA transaction protocol, Figure 14, is fundamentally different from kernel 2 and the 
generic EMV “Chip & PIN” transaction protocol.  The protocol is stripped down to a single 
command, Get Processing Options, which sends the transaction data plus a random nonce to the card.  
The card responds with the card authentication SDAD, the TC (transaction approved) cryptogram and 
the plaintext card data required by the Issuer.  This completes the transaction. 
 
Figure 14 – Kernel 3 fDDA Contactless Transaction (offline only) 
The kernel 3 protocol sequence is very fast, completing in less than 500ms in our experiments [29]. 
However, to achieve the fast contactless transaction times the protocol sequence drops the 
authorisation request cryptogram (ARQC) and response from the issuer (ARPC).  This reduces the 
capability of the Issuer to catch fraudulent transactions. 
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One of the identified impacts of this difference between the two protocols is that kernel 3 (Visa) 
contactless cards are vulnerable to the foreign currency flaw, discussed in Chapter 6, whereas kernel 2 
(MasterCard) contactless cards are not vulnerable.   
3.7! Magnetic Stripe Contactless Transaction Protocol 
The magnetic stripe contactless transaction protocol is an alternative to the EMV contactless protocol, 
implemented in countries such as the USA who have implemented contactless payments in a magnetic 
stripe payment environment.   
A magnetic stripe contactless transaction simulates swiping a magnetic stripe card through the 
magnetic stripe reader in the POS terminal. 
The POS terminal sends the Get Processing Options command to the contactless card.  The card 
responds with all of the data required to replicate a magnetic stripe; the track 1 data, the track 2 data 
and the dynamic CVV. 
Kernels 2,3,4 and 6 include support for magnetic stripe contactless protocol for compatibility with 
countries still using magnetic stripe.  This makes EMV contactless cards vulnerable to the combined 
pre-play / downgrade attack described by Roland and Langer (2013) [26]. 
3.8! Conclusion 
This brings us back to our original question “has usability been improved at the cost of security?”.  
EMV is extremely flexible because, as Figure 9 illustrates, EMV security is designed as a set of 
optional authentication processes.  However, it is these options that make the EMV transaction 
protocol vulnerable to attacks which “downgrade” the transaction protocol to a lower security option, 
such as, Murdoch et al. (2010) [13] and Roland and Langer (2013) [26] and Barisani et al. (2011) 
[30].   
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Chapter 4.! Literature Review of EMV Protocol 
Security Vulnerabilities 
 
This literature review presents research related to analysis of the security of the EMV protocol and the 
underlying smartcard technologies. The review is divided into four categories: 
•! structured / formal analysis of the EMV protocol 
•! exploitable vulnerabilities in the EMV protocol 
•! exploitable vulnerabilities in EMV contactless technology 
•! review of known vulnerabilities in the EMV payment system. 
In this literature review I draw out the recurring issues, identified in the introduction, the wireless 
interface, PIN entry not required and the increased complexity due to the seven different contactless 
kernels.  This will be done by relating these issues to the selected research papers discussed in this 
chapter: 
4.1! Research Categories 
This section lists the academic research papers included in this literature review and identifies which 
of the four categories to which they are applicable. 
Structured / Formal Analysis of the EMV Protocol 
De Ruiter and Poll (2011) “Formal Analysis of the EMV Protocol Suite” 
De Koning Gans and De Ruiter (2012) “SmartLogic tool: Analysing & testing smartcard protocols”  
Choudary (2010) “The Smart Card Detective: A HandHeld EMV Interceptor,” 
Aarts (2013) “Formal models of bank cards for free” 
Ouerdi et al. (2013) “Abstract tests based on SysML models for EMV Card”. 
Pasquet et al. (2008) “Secure Payment with NFC Mobile Phone in the SmartTouch Project” 
Ming-hui et al. (2007) “Security Mechanism Research of EMV2000 
Exploitable Vulnerabilities in the EMV Protocol 
Murdoch et al. (2010) “Chip & PIN is Broken” 
Roland and Langer (2013) “Cloning credit cards: a combined pre-play and downgrade attack on EMV 
contactless” 
Bond et al. (2014) “Chip and Skim: cloning EMV cards with the pre-play attack” 
Barisani et al. (2011) “Chip & PIN is definitely broken” 
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Degabriele et al. (2011) “On the Joint Security of Encryption and Signature in EMV” 
Anderson et al. (2005) “Chip & SPIN” 
Emms et al. (2014) “Harvesting High Value Foreign Currency Transactions from EMV Contactless 
Credit Cards Without the PIN” 
Emms et al. (2013) “Risks of Offline Verify PIN on Contactless Cards.” 
Exploitable Vulnerabilities in EMV Contactless Payment Technology 
Francis et al. (2012) “Practical Relay Attack on Contactless Transactions by Using NFC Mobile 
Phones” 
Roland and Scharinger (2013) “Applying Relay Attacks to Google Wallet” 
Roland et al. (2012) “Relay Attacks on Secure Element-Enabled Mobile Devices: Virtual 
Pickpocketing Revisited” 
Roland et al. (2012) Practical Attack Scenarios on Secure Element-Enabled Mobile Devices 
Kfir and Wool (2005) “Picking Virtual Pockets using Relay Attacks on Contactless Smartcard 
Systems” 
Diakos et al. (2015) “Eavesdropping near-field contactless payments: a quantitative analysis” 
Hancke (2011) “Practical Eavesdropping and Skimming Attacks on HF RFID Tokens.” 
Kirshenbaum and Wool (2006) “How to Build a Low-Cost Extended-Range RFID Skimmer” 
Oren et al. (2013) Range Extension Attacks on Contactless Smart Cards 
Review of Known Vulnerabilities in the EMV Payment System 
Markantonakis et al. (2009) Attacking smart card systems: Theory and Practice 
Anderson (2007) “RFID and the middleman” 
Anderson et al. (2005) “Chip & SPIN”  
Henzl (2012) “Security of Contactless Smart Cards” 
Anderson (1993) “Why Cryptosytems Fail”. 
Anderson et al. (2012) “Might Financial Cryptography Kill Financial innovation?” 
Murdoch and Anderson (2014) “Security Protocols and Evidence: Where Many Payment 
Systems Fail”. 
Anderson and Moore (2013) “The Economics of Information Security and Privacy”  
Moore and Anderson (2011) “Economics and Internet Security” 
4.2! Structured / Formal Analysis of the EMV Protocol 
The primary contributions of this PhD thesis are the analysis methodology of the EMV protocol, 
presented in Chapter 5 and the previously undocumented vulnerabilities in the EMV protocol, which 
were identified using the analysis methodology and are presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.  There 
is a limited amount of published research into structured analysis of the EMV protocol itself, our 
analysis is therefore a significant new addition to this research area.   
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De Ruiter and Poll (2011) [28, 31] is the most comprehensive formal analysis of the EMV protocol.  
They have built an F# abstract model of the EMV contact (Chip & PIN) protocol and use the ProVerif 
verification tool to perform analysis.  This research provides a very detailed model of the EMV 
protocol.  For instance, both their F# model contains detailed descriptions for low level data objects 
such as the CVM list, the PDOL, the AFL and AIP.  These low level data objects become the pre-
conditions of the transaction in the F# model, with the model attempting to resolve all of the possible 
starting values of these data objects to find out if any of the combinations of starting values end in an 
unexpected outcome and thereby point to a vulnerability in the EMV protocol.  Their F# model also 
depicts the permutations the different modes of the EMV transaction are fully modelled i.e. online / 
offline, PIN verified / signature verified and SDA / DDA / CDA authentication. 
The future work in this paper states that the F# model could be compiled to run as an application.  
This would allow the F# model to act like our protocol emulator code and interact with real EMV 
cards, thereby combining a formal model and practical experiments into one code base. 
The results of this analysis show that the model detects existing known issues in the Chip & PIN 
protocol such as Murdoch et al. (2010) [13].  However, it did not highlight the known error that the 
card CVM can be altered to force the POS terminal to reveal the PIN in plaintext [30] which is 
acknowledged by the authors.  It also does not highlight the vulnerability in which EMV cards ignore 
the transaction limits when the transaction is in a foreign currency [29] which is also applicable to 
contact Chip & PIN cards.  This may be due to the particular data abstraction decisions made by the 
research team; which suggests that it may be a worthwhile exercise for our Z model to revisit all of 
the data abstraction decisions we have made to see if there may be potential avenues we have not fully 
explored and thereby uncover new vulnerabilities in the EMV protocol. 
The approach proposed in Ouderi et al. (2013) [32] has built a formal model of the EMV protocol 
which they intend to use to identify vulnerabilities in the protocol and generate test cases which 
highlight the vulnerabilities. The research is based on the high level SysML model which captures the 
high level process flow and gives an easy to understand representation of the process flow. 
The SmartLogic tool presented by De Konig Gans and De Ruiter (2012) [33] allows practical protocol 
analysis experiments to be performed upon the real-world EMV cards and POS terminals.  The 
SmartLogic tool acts as a man-in-the-middle between an EMV card and a POS terminal during the 
performance of an EMV payment transaction.  The tool allows the researcher to investigate the impact 
of a theoretical vulnerability by changing / manipulating specific commands and/or data in the EMV 
transaction protocol sequence and observing the resultant change in the protocol from a “correct 
operation” to a vulnerable state.  In this way they have demonstrated the real-world impact of two 
known vulnerabilities which are manifest in EMV cards and POS terminals (1) the man-in-the-middle 
can force the EMV protocol to reveal the PIN in plaintext by altering the card capabilities (2) the 
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man-in-the-middle can simulate the message transmission time delays messages introduced by a relay 
attack proving that an EMV transaction will be completed even in a relay of 10,000km. 
Choudary (2010) [34] describes the implementation of the “Smart Card Detective” tool which can 
manipulate the commands / data of the EMV protocol.  The tool performs the man-in-the-middle 
protocol manipulation required to demonstrate that the attack described in Murdoch et al. (2010) [13] 
would work on real EMV cards and POS terminal thereby proving that the theoretical vulnerability in 
the EMV specification existed in actuality and could be used for fraudulent purchases. 
These tools “SmartLogic” [33]  and “SmartCard Detective” [34] use an approach of practical 
demonstration of the vulnerabilities in the EMV Specification.  This is done by manipulation of the 
transaction protocol in real-time by a man-in-the-middle which sits between a POS terminal and an 
EMV card.  The impact of their work is enhanced by proving that the vulnerability exists in the real 
world that its impact can be truly assessed. 
Aarts et al. (2013) [35] presents a novel approach to analysis of the EMV protocol, in which they use 
a learning machine to exhaustively interrogate a real EMV card with all of the possible permutation of 
commands and data available in the EMV protocol.  They program out a number of obviously 
incorrect command queries, such as incorrect Verify PIN with the wrong PIN which would block the 
card and halt further testing.  Other than these exception cases the learning machine is free to try any 
valid EMV command in any sequence.  EMV cards have an internal state machine, see Figure 37 
which controls the order in which commands should be sent to the EMV card in a valid transaction 
protocol sequence.  The learning machine maps the state machine of the EMV cards tested finding, by 
trial and error, which commands elicit what responses when the card is in a given state.  This machine 
learning approach is completely different to our modelling approach.  Despite this, the different 
techniques have identified a number of the same vulnerabilities in the EMV protocol via different 
routes: 
•! The MasterCard state machine enforces a set order to the command sequence of the kernel 2 
protocol i.e.  SELECT is followed by GET PROCESSING OPTIONS is followed by GET 
DATA / READ RECORDS, is followed by GENERATE AC and so on.  Kernel 3 (Visa) 
fDDA cards are less restrictive once the SELECT command has selected the application any 
other command can be run. 
•! Kernel 2 cards default to requesting that the transaction is completed in online mode i.e.  in 
the case where the first GENERATE AC from the POS terminal requests a Transaction 
Certificate (TC) offline completion of transaction, the kernel 2 card will respond with ARQC 
request for online completion of the transaction.  At this point the specification indicates that 
the POS terminal must send the ARQC to the Issuing Bank and request an APRC which will 
indicate to that card that the issuing bank has sufficient funds and is willing to authorise the 
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transaction.  However, both our preliminary work with our EMV emulator and the work of 
Aarts et al. (2013) indicate that it is possible to for the kernel 2 card to generate the TC from 
the second GENERATE AC command without a valid ARPC from the bank.  This is 
achieved by setting the data fields in the GENERATE AC command to indicate that the POS 
terminal is offline only this triggers the card to respond with a TC without requiring the 
ARPC from the issuer.  This creates a potential vulnerability in kernel 2 cards which can be 
manipulated into approving a transaction without the approval of the issuing bank. 
Future work for both this research and our research includes an investigation of the implications of 
being able to generate a TC without issuer approval.  Can that TC be utilised by a man-in-the-middle 
attack to approve a transaction? 
The analysis work by Pasquet et al. (2008) [36] is interesting in that they set out to perform a security 
analysis of the contactless mobile phone payments technology “Smart Touch”.  The analysis method 
they are developing is based on Common Criteria analysis (ISO 15408).  The paper proposes the use 
of Common Criteria analysis because it has the flexibility to deal with the complexity involved in the 
security analysis of a payments system which combines hardware and software elements as well as 
RF communications.  Unfortunately at time of publication (2008) the “Smart Touch” project was still 
in pilot phase and was therefore not developed enough for the Common Criteria analysis to produce 
any analysis and/or results.  On reflection the Common Criteria analysis proposed in this paper is a 
qualitative analysis technique relying on the experts and the community to select the criteria against 
which the system will be evaluated.  This contrasts with our methodology and the previously 
discussed research [35] [32] [33] which utilise practical experiments and abstract modelling. 
Ming-hui et al. (2007) proposes a number of improvements to the EMV protocol and then analyses 
the resultant protocol.  The paper identifies a number of deficiencies in the EMV protocol which we 
highlight in our discussion of POS authentication, Chapter 8: 
•! The Merchant ID and Terminal ID are not included data which is cryptographically signed by 
the card to be sent to the Issuer.  This potentially allows the merchant or POS terminal to act 
maliciously without being traceable. 
•! The EMV protocol does not include a mechanism for the EMV card to authenticate the 
identity of the POS terminal.  Thereby potentially allowing malicious devices to masquerade 
as a POS terminal to perform unauthorised transaction with the card. 
The proposed solution involves the addition of issuer public keys to the POS terminals and stricter 
key management at the POS terminal.  Our design for POS authentication, Chapter 8, by the EMV 
card also required additional keys to be stored at the POS terminal.  We asked for feedback on our 
POS authentication design from the UK Cards Association, Visa and MasterCard.  We learned from 
this that one of the main hurdles to the implementation of such a design is that there are a large 
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number of legacy POS terminals which are not under the control of the Issuing banks or payment 
providers (i.e.  MasterCard and Visa).  Therefore, it is difficult to make a change to the EMV 
payments system which involves changing POS terminals. 
4.3! Exploitable Vulnerabilities in the EMV Protocol 
In this section we focus on the research papers which have identified exploitable vulnerabilities in the 
EMV protocol, especially those which fall into one or more of the following categories: 
•! the vulnerability is inherent to the protocol; which means that every EMV card and POS 
terminal which implements the protocol will therefore exhibit the vulnerability 
•! the vulnerability is exploitable; that is the vulnerability allows a transaction to be authorised 
under circumstances where the transaction would normally be rejected. 
•! the vulnerability can be demonstrated to exist in real EMV cards and POS terminal; this gives 
the research real-world impact 
•! the vulnerability compromises one of the security features in the EMV protocol; thereby 
allowing an attacker to authorise a transaction for which they do not have permission. 
Vulnerabilities Inherent to the Protocol Specification  
Murdoch et al. (2010) [13] identifies a vulnerability in the EMV payments system which allows an 
attacker to authorise a payment whilst entering an incorrect PIN.  A man-in-the-middle device can 
subvert the cardholder verification process, Figure 15.  Telling the POS terminal that the PIN entered 
by the attacker is correct, whilst telling the EMV card that this is a transaction verified by signature 
and therefore no PIN required.  This bypasses the primary security of the EMV Chip & PIN protocol 
i.e. the cardholder PIN.   
 
Figure 15 – Murdoch et al. (2010) protocol sequence 
The research team performed practical experiments to demonstrate that the vulnerability was present 
in UK issued credit / debit cards and UK POS terminals.  The importance of this research was 
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highlighted in 2012 when criminals were arrested in France, they had exploited the vulnerability to 
conduct 6,000 fraudulent purchases with a total value of more than €500,000 [37].   
Murdoch et al. (2010) [13] uncovers critical failings in the banks transaction validation processes.  
The transaction data transmitted to the issuing bank includes the Terminal Verification Results (TVR) 
and the Issuer Application Data (IAD), which together encode the results of the cardholder 
verification carried out by the POS terminal and card.  These data are signed by the card so the man-
in-the-middle cannot alter them.  However, despite this, the data required to clearly identify the fraud 
are split across several data fields some of which are visible to the POS terminal and others are visible 
to the issuing bank.  This creates an ambiguity in the data which makes it difficult to detect this type 
of attack at either the POS or the issuer.   
The EMV transaction protocol is designed to ensure that the EMV payment cards issued by many 
different issuing banks are accepted at any of the POS terminals / ATMs worldwide.  This is a 
challenge as the cards, POS terminals and ATMs support multiple authorisation modes (online / 
offline), authorisation methods (PIN, signature, contactless) and cryptographic authentication 
technologies (SDA, DDA, CDA).  To make any EMV card compatible with any POS / ATM, the 
protocol includes a negotiation at the start of the transaction to decide on authorisation mode, method 
and cryptography.  The POS / ATM will select the most secure combination of mode, method and 
cryptography available to both the card and the POS / ATM. 
This negotiation process is a significant weakness in the protocol.  There are a number of research 
papers that prove it is possible for a man-in-the-middle to alter the capabilities of the card or the POS / 
ATM, to cause the POS / ATM to select an exploitable authentication mode, method or crypto.  This 
type of attack is called a downgrade attack, where vulnerability is discovered in the EMV protocol 
and the attack must put the POS /ATM into a given mode to enable the vulnerability to be exploited.  
Two such attacks are Roland and Langer (2013) [26] and Barisani et al. (2011) [30]. 
The vulnerability discovered by Roland and Langer (2013) [26] allows the attacker to create cloned 
EMV contactless cards.  In normal operation a cloned EMV contactless card should not be accepted, 
because the private key on the original EMV contactless card cannot be copied.  This means that the 
cryptographic signature produced by the cloned card will not be validated by the POS terminal.  
However, the downgrade element of the attack alters the capabilities of the cards to fool the POS 
terminal into performing a magnetic stripe mode contactless transaction rather than the EMV mode 
transaction.  The cryptographic protection on the magnetic stripe contactless transaction is much 
weaker than the combined RSA / 3-DES protection employed in EMV mode transactions.  This paper 
demonstrates that the CVC3 code, used to authorise magnetic stripe mode transactions, can be 
manipulated to reduce the to number of possible values to 999.  This allows a cloned card to be 
created with the 999 possible CVC3 responses encoded upon it. 
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Degabriele et al. (2012) [24] describes a theoretical partial oracle attack on the RSA cryptography 
used by DDA / CDA cards.  This paper demonstrates that it is theoretically possible to forge the DDA 
/ CDA cards digital signature.  However, even at best, the attack would need to run 4,639 partial 
transactions against a card to generate the forged digital signature, making the attack impractical.  
Given that each transaction takes approximately 500ms, to complete the attack would require access 
to the card for 38 minutes. 
Barisani et al. (2011) [30] was a black hat presentation at DEFCON 19 which covered a number of 
known issues in EMV such as the Murdoch et al. (2010) [13].  Part of which introduced a downgrade 
attack in which POS terminal can be convinced to reveal the PIN entered by the cardholder in plain 
text rather than in enciphered form, thereby allowing a man-in-the middle to record the PIN. 
Vulnerabilities Caused by Omissions in the Specification 
The EMV protocol specifications sometimes create the opportunity for exploitable vulnerabilities by 
omission; one such case is highlighted by Bond et al. (2014) [25].  The EMV specification only states 
that the number should be “unpredictable” it does not state how this will be achieved, it leaves this 
decision open to the manufacturer of the POS / ATM.  The research team discovered that some POS 
terminals / ATMs uses unpredictable number (UN) generation techniques that were in fact very 
“predictable”.  For example, some POS terminals / ATMs simply used the time from real-time clock 
as the UN, some performed a hash algorithm upon the time and used that as the UN while others had a 
predictable sequence of UNs which reset to the beginning each time the POS / ATM is powered-up.  
The ability to predict the UN sequence means that the attacker can pre-generate a transaction 
authorisation from a genuine EMV card and use the authorisation cryptograms to create a cloned 
EMV card. 
Anderson et al. (2005) [38] is a review of the vulnerabilities in the EMV payment system as it was in 
2005, at which time the EMV cards issued in the UK were all SDA cards.  As [38] highlights it was 
possible to create cloned SDA cards, because the authentication data supplied by the card is the same 
for every transaction.  Cloned SDA cards have been dubbed “YES cards” as they will perform an 
EMV transaction with SDA static authentication; when it comes to the PIN verification step in the 
EMV protocol sequence the card simply replies “YES” to any PIN entered by the attacker.  In the UK 
the process of replacing SDA cards with DDA / CDA cards, which cannot be cloned in this way, 
began in 2009 with the majority of cards SDA cards replaced by DDA / CDA cards by 2013.   
Roland and Langer (2013) [26] and Barisani et al. (2011) [30] have demonstrated the negotiation 
process at the start of an EMV transaction allows the attacker to select an SDA transaction.  
Unfortunately, this means that despite the investment made replacing all of the SDA cards in the UK 
with DDA / CDA cards that the “YES card” attack may still be applicable at certain offline POS 
terminals. 
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Our work [27] demonstrates that ambiguities in the EMV contactless protocol specification [7] can 
lead to vulnerabilities in the real world implementation of EMV cards.  Our research found that 
specification for kernel 2 contactless cards [39] included a statement that explicitly prohibited the use 
of the Verify PIN functionality in contactless mode, for “performance, usability and security reasons”.  
We found that the specification for kernel 3 contactless cards [7] Book C-3 provided for the use of 
Verify PIN in contactless payments using a mobile phone, however, there was no explicit statement 
restricting the use of Verify PIN for contactless cards.  This omission / ambiguity means that the 
manufacturers of contactless Visa cards have no guidance on contactless Verify PIN.  Our research 
found that UK issued kernel 2 contactless cards blocked the Verify PIN command whilst the majority 
of UK issued kernel 3 cards allowed the Verify PIN command. 
The vulnerability allows unauthorised access to the Verify PIN functionality of EMV contactless 
cards and potentially allows an attacker to compromise the cardholder’s PIN whilst the card is still in 
their wallet.  We built a scenario where the attacker would guess the cardholder’s PIN whilst the 
cardholder was presenting his/her wallet to their building entry system each day.  We also identified 
that the vulnerability would allow an attacker to temporarily block any contactless Visa cards in the 
wallet by making 3 deliberately incorrect PIN attempts on each card.  This would be an effective 
denial of service attack on the cardholder causing them inconvenience and embarrassment the next 
time they attempted to use their cards. 
The abstract Z model in our analysis methodology, Chapter 5, allows us to identify omissions in the 
EMV protocol specification.  One such omission is discussed in “Harvesting High Value Foreign 
Currency Transactions from EMV Contactless Credit Cards without the PIN”, Chapter 6.  This is an 
exploitable vulnerability which compromises the security features of the EMV protocol.  Contactless 
payments are intended low value transactions, under £20 (May 2015) in the UK.  Above £20 the 
cardholder must enter their PIN giving additional security for higher value transaction.  The 
vulnerability allows an attacker to authorise transactions significantly greater than £20 without the 
cardholder’s PIN.  The vulnerability is present on the contactless interface of the card, this potentially 
allows an attacker to exploit the weakness whilst the contactless card is still in the cardholder’s wallet.  
In order to illustrate the “real-world” impact of the vulnerabilities identified by our research [29] [27] 
we develop practical demonstrations using Android mobile phones.  This shows that the vulnerability 
exists in actual EMV cards and POS terminals and that it can be exploited using off the shelf 
equipment available to the fraudsters. 
4.4! Exploitable Vulnerabilities in EMV Contactless Payment Technology 
There are a number of known vulnerabilities in the underlying technologies which support EMV 
contactless payments, these can be split into the following categories: 
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•! contactless transaction relay 
•! eavesdropping contactless payments 
•! extending the effective range of NFC  
These categories of vulnerability have one thing in common, they take advantage of the underlying 
contactless / NFC technology they are very difficult to guard against and or prevent.   
Contactless Transaction Relay 
EMV contactless payments make the security assumption that the cardholder has authorised the 
transaction because the EMV card was placed on the POS terminal.  This is based upon the limited 
range of the underlying ISO-14443 wireless technology [40] which has a maximum effective range of 
only 10 cm.  Relay attacks break this security assumption allowing transaction to be completed whilst 
the payment card is potentially many kilometres away from the POS terminal. 
 
Figure 16 - EMV Contactless Transaction Relay 
 
Figure 16 illustrates how a Contactless Relay attack is carried out.  Relay attacks are relatively simple, 
which makes them easy to implement and very hard to prevent.  The attacker has two NFC enabled 
mobile devices.  The “proxy” device (A) communicates with the POS terminal.  The “mole” device 
(B) communicates, with the victim’s genuine EMV card.   
(A) receives data requests from the POS terminal.  (A) sends the requests to the (B), which passes the 
request to the genuine card.  (B) takes the genuine responses from the card and relays them to (A).  
(A) in turn passes the genuine responses to the POS terminal. 
There is no processing of the data involved in the relay.  (A) and (B) simply relay messages from the 
POS terminal to the card and responses from the card to the POS.  Both the card and the POS terminal 
are unaware that they are not 10cm apart.  The relay between the “proxy” (A) and the “mole” (B) can 
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be either Bluetooth or can be via the mobile phones connection the Internet.  Bluetooth is limited in 
range 10 metres but has the advantage of being a dedicated connection with guaranteed 
communication speed.  Using an internet connection enables the relay to take place over much larger 
distances (many kilometres), however, the communication speed is not guaranteed which may cause 
the relayed transaction to drop out. 
Francis et al. (2009) [41] demonstrates that NFC enabled smartphones can provide a perfect platform 
for both the proxy (A) and the mole (B) as they combine NFC and go anywhere internet 
communications.  They are also innocuous as smartphones are now starting to have EMV compatible 
payment applications installed on them.  A recent publication by the team at RHUL demonstrates that 
relay attacks are a very real threat to EMV payments; Francis et al. (2012) [42].  Publications by 
Cambridge University and Tel Aviv University reinforce this research.  Drimer and Murdoch (2007) 
[43] and Kfir and Wool (2005) [44]. 
Contactless payments cards are “passive”, they can be activated to make a payment by any ISO-14443 
reader that comes within range.  Mobile phone payment devices are more secure in that the payment 
applications, such as Google Wallet, require the user to unlock the application before a payment is 
made.  This means that unlike the “passive” cards, the mobile phone payment device cannot be 
attacked whilst still in the cardholder’s wallet. 
However, once the mobile payment device is active the mobile phone payment device performs 
exactly the same contactless transaction protocol as the contactless cards.  This means that the mobile 
phone payment can be relayed in the same ways as a contactless card payment.  This is demonstrated 
in the research Roland and Scharinger (2013) [45] and Roland et al. (2012) [46].  This research 
demonstrates a novel vector of attack, a malicious app resident on the Google Wallet mobile phone 
acts as the relay “mole” (B).  The malicious app activates the Google Wallet payment app and sends a 
payment to a waiting “proxy” (A).  This attack vector means that the attacker does not have to get 
physically close to the Google Wallet device as is the case in the classic relay scenario Figure 16.  The 
attack vector makes this attack scenario particularly dangerous as the attacker can take payments from 
any mobile phone that installs the malicious app.  The app then transmits these payments to any 
location with internet access where the payment is collected by the “proxy” (B) and a collaborating, 
possibly malicious, merchant with a POS terminal. 
This research shows that mobile phone payments are just as vulnerable to relay attack as EMV cards, 
despite having the added security of a PIN code unlock.  Further to this our testing of the Orange 
QuickTap mobile phone payment app found that once the payment app had been activated to make a 
payment the payment functionality would remain active for several minutes after the screen had gone 
blank.  This would allow a short window of opportunity for a relay attack subsequent to a legitimate 
payment having been made with the QuickTap phone. 
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Eavesdropping, Skimming and Extended Range Reading  
Contactless payments utilise the ISO-14443 wireless communications standard [40], which is an open 
standard used in many different contactless applications on smartcard and mobile devices.  Use of this 
common standard leaves contactless payments vulnerable to data hijacking attacks such as 
eavesdropping, skimming and extended range reading.  The data gathered by these attacks include the 
16 digit card number (PAN) and the card expiry date, which research shows is sufficient to create a 
new account on Amazon.com and make online purchases [47] [48].  This is due to the minimal 
security checks on some websites which do not enforce a full check on all of the card-not-present 
security fields recommended by EMV, i.e.  the PAN, expiry date, CVV2, cardholder name and 
cardholder address.  Therefore despite the cryptographic security that prevents cloning of EMV cards 
based on the data obtained through contactless eavesdropping, skimming and extended range reading;  
the data collected are still useful in performing card-not-present attacks. 
Eavesdropping 
A number of research projects have looked into the practicalities of eavesdropping the ISO-14443 
wireless communications.  These projects show that it is possible to eavesdrop the data from a 
contactless payment at a distance of 1 metre.  The research does prove that eavesdropping produces 
exploitable data, thereby making the contactless EMV cards vulnerable to attack.  However, the 
research also shows that the equipment required to perform contactless eavesdropping is very 
specialised requiring a great deal of electronics expertise to build.  For instance Diakos et al. (2015) 
[49] presents excellent research which builds the eavesdropping equipment into everyday objects such 
as a shopping trolley.  However, as the research also shows, the RF receiver and the signal processing 
equipment required are complex and would require a great deal of work to make the equipment 
portable enough to be used in real-word attack scenario. 
This would make eavesdropping a much less attractive method of collecting credit card data when 
compared with skimming attacks using an NFC enabled mobile phone.  Research by Francis et al. 
[41] [42] and our research [47] [29] show that skimming attack can be performed using off-the-shelf 
Android mobile phones which are very portable and discreet. 
Hancke et al. (2011) [50] makes a comparison between eavesdropping and skimming attacks using the 
same equipment.  The result of the comparison between the eavesdropping and skimming concludes 
that eavesdropping has the potential to read from a greater distance, however, the skimming provides 
more reliable data reading.  With eavesdropping being more susceptible to atmospherics, 
environmental conditions and RF interference. 
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Skimming 
The popularity of NFC enabled Android mobile phones provides a perfect attack platform for 
contactless skimming as demonstrated in [42] [47] [29].  However, that is not the only potential attack 
vector, we developed an attack platform that masquerades as a NFC door reader [27].  The door 
reader accesses all of the cards in a victim’s wallet before activating the door opener.  Our multiple 
card reader software utilises the standard anti-collision functionality present in the ISO 14443 
standards [40] (part 3).  One possible attack scenario could have our multiple card reader deployed as 
an Oyster card turnstile or ITSO card turnstile, in such a scenario the attack could capture the details 
of many thousands contactless payment cards.   
Our experimental research [51] presented a practical skimming attack costing only £40, which would 
allow a shop assistant to collect credit card details to make fraudulent online purchases. 
Extended Range Contactless Reading 
The maximum practical communication range of EMV contactless payments cards is approximately 
5cm.  EMV uses the restricted communications range of ISO 14443 as a design security feature.  The 
cardholder authorises the payment by tapping their card on the POS terminal, the assumption being 
that the cardholder must be present at the merchant location to authorise the payment.   
There has been significant research into the extending the read range of contactless payment cards.  
Kirshenbaum and Wool (2006) [52] demonstrates that ISO 14443 cards can be read at a distance of 
30cm which is 6 times the design distance.  The experiments show that to increase the effective 
reading range of ISO-14443 cards that reader must increase the transmission power from 200mW to 4 
Watts and increases the antenna size from 5cm diameter to 50cm diameter.   
Hancke et al. (2011) [50] introduces an interesting concept, it utilises two separate antennas to extend 
the reading range.  A standard ISO 14443 reader uses a single antenna to power the card, transmit data 
to the card and to receive the card responses.  The two antenna approach uses one antenna to power 
and transmit, it uses the second antenna to receive the card responses.  Using a second receiving 
antenna allows the attack to increase the reading range of ISO 14443 whilst using less signal power 
and smaller antenna diameters. 
One of the attack scenarios explored in Oren et al. (2013) [53] is a “mafia fraud attack” scenario.  The 
POS terminal (“ghost”) which is dedicated to receiving fraudulent transactions.  An extended range 
contactless reader (“leech”) is used to capture transactions from passing victims at a range of 1 meter 
whilst the contactless payment card is still in the victim’s wallet.  The “ghost” and the “leach” are 
connected by the relay allowing them to be many kilometres apart. 
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4.5! Review of Known Vulnerabilities in the EMV Payment System 
Markantonakis et al. (2009) [54] provides a good overview of the published research concerning 
practical attacks on EMV cards.  It places EMV cards in the context of all of the different applications 
using similar smartcard technology.  It identifies skimming, eavesdropping, relays and extended range 
reading as being the primary threats against contactless payment cards.  
Anderson et al. (2005) [38] reviews the known vulnerabilities in EMV.  It explores the real-world 
impact of the vulnerabilities in terms of: 
•! monetary value of the fraud attributed to an attacker exploiting the vulnerability 
•! the indirect impacts of being a victim of fraud upon the cardholders and merchants 
•! the cross over impacts on other areas of the payments system e.g.  magnetic stripe data being 
used to commit card-not present fraud. 
•! the EMV fraud liability shift from the banks to the merchants and cardholders.  In the UK 
prior to the introduction of EMV the banks were liable for the cost of all card fraud in the 
UK.  Post EMV the merchant or cardholder can be held responsible e.g.  if the correct PIN is 
used the bank will assume that the customer was negligent with their PIN and is therefore 
liable for the cost of the fraud. 
The UK and Europe migrated from magnetic stripe card payments to EMV Chip & PIN based 
payment technology in 2004.  The United States is currently (May 2015) in the process of migration 
from magnetic stripe to EMV Chip & PIN.  US banks have started issuing EMV payment cards and 
US retailers, such as Wal-Mart, have commenced a rolling out of EMV compatible POS terminals. 
The card payment scheme providers are using the move to EMV to bring about a liability shift in the 
United States [1] [3] [2].  This has raised discussion in the US news media that customers and retailers 
will have greater exposure to fraud losses than was the case for the magnetic stripe payments system. 
Anderson (2007) [55] highlights that, of all of the known vulnerabilities of contactless payment cards 
it is the ability to communicate with the card without the knowledge of the cardholder that is the 
fundamental flaw in the contactless design. 
4.6! Contribution of Literature Review to this PhD Research 
This literature review has focused on four areas of academic research related to the security of the 
EMV contactless protocol; structured / formal analysis of the EMV protocol, exploitable 
vulnerabilities in the EMV protocol, exploitable vulnerabilities in contactless technology and review 
of known vulnerabilities in the EMV payment system.  The research in the literature review 
influenced the research presented in this PhD thesis as follows. 
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Structured / formal analysis of the EMV protocol 
Research relating to structured / formal analysis of the EMV protocol followed two approaches; 
building a formal model of the EMV protocol or building tools which analyse EMV protocol 
messages of actual transactions in real-time.  Formal analysis can identify errors in the specification 
which are outsides the bounds of normal operation and therefore are not picked up in testing.  The 
protocol analysis tools are good at identifying vulnerabilities in the real-world operation of the 
protocol and injecting errors to demonstrate the weaknesses. 
De Ruiter and Poll (2011) [28, 31] is the most comprehensive formal analysis.  However, the analysis 
only identified a number of known vulnerabilities in the protocol and did not predict any new 
vulnerabilities, which have since been identified by other research. 
There were a number of very good protocol analysis tools in the academic research by De Koning 
Gans and De Ruiter (2012), Choudary (2010) and Pasquet et al. (2008), which have been used to 
identify vulnerabilities in the EMV protocol.  The drawback of the analysis tools is that they examine 
the protocol as it is implemented by the software developers, which is their interpretation of the 
meaning of the original specification.  This makes it difficult to predict the edge-case vulnerabilities 
generated by fundamental errors / omissions in the specification. 
Our approach was to develop a methodology, Chapter 5, which combined both analysis techniques.  
As the literature shows the strength of formal in predicting outlying edge cases mitigates the weakness 
of the tool based approach that it is restricted to testing what has been implemented by a 3rd party.  
The strengths of analysis tools reside in the analysis of real-word operation of the protocol, thereby 
helping us refine the formal model so that it closely follows the real-world operation of the protocol 
and overcomes some of the ambiguities in the EMV specifications. 
Our approach is the first in the literature to successfully combine the formal and tool based 
approaches and to use the resulting methodology to identify previously undocumented vulnerabilities 
in the EMV protocol. 
Exploitable vulnerabilities in the EMV protocol 
Our methodology was also influenced by the research into exploitable vulnerabilities in the EMV 
protocol.  At the outset of my, PhD researchers at Cambridge University (Mike Bond and Ross 
Anderson) encouraged the use of practical experiments in my research.  This allowed me to 
demonstrate that the vulnerabilities the methodology highlighted in the protocol were exploitable in 
the real world, and thereby increase the impact of the research.  This approach has proved very 
successful in our papers Emms et al. (2013) and Emms et al. (2014) which were accepted at FC 2013 
and CCS 2014 respectively.  The influential papers in the area Murdoch et al. (2010), Roland and 
Langer (2013) and Bond et al. (2014) use this approach.  Using practical demonstration reinforcing 
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the impact of the discovery of a vulnerability in the protocol that could otherwise be easily dismissed 
as a minor technical issue.   
Exploitable vulnerabilities in the EMV contactless technology 
Research into the exploitable vulnerabilities in the EMV contactless technology, have both influenced 
and confirmed the technology choices made in our experimental work.  Work by Hancke (2011), 
Roland and Scharinger (2013), Roland et al. (2012) demonstrated the use of NFC enabled 
smartphones as a practical attack platform against EMV contactless payments.  Their work was 
concurrent with our work and helped to confirm our direction.   
Work such as Francis et al. (2012) on relay attacks provides indirect supporting evidence for my 
research.  The primary focus of my research is analysis of the protocol, a relay works without 
understanding the content of the protocol messages.  However, in some of our research we build upon 
the mobile phone to mobile phone relay, by inserting a man-in-the-middle which alters the protocol to 
exploit a specific protocol vulnerability. 
Work by Kfir and Wool (2005) and Diakos et al. (2015) on extending the range of NFC 
comprehensively explores extended range reading and eavesdropping contactless payments.  This 
allowed me to decide that to develop the hardware required for long range NFC reading would divert 
time and effort from analysis of the protocol which was my primary research goal, without adding to 
the scientific knowledge in this area. 
Review of known vulnerabilities in the EMV payment system. 
Papers in this category look at the system wide impacts of the individual vulnerabilities in the EMV 
payment system.  This gives context to our research and has helped me to more fully understand the 
impact of the vulnerabilities identified by my research and assisting me to convey this message to a 
non-academic audience; the general public, law enforcement and the payment industry. 
4.7! Conclusion 
There are several leading academic research teams actively analysing the security of the EMV 
transaction protocol and researching potentially exploitable vulnerabilities in the EMV protocol.  
These researchers have adopted various approaches including formal modelling and practical 
experiments on real EMV cards, POS terminals / ATMs.  In this literature review I have established a 
link between the existing academic research and the three areas of weaknesses in contactless payment 
identified in Chapter 1: 
•! the wireless interface makes EMV contactless payments vulnerable to several new categories 
of attack (i.e. skimming, eavesdropping and relay) which were not present in Chip & PIN. 
Chapter 4.  Literature Review of EMV Protocol Security Vulnerabilities 
54 
•! contactless payments do not require PIN verification; consequently many of the attacks 
described in the literature review are only possible because there is no cardholder interaction 
required to complete the transaction. 
•! the introduction of contactless payments increases the complexity of the EMV authentication 
process, Figure 9.  This exacerbates a pre-existing problem identified in the literature review, 
whereby the complexity of the EMV authentication process facilitates many of the attacks, in 
particular man-in-the-middle and downgrade attacks. 
The EMV contactless protocol is just one part of the EMV payment system which also includes card-
not-present payments, magnetic stripe compatibility mode payments and Chip & PIN payments.  This 
means the security of the EMV protocol and the contactless technology that supports it must be 
analysed in the wider context of the EMV payment system.  There are several cases where a 
vulnerability in the contactless transaction protocol / technology does not affect the security of 
contactless payments but does affect one of the other EMV payment methods. 
The literature review supports the assertion made in this PhD thesis that the EMV payment system is 
fundamentally weakened by the EMV philosophy of providing support for all previous card payment 
technologies including magnetic stripe, SDA and printed plaintext data in the case of card-not-present 
payments.  It is apparent that despite the investment made in improving the security technology of 
EMV payments cards, the requirement for backward compatibility reduces the security to the least 
secure technology supported by the system.  
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Chapter 5.! Analysis Methodology 
 
This chapter describes the methodology, Figure 17, developed as part of this PhD research, to analyse 
the security of the EMV contactless protocol.  Our analysis methodology combines the strengths of 
formal modelling with a protocol emulator which provides real time analysis of the protocol as it is 
implemented in the EMV payment system.  The two models complement each other, the formal 
model predicts potential vulnerabilities in the protocol based on the EMV specification, while the 
protocol emulator allows us to evaluate the real-world impact of these potential vulnerabilities on the 
EMV protocol. 
 
Figure 17 - Overview of Analysis Methodology 
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The analysis methodology, Figure 17, combines three elements: 
•! Describing the EMV protocol; uses UML diagrams and reference tables to describe the EMV 
protocol and provide a documented linkage back to the EMV Specifications [6] [7]. 
•! Modelling the EMV protocol; our methodology combines a Z abstract model with a protocol 
emulator.  The Protocol Emulator allows us to execute EMV protocol sequences with real 
EMV cards, thereby allowing us to evaluate the impact of vulnerabilities identified in the 
EMV specification.  The Z Abstract Model highlights potential vulnerabilities in the EMV 
specification and generates test cases for the protocol emulator. 
•! Practical demonstrations; we have developed a number of Android based attack scenarios 
which show that the vulnerabilities identified by our analysis methodology, can be exploited 
using off-the-shelf equipment.  This demonstrates the real-world impact of the vulnerability 
The objective of the analysis methodology, Figure 17, is to evaluate the security of the EMV 
transaction protocol.  The evaluation process is carried out using the protocol emulator together with 
the Z abstract model.  Once the modelling has identified a vulnerability in the protocol our 
methodology provides a link to the location(s) in the EMV specification which have generated the 
vulnerability.  This is achieved by a combination of the UML diagrams, the reference tables and 
structured comments in the protocol emulator code.  It provides documented evidence that the 
vulnerability is attributable to an inherent flaw in the specification rather than being simply an 
implementation error by a manufacturer of a particular EMV card. 
Our practical demonstrations are designed to communicate the results of our research to a non-
technical audience.  This increases the impact of our work making our security message accessible to 
members of the public who are carrying EMV contactless cards. 
5.1! Describing the EMV protocol 
The EMV transaction protocol specifications [6] [7] are lengthy and complex, consisting of 14 books 
and 2392 pages.  Contactless payments added greatly to that complexity comprising 10 of the 14 
books and 1645 pages.  A great deal of this complexity derives from the inclusion of seven different 
contactless protocol sequences; one for each of the payment scheme operators, MasterCard, Visa, 
American Express, JCB, Diners, Discover and UnionPay, whereas, Chip & PIN has a single protocol 
sequence for all card types.   
A major challenge for the analysis of the EMV protocol was to condense the information in the EMV 
specifications into a manageable format, which was easier to work with (than the 2392 pages of the 
EMV specification) but which retained the linkage between the original specification text and the 
models we have built based on the specifications.  The analysis methodology uses a combination of a 
UML protocol sequence diagram with associated reference table to achieve this. 
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5.2! UML Diagrams 
The role of the UML protocol sequence diagrams is to collate information from multiple sources in 
the EMV specification to create a single description of the transaction protocol sequence (kernel).  
There are eight transaction protocol sequences (kernels) in the EMV specification, one for contact 
transactions and seven for contactless transactions.  There is a single UML diagram for each of the 
eight kernels.  Figure 18 shows the UML diagram for kernel 3 fDDA contactless protocol sequence. 
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Figure 18 – Kernel 3 fDDA Contactless Protocol Sequence 
Each message, response and function is numbered to provide an easy to follow documented link with 
the reference table and the java code of the protocol emulator.  The complete transaction protocol 
sequence consists of a number of command messages sent by the POS terminal and responses 
returned by the payment card.  The numbering scheme reflects this; the initial commands are given a 
new whole number (e.g.  7.0) all related responses are given numbers in that range (e.g.  7.1, 7.2, 7.3 
etc).  Some actions are initiated by an external user such as 1.0 InitiateTransaction() and 3.0 
PresentCardToTerminal().  Other actions are initiated and completed internally within either the 
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payment card or the POS terminal such as 5.0 ChooseAID() and 9.1 GenerateUPN(), these are usually 
actions which create or select the data required by the next message or response. 
5.3! Reference Tables 
Each UML protocol sequence diagram is accompanied by a reference table.  The table provides a 
detailed description of each message and each response in the UML protocol sequence diagram and a 
list of references in the original EMV specification from which the UML and descriptive text are 
derived. 
The following example of an entry in the reference table, Figure 19, reflects the numbering scheme of 
the UML diagram, Figure 18, to create the link between UML diagram and the table.  Figure 19 
shows a single table entry corresponding to 9.7 Transaction Approved - TC, SDAD, Application 
Cryptogram (AC), AFL in the UML diagram. A full example of the linkage between the UML 
diagrams, reference tables, protocol emulator code and the Z abstract model code are given in 
Appendix A. 
The descriptive text of the table provides an overview of the functionality of each message / response 
in the protocol sequence.  The references consist of the EMV book with version (EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3), 
page number (p50)$and section number / title (5.4.3$Determine$the$Card$Transaction$Disposition).  This 
provides implementation level details required for the coding of the protocol emulator and the 
creation of the abstract model.  The same references appear in the protocol emulator code and provide 
a documented linkage between a vulnerability observable using the emulator and its origin in the 
EMV specification. 
Descriptive*Text* References*
!9.7$Transaction$Approved$,$TC,$SDAD,$
Application$Cryptogram$(AC),$AFL$
$
If$the$card$approves$the$completion$of$the$
transaction$in$offline$mode,$it$will$return$
Transaction$Cryptogram$$(TC)$in$the$Cryptogram$
Information$Data$(CID).$$The$card$also$returns$
all$of$the$data$elements$required$by$the$
terminal$to$complete$the$transaction:$
Signed$Dynamic$Application$Data$(SDAD)$used$by$
the$terminal$to$verify$that$the$card$has$
approved$the$same$transaction$that$the$terminal$
sent.$
Application$Cryptogram$(AC)$used$in$the$
completion$of$the$transaction$with$the$Bank$to$
validate$that$a$valid$card$completed$the$
transaction.$
Application$File$Locator$(AFL)$contains$the$
location$in$the$card’s$file$structure$where$the$
terminal$can$read$the$data$elements$required$to$
complete$the$transaction.$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p50$
5.4.3$Determine$the$Card$Transaction$Disposition$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p43$
5.2.2.2$GPO$Response$SW1$SW2$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p46$
5.2.2.3$Contactless$Path$Determination$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p97$
A.2$Data$Elements$by$Name$$$
$
EMVv2.2$Book$C,3$,$p127$
Annex$C$Fast$Dynamic$Data$Authentication$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p128$
C.1$Dynamic$Signature$Verification$$$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$p59$
6.5.8$Get$Processing$Options$APDUs$$$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$p60$
6.5.8.4$Data$Field$Returned$in$the$Response$$$
$ $
Figure 19  - Section of Reference Table 
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5.4! Modelling the EMV Protocol 
The analysis methodology comprises two models, the protocol emulator and the Z abstract model, 
which are used in concert to identify vulnerabilities in the protocol sequence and to analyse the impact 
(exploitability) of the vulnerabilities.  
5.5! Protocol Emulator 
The protocol emulator is at the centre of our analysis methodology, it provides a functional model of 
the EMV contactless protocol sequences.  The protocol emulator consists of a PC application which 
emulates a POS terminal and an Android mobile phone app which emulates an EMV contactless card. 
Figure 20 shows the POS Terminal emulator and the card emulator performing a transaction together. 
 
Figure 20 – POS Terminal Emulation with EMV Card Emulator (Android phone) 
Having software emulations of both sides of the EMV contactless protocol sequence, the POS 
terminal and the card, allows us to: 
•! use the POS terminal emulator to execute the protocol sequence with real EMV cards 
•! run fully emulated protocol sequences between the protocol emulator and the card emulator.  
We generated self signed public / private key pairs for the card emulator, with a matching self 
signed CA public key on the protocol emulator.  This allows the card emulator to generate a 
SDAD signature which can be validated by the protocol emulator. 
•! the EMV card emulator can execute partial protocol sequences with a real POS terminal. 
However, transaction authorisation will always fail, because the emulator does not have the 
bank issued private keys to generate a SDAD that will validate in a real POS terminal. 
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The POS terminal emulator is the primary element of the protocol emulator.  The POS terminal 
emulator encapsulates the modelling of the EMV protocol sequences, the linkage to the UML 
diagrams and EMV specifications, as well as providing a fully functioning POS terminal.   
The Android EMV card emulator provides the functionality of the card side of the protocol sequence 
and records log traces from the card’s viewpoint. 
! POS Terminal Emulator 
The POS emulator allows us to run EMV protocol sequences with erroneous and edge case data, it 
also allows us to insert erroneous commands into the protocol sequence.  This gives us the ability to 
simulate different protocol scenarios based on our analysis of the EMV protocol.  The structured code 
comments in the protocol emulator allow us to link any erroneous behaviour observed by the emulator 
back to the EMV specification. 
 
Figure 21 - POS Terminal Emulator Performing Kernel 3 Protocol Sequence 
Figure 21 shows the POS terminal emulator running the Kernel 3 fDDA contactless protocol 
sequence, Figure 18, with a real EMV card (my Barclaycard Visa). 
Figure 22 is a screen shot of the POS terminal emulator showing the execution of the steps in the 
protocol sequence with my Barclaycard. 
The top part of the screen shows the transaction parameters that will be used in the protocol sequence 
i.e. this is a purchase transaction, the currency is UK pounds, the transaction amount is £1.00 and the 
date is 24-05-2015.  Transaction Mode sets the terminal capabilities; in this case POS NFC Offline.  
Setting the terminal to offline means that the card will not request that the transaction is authorised by 
the Issuing bank using the ARQC authorisation cryptogram, the card will simply produce the TC 
transaction certificate to complete the transaction, Figure 14. 
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The terminal type merchant attended denotes that this is a POS terminal in a shop / restaurant with a 
member of staff operating the POS terminal (not an unattended petrol pump or vending machine). 
The bottom part of the screen contains the results of the running protocol sequence.  On the left is the 
result of the protocol sequence, in this case an approved contactless transaction for £1.00, currency 
0826 (UK pounds) and dated 24-05-2015 (reversed 150524).  Below the approved transaction shows 
the card details, that the transaction was approved by my Barclaycard. 
 
Figure 22 – POS Emulator fDDA Transaction with Log Trace 
The window on the right contains the log trace from the transaction protocol sequence.  In this case it 
shows the section of the protocol which corresponds to the UML diagram, Figure 18 step 7.0 
SelectApplication() to step 11.0 ValidateTransaction(). 
The log traces of the protocol emulator provide 
•! a list of the protocol sequence steps executed by the emulator. This links the results of the 
emulator experiments with the EMV specifications via UML diagram numbering scheme, e,g. 
UML (kernel 3) 8.0 PopulatePDOL() 
•! details of the messages and data sent to the card by the POS terminal i.e. sendAPDU =>  
•! details of the card’s responses to the POS messages respAPDU <=  
•! decision point milestones, to make it easier to follow the process flow e.g.  
---TC Returned by Get Processing Options (9F10) --- 
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•! details of dynamically generated data structures such as the DDOL => 179C6A9E… which 
will help ease the process of interpreting the log trace 
A full trace log for this protocol sequence can be found in Appendix A.4. 
Figure 22 shows the UML entries in the trace log which are used to provide a linkage between the 
running code which is performing the protocols sequence to the UML diagrams and reference tables.  
This creates a documented link from the error occurring in the trace logs => UML diagrams => 
reference tables => EMV specification (book, section number and page). 
 
Figure 23 - POS Terminal Emulator Parameter Settings 
Figure 23 shows the parameter settings that set up the protocol sequence.  This allows the POS 
terminal emulator to run a protocol sequence that targets a particular security vulnerability.  For 
instance by setting the EMV parameter switch of an Offline only terminal, we can force the EMV 
card not to request Issuer approval using the ARQC.  We can also switch off the more secure features 
of EMV such as enciphered PIN, forcing the card to perform plaintext PIN. 
This exploits the process by which EMV selects which security features will be utilised in this 
protocol sequence, Figure 9.  It forces the EMV card to perform the security options which allow a 
vulnerability to be exploited; the attack outlined by Roland and Langer (2013) [26] does exactly this.  
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It downgrades the POS terminal from EMV mode to Magnetic Stripe mode, thus bypassing the 
stronger cryptographic protection present in EMV mode contactless transactions.  
! Executing Bespoke Protocol Sequences 
The POS Terminal Emulator also has the capability to execute protocol sequences such as the 
contactless PIN verify sequence, Figure 35, described in section 7.2.1.  This functionality is used to 
specifically target vulnerabilities that are present in the EMV specifications but which do not fall 
within the usual format of an EMV protocol sequence as was the case for the contactless PIN verify 
vulnerability.  The POS terminal emulator runs the bespoke protocol sequence and records the 
responses of real EMV cards for evidence of the presence of the vulnerability. 
 
Figure 24 - POS Emulator Running the Contactless PIN Verify Protocol Sequence 
Figure 24 shows the POS emulator running the PIN verify protocol sequence in contactless mode.  
The log trace (bottom left) shows that the card verifies the enciphered PIN which is an operation that 
it should not perform in contactless mode (see Chapter 7 for details of the contactless Verify PIN 
vulnerability). 
! Implementation of the Protocol Emulator 
The protocol emulator is a Java Application for a PC platform.  The emulator uses a PC/SC compliant 
USB smartcard reader to communicate with the both contactless and Chip & PIN EMV cards.  The 
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software uses the javax.smartcardio library to control the PC/SC smartcard reader and communicate 
with the card. 
The emulator code is designed to closely follow the structure of the EMV specifications.  There is a 
Java class for each of the protocol sequence variants (kernels) described in the the EMV specification 
[6] [7].  There is an Entry Point class which decides which of the kernels will be performed based on 
the capabilities of the EMV card, this reflects the functionality described in [7] Book B Entry Point 
Specification.  The structure of the protocol emulator includes the following: 
•! entry point processing 
•! contact “Chip & PIN” transaction protocol, which we have called kernel 0 in the emulator 
•! kernel 1 - Visa contactless transaction protocol with online transaction authorisation support 
•! kernel 2 - MasterCard contactless transaction protocol  
•! kernel 3 – Visa fDDA contactless transaction protocol for offline only transactions 
•! kernel 4 - American Express contactless transaction protocol, 
•! kernel 5 – JCB contactless transaction protocol 
•! kernel 6 - Discover contactless transaction protocol 
•! kernel 7 – UnionPay contactless transaction protocol. 
•! contactless magnetic stripe transaction protocol 
This emulator uses an abstract kernel class containing the common functionality, with each of the 
kernels being a concrete implementation of the abstract kernel class and adding the card provider 
specific functionality. 
! Protocol Emulator Structured Coding  
The protocol emulator uses structured comments in the code to provide a linkage between the running 
software in the emulator and the:  
•! the UML diagrams: //$UML$9.7$Transaction$Approved$Application$Cryptogram$(AC),$AFL 
•! the reference table, the emulator code contains the full descriptive text as per Figure 19: 
//$If$the$card$approves$the$completion$of$the$transaction$in$offline$mode,$it$will... 
•! the EMV Specifications: //$EMV$v4.3$Book$3 - Annex$B$Rules$for$BER,TLV$Data$Objects - p155 
•! the emulator’s log traces: Log.Write("UML$9.7$Transaction$Approved",$Log.PROTOCOL); 
In this way each line of Java code can be traced back to its origin in the EMV specification and can 
also be understood as part of the overall protocol sequence thanks to the references to the UML 
protocol sequence diagram. 
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*
$ Log.Write("UML$9.0$GetProcessingOptions(PDOL)$",$Log.PROTOCOL);$$$
$ //$UML$9.0$GetProcessingOptions(PDOL$data)$$
$ //$In$the$Visa$fDDA$transaction$Get$Processing$Options$(GPO)$is$used$to$request$completion$
$ //$of$the$transaction.$$The$PDOL$data$must$contain$all$of$the$data$elements$requested$by$
$ //$the$card$otherwise$the$transaction$will$be$rejected$
$ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$2.4.1$Initiate$Application$Processing$,$p12$
$ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.2$Initiate$Application$Processing$,$p40$
$ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.2.1$Get$Processing$Options$(GPO)$Command$,$p40$
$ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.2.2$Initiate$Application$Processing$,$p40$to$p46$
$ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$6.5.8.4$Data$Field$Returned$in$the$Response$,$p60$
$ ResponseAPDU$response$=$this.Reader.GetProcessingOptions(dol);$
$ if$(response.getSW()$==$Const.SW_SUCCESS)$
$ {$
$ $ //$Split$the$HEX$string$response$from$the$card$into$individual$fields$with$a$TAG$and$Value$
$ $ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$Annex$B$Rules$for$BER,TLV$Data$Objects$p155$
$ $ //$Or$if$it$isn't$TLV$decode$it$as$a$Format$1$object$–$$
$ $ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$6.5.8.4$Data$Field$Returned$in$the$Response$Message$
$ $ if(!this.CardData.DecodeResponse(response))$
$ $ $ this.CardData.FormatGPOResponse(response.getData());$
$ $ byte$[]$iad$=$this.CardData.FindData(Const.TAG_IAD);$
$ $ Log.Write("UML$9.7$Transaction$Approved",$Log.PROTOCOL);$$$
$ $ //$UML$9.7$Transaction$Approved$Application$Cryptogram$(AC),$AFL$
$ $ //$If$the$card$approves$the$completion$of$the$transaction$in$offline$mode,$it$will$
$ $ //$return$Transaction$Cryptogram$$(TC)$in$the$Cryptogram$Information$Data$(CID).$
$ $ //$The$card$also$returns$all$of$the$data$elements$required$by$the$terminal$to$
$ $ //$$complete$the$transaction:$$
$ $ //$Signed$Dynamic$Application$Data$(SDAD)$used$by$the$terminal$to$verify$that$the$
$ $ //$card$has$approved$the$same$transaction$that$the$terminal$sent.$$
$ $ //$Application$Cryptogram$(AC)$used$in$the$completion$of$the$transaction$with$the$$
$ $ //$Bank$to$validate$that$a$valid$card$completed$the$transaction.$$
$ $ //$Application$File$Locator$(AFL)$contains$the$location$in$the$card’s$file$$
$ $ //$structure$where$the$terminal$can$read$the$data$elements$required$to$complete$$
$ $ //$the$transaction.$$
$ $ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.4.3$Determine$the$Card$Disposition$,$p50$
$ $ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.2.2.2$GPO$Response$SW1$SW2$,$p43$
$ $ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.2.2.3$Contactless$Path$Determination$,$p46$
$ $ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$A.2$Data$Elements$by$Name$,$p97$
$ $ //$EMVv2.2$$Book$C,3$,$Annex$C$Fast$Dynamic$Data$Authentication$,$p127$
$ $ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$C.1$Dynamic$Signature$Verification$,$p128$
$ $ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$6.5.8$Get$Processing$Options$APDUs$,$p59$
$ $ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$6.5.8.4$Data$Field$Returned$in$the$Response$,$p60$
$ $ //$TC$Returned$by$Get$Processing$Options$(9F10)$
$ $ if$(Util.BitCompare(iad[4],$Const.IAD_VISA_STATUS_MASK,$Const.IAD_VISA_TC))$
$ $ {$
$ $ $ Log.Write(",,,,,,,,,$TC$Returned$by$Get$Processing$Options$(9F10)$,,,,,,,",$Log.PROTOCOL);$$$
$
Figure 25 - Section of Protocol Emulator Code 
 
Figure 25 shows a section of POS emulator code which performs the operations which correspond to 
the UML diagram steps 9.0 GetProcossingOptions(PDOL data) and 9.7 Transaction Approved - TC, 
SDAD, Application Cryptogram (AC), AFL.  The section illustrates the use of structured code 
comments and the use of log traces to record UML references into the record of the protocol message 
sequences (see Figure 22 for an example of the log trace output). 
The protocol emulator is a concrete software implementation of the EMV transaction protocol.  It is 
both an end product of the analysis methodology and also the test-bed used to validate the findings of 
our analysis methodology; for instance the protocol emulator was used to confirm the existence of the 
foreign currency flaw in UK issued payment cards. 
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! EMV Card Emulator 
The card emulator completes our ability to emulate of the both sides of the EMV contactless protocol 
sequence.  The card emulator can be used in two ways: 
•! to implement working solutions for vulnerabilities in the EMV protocol sequences.  The POS 
emulator and card emulator can be used together to demonstrate the efficacy of a proposed 
change to the contactless protocol e.g. the POS authentication protocol Chapter 8 
•! the card emulator can be used as surrogate card when developing new protocol sequence in 
the POS terminal emulator.  This is a more efficient process than using real EMV cards which 
may get blocked by an incorrectly coded protocol sequence. 
 
UML 4.0 ListAvailableNFCApplications() 
“2 PAY received” 
UML 4.1 List of available applications 
the card emulator returns a list of payment 
applications, in this case “Visa” 
UML 7.0 SelectApplication(AID) 
“VISA applet selected” the card activates the Visa 
application and Visa data including the PDOL 
UML 7.1 Transaction Setup data inc. PDOL 
“PDOL Sent” the card returns the PDOL  
UML 9.0 GetProcessingOptions(PDOL) 
“Amount 000000000100” 
“Terminal Currency Code: 0826” 
UML 9.1 GenerateUPN() 
“Unpredictable Number:096392C7” 
UML 9.7 Transaction Approved TC + SDAD 
“SDAD sent" if the card emulation approves the 
transaction it returns an SDAD to the POS  
UML 10.0 ReadAFLRecord(SFI, record) 
“Sending SFI 2 Record 2” 
“Sending SFI 2 Record 3” the card emulator 
returns the data blocks requested by the POS 
 
Figure 26 - Card Emulator Kernel 3 fDDA Protocol Sequence 
Figure 26 shows the card emulator responding to the messages sent by a POS terminal during a 
Kernel 3 fDDA transaction protocol sequence.  The left side of Figure 26 shows the screen output of 
the card emulator.  The right hand side of Figure 26 shows the UML diagram references which 
correspond to the text displayed by the card emulator. 
! Implementation of Card Emulator 
The card emulator was implemented by Joseph Hannon.  It was written for an NFC enabled Android 
phone.  This takes advantages of the Android mobile phone ability to operate in NFC card emulation 
mode [56] which allows the Android mobile phone to act like an EMV contactless payment card 
when it is presented to a POS terminal. 
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The card emulator currently implements kernel 3 (Visa) and kernel 2 (MasterCard) contactless card 
types.  The card types share a great deal of functionality however, there are a number of rules and data 
structures which are particular to specific card types.   For instance MasterCard has a state machine, 
Figure 37, which dictates the order in which commands can be executed in the kernel 2 protocol, this 
is not present in kernel 3 specification.  Kernel 2 cards have a publicly accessible data structure which 
contains a record of the last 10 transactions whereas Visa implements a cumulative transaction total 
which is held privately by the card. 
The card emulator is a passive listening daemon which waits to receive the protocol messages sent by 
the POS terminal and responds with an appropriate message and/or status code.  It handles the 
following EMV protocol messages: SelectApplication(), GetProcessingOptions(), GetChallenge(), 
GetData(), ReadRecord(), VerifyPIN(), GenerateAC(), InternalAuthenticate().  The card emulator 
does not allow the methods to run concurrently which replicates the operation of EMV cards.  It also 
enforces EMV card processing rules such as the SelectApplication() command which must be 
successfully completed before any other command can be executed.  ExternalAuthenticate() is not 
currently supported by the emulator as it is not used in the kernels currently implemented in in the 
protocol emulator. 
The card emulator includes the RSA and 3-DES cryptographic functionality to verify an enciphered 
PIN, generate an Application Cryptogram and generate a SDAD.  To achieve this we have 
implemented a set of shared keys for the POS terminal emulator and the card emulator which follows 
the structure of the EMV PKI as described in section 3.3.4.  This allows the card emulator to generate 
Application Cryptograms and SDAD signatures which can be validated by the POS terminal.  The 
keys are self-signed so will only work between the POS emulator and the card emulator. 
5.6! Z Abstract Model 
The Z abstract model was developed in collaboration with Dr Leo Freitas, based upon the model of 
the EMV protocol sequences I had developed in building the protocol emulator.  This was a 
collaborative effort where I provided detailed knowledge of the EMV protocol specification which Dr 
Freitas codified into the Z abstract model.  Dr Freitas also drew upon his previous work on the formal 
analysis of Mondex smartcard payments system [57] to create the abstract model. 
The abstract model identifies potential vulnerabilities in the EMV protocol and develops test cases to 
be run on the protocol emulator based on the vulnerability.  It was in the building of the pre-
conditions of the Z abstract model that the foreign currency flaw was spotted (see section 5.8). 
The description implementation of the Z Abstract Model in this section was taken verbatim from a 
paper co-authored with Dr Freitas [29].  I have left these two sections as written by Dr Leo Freitas 
because he is the creator of the model and his words best describe the implementation process. 
Chapter 5.  Analysis Methodology 
68 
! Motivation for the Z Abstract Model 
In this work, we studied the EMV requirements documents [6] [7] to produce a formal Z abstract 
model of its properties and functionalities, specifically for the kernel 3 fDDA contactless transaction 
protocol, summarised in Figure 18.  The motivation is to capture these requirements mathematically, 
enabling us to check that the properties of interest hold (i.e.  the requirements documents are 
consistent), and to produce test cases for our EMV emulator derived from formal proof of operational 
feasibility of each protocol stage (i.e. by proving the stage is feasible, we expose both abstract 
behaviours: normal and exceptional). 
Our abstract model uses the Z notation [58], which Dr Leo Freitas had previously used to successfully 
model the Mondex card payment protocol [57].  Mondex was awarded ITSEC level E6 (ITSEC's 
highest security-level) [59], this can be directly attributed to the formal analysis of the Mondex 
protocol performed using Z notation and the Eves verification tool.  The Mondex card payment 
protocol was developed by National Westminster Bank in the early 1990s, and later bought 
MasterCard where it was influential in the development of the EMV “Chip & PIN” protocol.  Thus, 
the consideration to use Z for mechanising EMV was straightforward: we already had some aspects of 
the mechanisation (e.g. necessary proof engineering, organisation of tokens/certificates, auxiliary 
lemmas and definitions, etc) in place.  Having said that, other formal languages with theorem proving 
support, such as Event-B or KIV would be equally suitable. 
In 2006, 10 years after the release of Mondex, Prof. Woodcock led a Grand Challenge effort to 
identify any residual errors in the Mondex proof using automated theorem provers.  In the process, 
nine different teams using different formalisms attempted the problem, where the work of Dr. Leo 
Freitas [60] was the “control” in the sense that it mechanised the original “warts-and-all” rather than 
with any translation to different languages [59]. 
! Implementation of the Z Abstract Model 
Proof obligations in Z are usually of three kinds: well-formedness of models, where partial functions 
are applied within their domains, and unique existential quantifiers are sound; operational feasibility, 
where specified operations have (implicitly defined) pre-conditions  strong enough to establish 
(explicitly defined) post-conditions; and data reification via (usually forward) simulation, where the 
use of (concrete) data structure representations in operations closer to an implementation language are 
shown to respect the abstract representation and operations. 
Our models have 49 type definitions, 61 Z schemas representing the NFC operations of the protocol, 
and 79 proofs in total, of which 49 are theorems representing properties of interest for the whole 
model [61].  Feasibility proofs are useful in deducing formal model-based test cases, as they 
characterise the complete space of behaviours for all operations of interest, including successful and 
all possible error cases, both determined by mathematical predicates representing disjoint behaviours 
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of the protocol.  That is, feasibility proofs characterise a set of disjoint predicates with (in EMV’s 
case) non-overlapping conditions that when accumulated lead to true (e.g. pre-condition of an 
operation being x < 0 or x > 0 or x = 0).  Thus, each disjunct represents a unique class of behaviours 
for the functionality being proved.  Moreover, we also prove that these disjunct predicates amount to 
true, hence we guarantee all behaviours are accounted for. 
The formal model follows the methodology advocated in [62], which enumerates requirements 
realised by each piece for formal specification.  Thus, if all elements of the requirements are 
accounted for within the abstract mathematical model in a way that conveys the intended behaviour 
described in English, then proofs about the abstract model (or rather, proof failure) will lead (as our 
experiments show) into potential attacks and vulnerabilities discovered through proof investigation.  
Once validated by EMV experts, such a formal model becomes a more accurate representation of the 
EMV protocol than the EMV books [6] [7]. 
These efforts correspond to the POS terminal side of Figure 18.  The mechanisation of a formal 
concrete design, together with a proof of refinement indicate that these designs faithfully satisfy the 
abstract model linked to the requirements.  Refinement proofs are perhaps the most costly aspect of a 
proof exercise, as it needs to establish that the implementation details do not breach any of the 
contractual requirements established by the abstract model.  This concrete model can then serve to 
annotate the Java (or any other implementation) with formal specification for code-level functional 
correctness as done by tools such as VeriFast [63].   
Furthermore, we derive a set of test cases from this abstract model that is the smallest with highest 
coverage possible.  We also derive a systematic code-annotation technique, using the same principle 
to enumerate what aspect of the requirements each piece of code within the emulator is realised.  
These test cases represent a test-oracle based on requirements testing, rather than testing for any 
implementation issues.  Together, the test cases and systematic code annotation are useful for 
capturing potential (major) errors.  Errors from the concrete design are more likely to expose 
problems with implementation choices, and it is our aim in the future to annotate the emulator code 
with formal specification amenable to static analysis of the properties corresponding to the behaviour 
of the code. 
! Example: Section of Z Abstract Model  
Figure 27 shows a section corresponding to 9.7 Transaction Approved - TC, SDAD, Application 
Cryptogram (AC), AFL in the UML diagram.  The section of Z specification describes the relationship 
between the SDAD and the PDOL.  The PDOL is the transaction data sent to the card in the message 
represented by UML 9.0 GetProcessingOptionsCommand(PDOL data).  The SDAD is part of the data 
returned by the card in the message depicted in the UML diagram 9.7 Transaction Approved - TC, 
SDAD, Application Cryptogram (AC), AFL. 
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Figure 27 - Example Section of Z Abstract Model 
In the Z Abstract model the referencing notation is slightly different to that seen in the Protocol 
Emulator code and reference table e.g. [9. p.134] where 9 is a document reference to EMV Book C-3 
version 2.1 and p.134 is the page number.  
The full Z abstract model can be read in [61] which contains the Z specification and the proofs. 
5.7! The Process of the Analysis Methodology 
To address the complexity of the EMV specifications we have developed a systematic analysis 
methodology which combines formal and informal techniques.  I have described the individual 
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elements which comprise the methodology, UML diagrams, reference tables, protocol emulator and Z 
abstract model.  In this section I will describe how those elements are used together to create our 
analysis methodology. 
EMV$
Specifications
[O0.0]
Describe$the$EMV$
Protocol$Sequences
[A1]
Develop$Protocol$
Emulator$Code
[A4]
Develop$
Z$Abstract$Model
[A2]
UML$Diagrams$and$
References$Tables
[O1.1]
Z$Abstract$Model
[O2.1]
Run
Z$Abstract$Model
[A3]
Test$Cases
[O3.1]
Protocol$Emulator
[O4.1]
Bank$Issued$EMV$
Contactless$Cards
[O5.0]
Run$Test$Cases$in$
Protocol$Emulator
[A5]
Emulation$Results$
(e.g.$Trace$Logs)
[O5.1]
FeedbackFeedback
Feedback
Feedback
 
Figure 28 – Process Flow of Analysis Methodology 
Figure 28 shows process flow which connects the separate elements (UML diagrams, reference tables, 
protocol emulator and abstract model) of our analysis methodology.  The rounded boxes are activity 
nodes within the process e.g.  [A1].  The square boxes are object nodes e.g.  [O1.0]: these are the data 
sources that drive the activities.  Connecting edges, represented as black solid-arrows, indicate the 
default order in the flow of activities.  The red dashed-arrows are connecting edges that indicate 
feedback, creating an iterative process of refinement of the UML diagrams [O1.1], the Z abstract 
model [O2.1] and the protocol emulator [O4.1]. 
The EMV specifications [O0.0] are the originating source of all of the data in the process.  Any data 
or assumption made in the emulator code or in the abstract model should be traceable back to its 
origin (i.e. the book/section/page within the EMV specifications).  The EMV specifications are 
structured so that the complete description for a single transaction protocol sequence is split across 
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multiple sections and multiple books.  The UML sequence diagrams [O1.1] collate the multiple books 
of the EMV specification, into a single easy to follow description of the transaction sequence.  The 
transaction sequence diagrams [O1.1] are the initial stage of the iterative process that we used to 
create the concrete software implementation of the emulator [O4.1].   
Much of the process is concerned with constructing the UML sequence diagrams as accurately as 
possible.  To achieve this, we use a detailed analysis of the EMV requirements and a detailed working 
knowledge of the structure of the various specifications contributing to a single transaction.  
Moreover, we use feedback from the Z abstract model construction [A2], the derivation of test cases 
[A3] and the development of the protocol emulator [A4]. 
At each stage of the process if additional information is found about the working of EMV it is fed 
back into the UML transaction sequence diagrams [O1.1].  The feedback is essential to refine our 
understanding of the EMV specifications and to document it.  Each time the UML diagrams are 
updated this drives the improvement of the coding of the protocol emulator [O4.1].  The protocol 
emulator is used in practical experiments [A5], running full or partial transaction protocol sequences 
against real bank cards [05.0] and generating results in the form of detailed log traces [05.1] which 
contain references to the UML diagrams for traceability. 
5.8! Example of Using the Methodology  
This section briefly describes the use of the analysis methodology in the identification and 
confirmation of the foreign currency flaw in the EMV contactless protocol.  Identification of the flaw 
came from the Z abstract model and confirmation that the flaw was exploitable was provided by the 
protocol emulator. 
The first indication that there was a potential issue came during the process of defining the pre-
conditions of the Kernel 3 fDDA protocol sequence.  Our method of working involves Dr Freitas 
building the Z specification based on my knowledge of the EMV specifications and Dr Freitas’s 
knowledge of modelling.   
Our first revision of the model highlights that there were a number of unsatisfied pre-conditions one 
of which was the relationship between the transaction currency and the local currency of the card.  To 
satisfy this missing pre-condition I went back to the EMV specifications and located all references to 
the transaction currency and card currency.  This yielded a single reference in EMV specification, 
Book 3 (version 4.3) [6] page 163, which states “If transaction is in the application currency and is 
under X value”, where X is the card offline transaction limit. 
It was now clear from the abstract model that the currency pre-conditions could not be met when the 
transaction currency did not match the card’s local currency.  Figure 29 shows the section of the 
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model which deals with the relationship between the transaction currency tcurrency and the card’s 
local currency cardCurrency. 
 
Figure 29 - Abstract Model Z Schema 
Once the abstract model had identified the potential flaw the protocol emulator was used to verify the 
existence of the flaw and quantify the degree to which the flaw is exploitable. 
 
Figure 30 – POS Emulator Running the Foreign Currency Flaw Protocol Sequence 
A protocol sequence was implemented in the POS terminal emulator that fully exercised the flaw.  
From this I discovered that the foreign currency flaw was present and exploitable in most of the Visa 
cards tested.  I found that the amount authorised by Visa debit cards, varied from $0.00 to 
$999,999.99, depending upon the Issuing Bank and the type of card (debit or credit). 
FDDANFCVisaPDOL
NFCVisaPDOL !; Transaction !; cardCurrency? : CURRENCY
pdolAmount ! = convertCU ((tcurrency !, cardCurrency?), amount !)
pdolCashback ! = cbamount !
pdolUpno! = tunpredictableNumber !
pdolCountry ! = tcountry !
pdolCurrency ! = cardCurrency?
pdolDate! = tdate!
pdolTrType! = type!
With the payload ready, we describe the refactored operation below. The state of both terminal
and card does not change (⌅), either does the transac ion (tr 0 = tr), which needs to be g ven
explicitly, since it is not an inclusion of State, but a variable of schema type Transaction. The
state rid 0 (i.e. the AID agreed between terminal and card) is set to the given card kernel input
(aid?), providing it is within what the card is capable of. Notice that although the pdolTrType! is
fixed from NFCVisaPDOL !, the model of the fDDA does not insist on NFC explicitly. This means
it could be reused for other types of transactions.
NOTE: It is worth noting that the currency conversion expected for the pdolAmount ! result
output works under the expectation of exchange rate accurancy and consistency. Through
experiments with the real protocol on an emulator, we have found that this relationship
between pdolAmount ! and currencyCU over the transaction and card parameters does not
hold.
CPDOLQueryTNFCVisaOkay
⌅State
aid? : AID ; pdol ! : PDOL
aid? 2 acap
rid 0 = aid?
(9FDDANFCVisaPDOL •
cardCurrency? = ccurrency ^
tr 0 = ✓Transaction ! ^
pdol ! = FDDA NFC VISA (✓NFCVisaPDOL !))
This operation queries the terminal for information the card needs that is output by pdol !. This
corresponds to 5.2, 6, and 7.1 in Figure 2.1: the pdol ! output correspond to 7.1; 5.2 is the specific
choice for NFCVisaPDOL, whereas 6 is the collection of transaction information for the card given
on pdol !. The actual PDOL data is to be used by 7.2  7.4.
For the failure modes (7.5), it could happen either if aid? 62acap (as modelled by TQueryCAIDFail),
or if the operation (or kernel) within the card has been blocked: e↵ectively, this is just an operation
that reduces the acap of the card. The result of failure is that either the AID selected is invalid.
CPDOLQueryTNFCVisaFailBadAID
⌅State; aid? : AID ; pd l ! : PDOL
pdol ! = FDDA NOOP PDOL
(aid? 62 acap
_
tr .ttq .usage 62 chosenUSAGE \musage
_
¬ (9 cct : chosenCVM • cct ✓ tr .ttq .cap))
That is, either the chosen AID input is not available, or it is but we cannot find any CVM
capability within the transaction’s capabilities (tr .ttq). Another case is when the pdol ! payload or
the Transaction are inconsistent with FDDA NFC transactions.
21
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Figure 30 shows the POS terminal emulator running the foreign currency protocol sequence.  The 
result of this test is that the contactless Visa card authorised the amount $999,999.99, thereby showing 
that the vulnerability was present. 
The model indicated that the vulnerability was exploitable in kernel 3 (Visa) fDDA contactless 
protocol due to kernel 3 having the offline only transaction authorisation.  Kernels with online 
transaction authorisation such as kernel 2 (MasterCard) were not affected by the vulnerability as the 
card would request online completion of the transaction if a foreign currency was requested.  To 
verify this, I tested several kernel 2 contactless cards using the foreign currency protocol sequence 
and found in all cases that the kernel 2 cards rejected the protocol.  This can be attributed to the 
difference in authentication processes of the two protocols, section 3.6. 
5.9! Conclusion 
Our analysis methodology combines the strengths of formal analysis with a functional model of the 
protocol.  The process allows us to: 
•! identification of vulnerabilities in the EMV protocol specifications. 
•! perform exhaustive experiments on the EMV protocol which clearly define the scope and 
impact of the vulnerability. 
•! provide a documented link between the vulnerability observed in real EMV cards and the 
origin of the vulnerability in the EMV specification. 
Development of the protocol emulator and the Z abstract model have been carried out in parallel, with 
feedback from the development of one influencing the development of the other.  This has resulted in 
a deeper understanding of the EMV protocol sequences and thereby more exact representation of the 
specification by the protocol emulator.  A practical example of this process follows; in the Z abstract 
model the card CVM and terminal capabilities are modelled as sets of capabilities, for which one of 
the possible options is an “empty set”.  This makes a practical difference in the protocol emulator 
where CVM of “0000” is very different from the empty set of “ ”.   
For the most part, knowledge gained in the development of the UML diagrams and the protocol 
emulator was used to develop the Z abstract model.  However, there were many cases where the 
development of the abstract model highlighted gaps in the knowledge captured in the protocol 
emulator, deriving from the abstract model’s ability to highlight the absence of value. 
The methodology described in this chapter has been the foundation on which our contactless 
payments research has been based.  It creates a structured framework that can identify vulnerabilities, 
demonstrate that they are exploitable in the real-world and link the vulnerability back to a specific 
point in the original EMV specification.  Which is distinct from the identification of implementation 
error in particular cards or POS terminals 
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Chapter 6.! Foreign Currency Flaw 
 
This chapter describes the “Contactless Foreign Currency Flaw” which was identified in the EMV 
contactless protocol specifications using our analysis methodology, Chapter 5.  The flaw in the 
specification translates into an exploitable vulnerability in UK issued contactless Visa cards, which 
allows the attacker to bypass the safeguards built into the EMV contactless protocol. 
The chapter is organised as follows; in 6.1 we outline the vulnerability and highlight the EMV 
security features bypassed by the attack, in 6.2 we outline the safeguards built into the EMV payments 
system and in 6.3 explain the exploited EMV functionality. in 6.4 we briefly describe how the 
vulnerability was discovered, in 6.5 we outline the attack scenario which exploits the vulnerability, in 
6.6 we describe the experimental implementation carried out to demonstrate the real-world impact of 
the vulnerability, in 0 we give the test results of our experimental work and in 6.8 and 6.9 we explain 
our conclusions and propose a potential solution.  
6.1! Vulnerabilities Arising from Foreign Currency Flaw 
Our research has identified a practical attack on EMV contactless credit and debit cards, which allows 
large-scale “harvesting” of fraudulent payments from unsuspecting cardholders.  The attack exploits 
six functional characteristics of EMV contactless credit and debit cards: 
•! UK issued kernel 3 (Visa) credit cards will approve transactions values of 999999.99 in any 
foreign currency; this allows the attack ignore the £20 contactless payment limit. 
•! The contactless interface allows transactions to be extracted whilst the card is still in the 
cardholder’s wallet. 
•! The cardholder’s PIN is not required for contactless transactions; this allows the fraudulent 
transaction to be extracted from the card without any further interaction from the cardholder. 
•! Kernel 3 contactless cards will approve transactions in offline mode; this allows the attack to 
be performed without connecting to the card payment system, thereby avoiding any additional 
security checks by the bank. 
•! The merchant details are not included in the data cryptographically protected by the card; this 
allows the merchant details to be added later, making the attack more flexible and scalable. 
•! While the EMV protocol requires payment cards to authenticate themselves to the POS 
terminals, currently there is no requirement for POS terminals to authenticate themselves. 
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The main contribution of this chapter is the identification of a newly discovered vulnerability of the 
EMV protocol centred on the card’s handling of foreign currencies.  This is made possible by a 
combination of the six functional characteristics described above.  The introduction of EMV 
contactless cards has created a situation comparable to that described by Reason in his “Swiss cheese” 
model [64] where layers of protection can be compromised if holes on each layer line up to create an 
exploitable attack.  In this case, the six characteristics line up in a way that defeats the safeguards put 
in place by EMV.  Through this chapter we also contribute two potential solutions which will mitigate 
this vulnerability. 
The ability to capture fraudulent transactions and store them for later transmission to a rogue 
merchant makes this attack different from previously described relay attacks [42] [46] [44] on EMV 
contactless cards.  The relay attack depends upon very close synchronisation between two attackers; 
the first attacker has to be in contact with the victim’s card whilst the second attacker makes a 
purchase at a POS terminal.  This makes relay attacks difficult to operate on a large scale. 
Similar to Murdoch et al. (2010) [13], our attack can potentially be operated on a large scale.  
Murdoch et al. (2010) allows attackers to buy goods from retailers, whereas the attack described in 
this chapter is different in that it targets the money in the victim’s bank account. 
The very recent Bond et al (2014) [25] attack is similar to our attack in that it could be operated on a 
large scale and it extracts money from the victim’s account.  It would be interesting to explore the 
possibility of using our mobile phone contactless-transaction-collecting app as the “skimming” 
platform for the attack. 
6.2! EMV Transaction Safeguards 
In the UK, EMV credit / debit cards can perform two different transaction types: contactless 
transactions, and contact (Chip & PIN) transactions. 
! Contactless Safeguards  
Contactless transactions are intended to be a fast and convenient replacement for small cash 
purchases.  In a contactless payment, the credit / debit card is placed on the POS terminal’s 
contactless reader for approximately 1 second and the payment is approved. 
There are two significant differences between a contactless transaction and a contact Chip & PIN 
transaction.  First, the contact transaction requires the cardholder to enter their PIN, whereas the PIN 
is not required for contactless transactions.  Second, contact transactions require the card to be 
removed from the wallet and inserted into the POS terminal, whilst a contactless transactions is 
completed wirelessly by placing the card on the POS terminal, this can be done whilst the card is still 
in the wallet. 
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PIN entry provides one of the key safeguards in Chip & PIN transactions.  The PIN ensures that only 
the cardholder, who knows the PIN, can use the card.  Contactless transactions are not protected by 
PIN entry.  EMV have therefore implemented the following safeguards to limit the potential loss from 
lost or stolen contactless cards: 
In the UK, each contactless transaction is limited to £20; any transaction above this value will require 
a Chip & PIN transaction. 
EMV cards are limited to five consecutive contactless transactions, after which the PIN must be 
entered in a Chip & PIN transaction. 
These safeguards ensure that the maximum loss due to a lost or stolen contactless card is £100. 
! Contact Chip & PIN Safeguards 
The majority of EMV card transactions are Chip & PIN transactions.  Chip & PIN transactions allow 
purchases up to the balance of a debit card or the credit limit of a credit card. 
Chip & PIN transactions are protected by the following safeguards.  First, the cardholder must enter 
their PIN to authorise the transaction.  This is used to ensure that the person making the payment is 
the authorised cardholder. 
Second, if the value of the transaction is greater than the card’s offline transaction limit, the card will 
request that the POS terminal makes an online connection to the bank to perform additional 
authorisation checks.  The POS terminal must connect to the bank to provide the card with the online 
authorisation code (Authorisation Response Cryptogram (ARPC)).  The bank will respond with the 
authorisation code only if the card has not been reported lost or stolen, and the account has sufficient 
funds to pay for the transaction.  The card will only authorise the transaction if it receives a valid 
online authorisation code from the POS terminal. 
! Cryptographic Protection of Transactions 
The EMV payment system utilises cryptography to ensure that (i) only genuine EMV credit / debit 
cards can authorise transactions (ii) the transaction details approved by the card cannot be altered. 
Application Cryptogram (AC) 
The AC contains a Message Authentication Code (MAC).  The MAC utilises a symmetric algorithm, 
either 3-DES or AES, to encipher the transaction data fields detailed below: 
•! amount authorised (value of the purchase) 
•! amount other (cashback amount if required) 
•! terminal country code (UK - 0826, USA - 0840 etc.) 
•! terminal verification results (POS status code) 
•! transaction currency code (UK£ - 0826, US$ - 0840 etc.) 
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•! transaction date 
•! transaction type (purchase - 00, cash - 01, refund - 20) 
•! POS terminal unpredictable number (prevents cloned cards) 
•! application interchange profile (card’s security capabilities) 
•! application transaction counter (card’s Application Transaction Counter (ATC)) 
The AC is sent to the bank as part of the Financial Presentment message, Table 7.  This allows the 
bank to verify that the transaction details supplied by the merchant are the same as the transaction 
approved by the EMV card, section 3.5. 
Signed Dynamic Authentication Data (SDAD) 
The SDAD is a RSA digital signature on a SHA1 hash of the transaction data.  In the Kernel 3 fDDA 
protocol the transaction data included in the SDAD are: 
•! POS terminal unpredictable number  
•! amount authorised  
•! transaction currency code 
•! card unpredictable number 
•! card transaction qualifiers  
The SDAD is used by the POS terminal to verify that the card is genuine, section 3.3.2. 
6.3! EMV Functionality Exploited by the Attack  
The attack circumvents the safeguards built into EMV credit / debit cards by exploiting some EMV 
functionality that has been made vulnerable due to the introduction of contactless payment interface.  
In particular, there are three features that are exploited in our attack scenario: 
•! Contactless foreign currency transactions.  As described in section 6.2.1 the safeguards built 
into EMV will limit the maximum value allowed for each contactless transaction to £20.  Any 
amount over £20 will require the cardholder to enter their PIN, and any amount above the 
offline transaction limit (e.g.  £100) will require the POS terminal to connect to the bank to 
perform additional checks before the transaction is approved.  Our research has found that 
EMV credit and debit cards can be tricked into approving contactless transactions of much 
higher value than £20, simply by requesting the transaction in a foreign currency.  In our 
experiments, EMV cards have been found to approve contactless transactions up to 
€999,999.99 without requesting the PIN, and without requesting that the POS terminal goes 
online to perform additional checks.  This sidesteps the usual safeguards employed by EMV 
payments system. 
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•! Wireless interaction with card.  This attack exploits the wireless interface on contactless cards 
to collect transaction authorisations whilst the card remains in cardholder’s wallet.  This 
means the cardholder remains unaware that they have been exploited until their card 
statement arrives, thereby allowing the attack to operate for longer and be more lucrative to 
the attackers. 
•! The merchant ID and terminal ID can be added later by the rogue merchant, as these data are 
not included in the AC generated by the card.  The AC cryptographically ensures that the 
transaction data approved by the card, Table 6, is the same as that received by the Issuer. 
6.4! Identification of the Foreign Currency Flaw 
The identification of the foreign currency flaw in the kernel 3 (fDDA) contactless transaction protocol 
demonstrate the efficacy of our analysis methodology, Chapter 5.  The discovery of this particular 
vulnerability can be attributed to the process of establishing the pre-conditions for Z abstract model. 
In layman’s terms, the abstract model tells us that the outcome of a Kernel 3 fDDA contactless 
transaction is dependent on the values of certain fields at the start of the transaction i.e. the “pre-
conditions”. In this case the pre-conditions  of interest are: 
(α) Value of the transaction 
(β) Card offline transaction limit 
(γ) Currency of the transaction 
(δ) Native currency of the card 
The abstract model is a set of rules which are defined and based on the EMV specification.  In this 
case the rule is based on the EMV specification, Book 3 (version 4.3) [6] page 163, which states “If 
transaction is in the application currency and is under X value”, where X is the card offline 
transaction limit. 
This creates a rule in the abstract model (α) < (β) which can only be evaluated if (γ) is equal (δ).  
However, the EMV specification does not state what should happen when (γ) not equal (δ) (i.e. the 
transaction is in a currency foreign to the card).  The abstract model reports this as a gap in the rule-
set; identifying that there is a given set of pre-conditions for which there is no corresponding rule in 
the abstract model.  The gap in the abstract model thereby identifying a potentially exploitable error in 
the EMV specifications. 
! Software Emulation of the Flaw 
Having identified a potential flaw in the specification our software emulator allowed us to run the 
different test case scenarios exploring what would happen for the different card types. 
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It was found that kernel 2 cards would request online authorisation of the transaction, using the 
ARQC online request cryptogram, when the POS terminal requested an offline transaction in a foreign 
currency.  This prevents the attack as the Issuing bank will know the correct exchange rate for the 
foreign currency and prevent the high value foreign currency transaction. 
However, we found that in the kernel 3 (fDDA) contactless protocol sequence, the card simply returns 
the TC Application Cryptogram on the first request.  Thereby missing out on the opportunity for the 
Issuing Bank to spot the high value foreign currency contactless transaction and block it. 
We carried out testing on UK contactless kernel 3 (Visa) cards; finding that the exploitable 
vulnerability was present in the majority of UK issued cards. 
Once we had used the emulator to find that the vulnerability was present in UK issued contactless 
cards, we built an attack scenario, section 6.5, to demonstrate that the vulnerability could be exploited 
in the real-world and was not just a problem restricted to the computer lab. 
6.5! Attack Scenario 
Figure 31 illustrates the attack scenario described in this section. 
 
Figure 31 - Transaction Harvesting Attack 
The attack consists of two stages: 
Attackers (collection of fraudulent transactions): attackers using Near Field Communication (NFC) 
enabled Android mobile phones can collect fraudulent transactions from unsuspecting cardholders.  
This can be done whilst the contactless card is still in the cardholder’s wallet (see steps 1 to 3 of 
Figure 31). 
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Rogue merchant (converting transactions into money): a rogue merchant converts the collected 
transactions into money in their bank account by sending the transaction data to a bank (steps 4 to 5 of 
Figure 31). 
Finally the transaction request enters the Card payment clearing system where the rogue merchant’s 
bank acts innocently to transfer the transactions into the card payment system, which transfers the 
money from the victim’s bank account into the rogue merchant’s bank account (see steps 6 to 10 of 
Figure 31). 
! Collecting Fraudulent Transactions 
Transactions are collected using a malicious app written for NFC-enabled Android mobile phones.  
The app automatically initiates and collects a transaction immediately upon detection of a contactless 
credit / debit card in the phone’s NFC field.  This process takes less than 500 milliseconds from card 
detection to transaction completion. 
It is imagined that attackers will operate in a similar way to pickpockets, hiding their activity in 
crowded situations such as on public transport or in the crowd at an event.  When a credit / debit card 
is detected, the app gives the attacker an audible signal through their headphones; a second audible 
signal is given when the transaction collection is complete.  This will allow the attacker to operate 
without attracting too much attention. 
Hardware: An Android mobile phone is chosen as the attack platform for the following reasons: 
•! Android mobile phones have a built-in NFC reader. 
•! the Android phone is an innocuous item for the attacker to carry in a crowded place; for 
example, it will not raise attention if the attacker is stopped by the police, since everyone 
carries mobile phones these days. 
•! the Android mobile phone platform provides portability, Internet connectivity and good 
battery life, making it a very capable attack platform. 
•! access to the NFC functionality is open in the Android SDK making it easy to create Android 
apps which can access contactless EMV cards. 
The Transaction Collecting App: The attack starts when the NFC-enabled Android phone identifies 
a contactless credit / debit card which is vulnerable to this attack in the victim’s wallet.  The app sends 
a transaction request to the vulnerable card. 
The app plays an audible alert to the attacker to signal that a vulnerable card has been found. 
When the victim’s card receives the transaction request message, it can approve or decline the 
transaction.  If the card approves the transaction it generates the AC and the SDAD, this proves to the 
bank and POS terminal respectively that the card that approved the transaction was genuine. 
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The cryptographic algorithms used to generate the AC and SDAD also ensure that the transaction 
details cannot be changed subsequent to the card authorising the transaction. 
When the attack is complete the app plays a second audible alert. 
Storage of Approved Transactions: The app was designed to operate in locations where an Internet 
connection is not always available, for example on underground public transport.  Therefore, the app 
will initially store the transaction data returned and when an Internet connection is available, will send 
the stored transaction data to the rogue merchant who will convert the transaction data into money. 
The ability to capture fraudulent transactions offline and store them for later transmission is one of the 
novel features of this attack.  This allows the attack to be operated on a large scale without the need 
for synchronisation. 
Furthermore, storing the transactions minimises the time required to collect fraudulent transactions as 
the app does not have to wait for a connection.  It also allows the attackers to operate in victim-rich 
crowded places that are normally without an Internet connection such as on subway trains, on buses 
and at large events. 
Converting Transaction Data into Money: The criminals would set up a rogue merchant account 
with an acquirer bank in one of the countries that accept EMV payments.  This rogue merchant will 
receive the fraudulent transactions collected by the attackers and convert them into money by sending 
the transaction data to the bank. 
The rogue merchant consists of three elements: 
•! An Internet-based listening service, which will receive collected transaction data from 
attackers. 
•! A data format conversion process, which converts the fraudulent transactions collected by the 
attackers into the format required by the bank. 
•! A rogue POS terminal, which must imitate the actions of a legitimate POS terminal so that it 
does not raise the bank’s suspicion.  To achieve this, the rogue POS takes the previously 
converted data, adds the merchant data and sends that data to the bank using an Internet 
Protocol (IP) connection. 
Internet-Based Listening Service: The rogue merchant provides an Internet-based listening service 
on a pre-arranged IP address and port number, to receive the fraudulent transactions from the 
attackers.  The transactions are initially stored to be processed later, once the merchant details have 
been added to the transaction and the connection to the acquirer bank is available. 
Data Format Conversion Process: Financial presentment request messages are used to transmit 
EMV credit / debit card transactions between the merchant (who captured the transaction) and the 
acquirer bank (who will process the transaction). 
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Merchant-related data such as merchant ID, terminal ID and the merchant’s bank account details are 
added to the transaction to complete the data required by the EMV card clearing system.  The 
fraudulent transaction is now ready for transmission to the acquirer bank. 
The exact format of the message will differ slightly between different acquirer banks.  However, there 
are a number of mandatory fields that are the same for every acquirer bank.  Standard 70 [65] in the 
UK and ISO 8583 [66] in other EMV countries define the mandatory data fields which must appear in 
the financial presentment request message and the optional fields which may differ between the 
acquirer banks. 
The software for our attack prototype implements a Standard 70 message format, complete with all of 
the mandatory fields and a number of optional fields (6.6). 
! Rogue POS Terminal Process 
Once correctly formatted, the financial presentment request message is sent to the bank.  The acquirer 
bank returns a financial presentment response message, to which the merchant responds with a 
financial presentment confirmation message that acknowledges receipt of the acquirer’s response 
message. 
The supported communication options for this message exchange are PSTN, X25 over ISDN, IP over 
ISDN, and IP over public networks (i.e.  the Internet) for transmission of messages between the 
merchant and the acquirer bank.  The software implementation presented in this chapter uses IP over 
the Internet. 
Our software implements data format conversion, section 6.6.3.2, and implements the sending of the 
financial presentment request message, Table 7 over an IP connection protected by SSL/TLS 
encryption.   
For obvious reasons we were unable to check against a real bank.  Of course, one approach to 
defeating the attack is to try to detect rogue POS behaviour at the bank, but it is not clear how well 
this can be done.  A simple solution would be to have the payment card reject any contactless foreign 
currency transaction immediately, but is just not practical.  A more effective solution can be 
implemented by either forcing foreign currency contactless transactions to be carried out in online 
mode only, or where that is not possible, to switch the transaction to Chip & PIN. 
6.6! Implementation 
To validate our research, we have implemented a number of software elements which demonstrate the 
viability and practicality of the attack.  The software consists of three separate applications: 
•! An Android mobile phone app which captures transactions from the cards.  Transactions are 
stored on the Android phone to be transmitted to the rogue merchant later. 
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•! A rogue merchant Internet listening service which waits to receive the captured transactions 
from attackers using the Android mobile phone app. 
•! A rogue merchant bank communications module which packages the transactions into 
financial presentment request messages for transmission to the bank.  This module handles all 
of the communication with the bank, which involves sending the financial presentment 
request messages and receiving acknowledgement messages. 
! Android Transaction Capture App 
We have implemented the attack platform on an NFC enabled Android mobile phone as this would be 
an innocuous device for an attacker to carry around in a crowd. 
For implementation and testing, we selected the Google Nexus 5 mobile phone.  Implementing on a 
mobile phone platform limits the effective range to approximately 1 cm.  However, in testing the 
Nexus 5 was capable of extracting transactions from an EMV contactless card which was located in a 
leather wallet in the pocket of a pair of jeans worn by our “unsuspecting” test victim. 
! Android App Operation 
The attacker starts by pre-setting the amount and currency for all the transactions which will be 
captured from the victims cards (Figure 32).  
 
Figure 32 - Transaction Harvesting Settings 
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Figure 32 shows the attacker setting the amount to 999,999.00 and setting the currency code to 0978 
which is the code for Euros.  In testing we have also obtained transaction approvals in for 999,999.99 
US Dollars, currency code 0840. 
The app is now ready and will automatically collect a transaction from every EMV contactless card 
that it detects, without any further interaction from the attacker.  This will minimise the chance of the 
attacker being detected, as they are not constantly interacting with their phone. 
 
Figure 33 - Capturing the Transaction 
In Figure 33 the screen on the left shows the app waiting to detect an EMV contactless card.  The 
screen on the right shows the €999,999.99 transaction being captured from the card. 
When the app detects an EMV contactless card, it sounds an audible alert in the attacker’s 
headphones; a second alert is given once the transaction has been successfully collected.  This takes 
less than 500 milliseconds.  Once the transaction has been captured the app stores the transaction data 
for transmission to the rogue merchant later.  As soon as the app has collected a transaction, it 
automatically returns to waiting to detect another EMV card; it is now ready to collect the next 
transaction. 
Figure 34 shows the data fields as captured by the app, this includes all of the data and cryptographic 
authorisation codes required by the bank to accept the transaction as genuine. 
Chapter 6 Foreign Currency Flaw 
86 
The mobile app stores transaction data until it has an Internet connection, at which point the app 
transmits the data to the rogue merchant. 
 
Figure 34 - Captured Transaction Data 
The code implements the kernel 3 fDDA [7] contactless transaction protocol sequence, Figure 18, as 
this is an offline only contactless protocol.  This allows the attack to be performed in less than 500 
milliseconds and avoids additional validation by the bank. 
The transaction data is sent by the card in TAG / Length / Value (TLV) format.  The Android 
application stores all of the data fields returned by the card for later transmission to the rogue 
merchant. 
Our software can collect and store multiple offline transactions, without a connection to the Internet.  
The stored transactions can then be transmitted once a suitable connection is available.  The 
transaction details will include all of the data fields required by the bank.  The Application 
Cryptogram (AC) and the clear text equivalent fields listed in section 3.5.2 are arguably the most 
important, as together they are used by the bank to verify and thereby approve the transaction. 
! The Rogue Merchant Application 
The rogue merchant application consists of three processes: 
•! an Internet listening service to receive the captured transactions from the Android app 
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•! a data conversion module which converts the EMV data in TLV format into the ISO 8583 / 
Standard 70 format required by the Issuing bank 
•! a POS terminal emulation which sends the formatted data to the bank to collect the money 
from the fraudulent transactions 
6.6.3.1! Internet Based Listening Service 
This is a simple Internet based service which listens to a pre-agreed IP address and port number.  The 
Android transaction capture app connects to the pre-arranged IP address and port number to send all 
of the collected transactions to the rogue merchant.  The listening service stores the transactions for 
later processing. 
6.6.3.2! Data Conversion Process 
The data conversion process accepts TLV data as captured from the EMV credit / debit card and 
converts it into ISO8583 / Standard 70 format required by the bank. 
To request the money from the victim’s account, the rogue merchant must send a financial 
presentment message (in ISO8583 or Standard 70 format) to the acquirer bank that holds their 
merchant account.   
Table 7 shows the data fields required by the ISO 8583 financial presentment message and shows how 
the rogue merchant will complete the data fields from the data generated by the EMV card during 
transaction approval. 
6.6.3.3! POS Terminal Emulation 
Once the financial presentment request message has been generated, it is sent to the acquirer bank to 
complete the transaction and transfer the money from the victim’s bank account into the rogue 
merchant’s account. 
In the UK, communications with the acquirer bank over a public IP network must be protected using 
Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) or IPSec [65]. 
The use of standard encryption such as SSL/TLS and/or IPSec allows the rogue terminal to be 
implemented in Java on a PC platform; no specialist hardware is required, illustrated in Table 7. 
Table 7 - Financial Presentment Message Data Requirements 
Item Name Description and mapping to EMV card data 
1 bit map extended  List of fields included in the message 
2 primary account number  *0x5A – 16-digit card account number 
3  processing code  Constant 00 for goods and purchases 
4  amount, transaction 0x9F02 – the transaction amount 
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5  amount, reconciliation  Transaction amount 0x9F02 converted into the 
currency to be applied to the victim’s card, this 
value is calculated by the rogue POS terminal 
7  date and time, transmission  Date and time the rogue POS transmits the 
transaction to the bank 
9  conversion rate, reconciliation Conversion rate for the reconciliation amount, 
calculated by the rogue POS terminal 
10  conversion rate, cardholder billing  As above; this value is calculated by the rogue 
POS terminal 
11  systems trace audit number  Transaction sequence number generated by the 
rogue POS terminal 
14  date, expiration  0x5F24 – Expiry date of the card (YYMM) 
16  date, conversion  Date / time of the currency conversion (same as 7) 
19  country code, acquiring institution Country code of the rogue POS terminal (e.g.  
0826 for UK, 0840 for USA, 0036 for Australia) 
20 country code, primary account number 0x5F28 – Country code for the card i.e.  0826 – 
UK 
21  country code, forwarding institution 0x5F28 – Country code for the bank that issued 
the card i.e.  0826 – UK 
22  point of service entry mode Type of POS terminal, constant value “051” for 
Chip & PIN / EMV contactless terminals 
23  card sequence number  0x5F34 – Identifies subsidiary EMV cards issued 
on the same 16-digit account number 
25   point of service condition code  Constant “00” normal card presentment 
26   point of service PIN capture code  Constant “x8xx” indicates a POS terminal that 
accepts up to 8 digits 
27 approval code length  Constant set by acquirer bank 
32  acquiring institution identification code Constant set by acquirer bank 
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33  forwarding institution identification 
code 
Constant set by acquirer bank, indicates the 
institution that will provide the card payment 
clearing (steps 6 to 9 in Figure 31) 
34  primary account number, extended  Not applicable to kernel 3 – used only when the 
primary account number begins with “59” 
39  action code (was response code)  Constant “0xx” for financial transaction request 
messages 
43  card acceptor name/location  Constant string name and location of the merchant 
49  currency code, transaction  0x5F2A – Transaction currency code 
50  currency code, reconciliation  Currency code for reconciliation, see item 5 
51  currency code, cardholder billing  0x9F42 – Currency Code from the card. 
66  country code, receiving institution 0x5F28 – Country code for the bank that issued 
the card i.e.  0826 – UK 
100  receiving institution identification code  Code that identifies victim’s bank – ISO 7812 
102  account identification 1 Information contained in 16-digit card account 
number 0x5A 
103 account identification 2 Information contained in 16-digit card account 
number 0x5A 
*EMV data fields from the EMV protocol are denoted by their EMV reference number e.g.  0x5A. 
Table 8 shows the communication sequence required for the POS emulation to transmit a transaction 
to the acquirer bank. 
Table 8 - POS / Acquirer Communication Sequence 
Message From → To Purpose 
financial presentment request message POS → Acquirer Requests approval and money transfer by the acquirer 
financial presentment response Acquirer → POS Contains the answer to the request 
financial presentment confirmation POS → Acquirer Confirms that the response was received 
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6.7! Test Results 
The attack software has been tested against various UK-issued credit / debit cards. Table 9 shows the 
vulnerability of several different card types. 
Table 9 - Vulnerability of UK-Issued Contactless Card Types 
Card Type Max Value Comment 
Kernel 3 credit cards (UK currency) 85.00 Kernel 3 credit cards will approve 
multiple transactions until offline 
limit reached  
Kernel 3 credit cards (foreign 
currency) 
999,999.99 Kernel 3 credit cards will approve 
foreign currency transactions up to 
the maximum value possible in EMV 
Kernel 3 debit cards (UK currency) 45.00 Kernel 3 debit cards will approve 
multiple transactions until offline 
limit reached 
Kernel 3 debit cards (foreign currency) 0.00 to 5,000.00 The value authorised by kernel 3 
debit cards varied dependent on 
Issuing Bank 
Kernel 2 credit and debit cards Not Applicable Kernel 2 (MasterCard) is not affected 
by this attack as the cards request 
online completion of transactions in 
local currency and foreign currencies 
! Transaction Capture Timings 
The Android transaction capture app is designed to operate as quickly as possible, thereby reducing 
the risk of detection for the attacker.  The software automatically collects the fraudulent transaction as 
soon as it detects a Kernel 3 contactless credit or debit card.  Table 10 shows analysis of protocol 
timings from 20 captured fraudulent transactions. 
Table 10 - Fraudulent Transaction Capture Timings 
Statistics Time (ms) 
Average transaction duration (card discovery to transaction approval) 478 
Standard deviation 36 
Fastest transaction 452 
Slowest transaction 527 
6.8! Potential Solutions 
The key weakness exploited in this chapter is that Kernel 3 credit cards will authorise unlimited value 
transactions in a foreign currency.  This makes the attack described in this chapter both scalable and 
very lucrative. 
The solution is relatively simple.  This can be done by changing future Kernel 3 credit cards to 
implement one or both of the following: 
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•! the cards will request online completion of contactless foreign currency transactions; making the 
transaction subject to the additional online verification steps. 
•! the cards will force Chip & PIN completion of all foreign currency transactions; this will eliminate 
the possibility of high value transactions without the added security of cardholder’s PIN. 
6.9! Conclusion 
In this chapter we have demonstrated that it is possible to collect high value transactions from 
contactless Kernel 3 credit cards whilst the card is still in the victim’s wallet.  The attack exploits a 
previously undocumented flaw in the cards, in which the cards will approve transactions of unlimited 
value in a foreign currency.  Combined with the lack of POS terminal authentication and the threat of 
contactless payment card skimming, this vulnerability poses a real risk that allows high value 
fraudulent transaction to be harvested and converted into money. 
Our experimental results show that the attack could be implemented in the “real world”, as the 
average time to capture the transaction was less than 500 milliseconds and Android phones with NFC 
are cheap and readily available 
We have also outlined a scenario by which the captured fraudulent transactions could be exploited by 
a rogue merchant to access the money in the victim’s bank account.  The rogue merchant receives the 
transactions and passes them off as genuine transactions to their bank.  It should be noted that 
although we have implemented the rogue POS terminal software, we have not tested it against a live 
acquirer transaction clearing system.   
We have proposed two simple changes in the operation of Kernel 3 credit cards that would eliminate 
the risk posed by this attack.  Both of which use the existing functionality of the cards and would 
therefore be relatively inexpensive to implement.
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Chapter 7.! Risks of Contactless Verify PIN 
 
This chapter describes a vulnerability discovered by using the analysis methodology described in 
Chapter 5.  The vulnerability arises from an omission in the kernel 3 (Visa) contactless specification.  
Whilst the kernel 2 (MasterCard) specification [67] defines that the functionality of ‘offline 
contactless PIN and Verify’ is excluded for security reasons, the kernel 3 card does not have an 
equivalent statement.  This omission leaves it unclear what the recommended action should be for 
Kernel 3 cards when they receive a contactless PIN Verify command.  
Because the specification does not say what to do, this leaves the implementation decision in the 
hands of the card manufacturer and the Issuing Bank.  Some Kernel 3 contactless cards excluded the 
functionality. However, as at 2014, 18.5 million [31] UK issued kernel 3 contactless cards did include 
the PIN Verify functionality. 
7.1! The Contactless PIN Verify Vulnerability 
In the UK the EMV specification for contact transactions supports PIN verification locally by the card 
(offline) and PIN verification remotely by the bank’s computers (online).  The specifications for 
contactless transactions specifically exclude the use of offline PIN verification (full details in [7] Book 
A section 5.9.3 and [68] section 2.4 point 5) because contactless offline PIN verification would 
require the PIN to be transmitted wirelessly to the card which poses a security risk from 
eavesdropping. 
The EMV specification does not permit PIN entry for contactless cards.  PIN entry is allowed on 
transactions made using NFC enabled mobile devices.  Mobile device payments are controlled by 
Consumer Device CVM2 rules, which permit online PIN verification, but not offline PIN (full details 
in [7] Book C3 sections 2.1 and 5.7). 
This chapter examines the security implications of the verify PIN functionality intended for Chip & 
PIN operation also being available over the contactless interface, where it can be accessed without the 
                                                      
 
2 Cardholder Verification Method (CVM) is the method by which the cardholder proves that they are the 
genuine cardholder and the  PIN or by signature 
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cardholder’s knowledge or consent.  Surprisingly many of the contactless cards currently in 
circulation in the UK allow access to offline verify PIN. 
The attack scenario presented draws upon research carried out into the predictability of PINs [69] 
which shows that there is a subset of PINs that are much more commonly used; meaning guesses from 
this subset are much more likely to be successful. 
The implementation work builds upon related investigations into the vulnerability of EMV contactless 
payment cards to various attacks, such as skimming [51] [41] and transaction relay [43] [42] .  These 
papers show that the wireless interface makes contactless payment cards vulnerable to new modes of 
attack that were not present in Chip & PIN.  Other research [70] [13] show that the EMV protocol 
sequence can be manipulated to produce erroneous behaviour in the cards and the POS terminals. 
In what follows, we first introduce the attack scenario then the technology used and finally the 
performance results demonstrating the practicality of the attack.  A critical part of our software 
implementation is the ability to find and attack EMV payment cards contained in a wallet with various 
other contactless cards.  Our software implements the ISO-14443 part 3 protocol sequence for card 
initialisation and anti-collision.  It can identify multiple cards, select each card in turn and 
communicate with each card once selected. 
7.2! Attack Scenario 
The attack scenario outlined in this chapter is presented as supporting evidence of our assertion that 
allowing contactless access to offline verify PIN represents a tangible threat to a large number of 
EMV payment cards currently in circulation in the UK.   
Newcastle University, like many other companies and institutions, uses NFC enabled identity cards to 
control access to our buildings.  When entering the building, many of us place our whole wallet on the 
door access reader as it is quicker and easier than taking the access card out of the wallet.  This gives 
an attacker the opportunity to access the other cards in the wallet, communicating with any contactless 
payment cards also present. 
Given that the person will enter the building on a regular basis and that the number of available PIN 
attempts is reset each time the payment card is used in a POS terminal or ATM, the attacker can have 
unlimited attempts to guess a card’s PIN. 
In our experimental implementation of the attack scenario we make use of (i) a protocol sequence 
which exploits the verify PIN functionality (ii) the ability to access multiple cards in a single wallet 
presented to the door access reader (iii) a strategy for guessing PINs [69] which will yield the greatest 
number of correct guesses. 
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! PIN Verify Protocol Sequence 
CardNFC'Reader
ListAvailableNFCApplications()
List'of'available'applications
SelectApplication(AID)
Processing'Data'Options'List'/'PDOL
VerifyPIN'(PIN'Guess)
PIN'Correct
['while'PIN'attempts'remaining'>'1']Loop
ChooseApplication()
GetData(PIN'Attempts)
PIN'Attempts'Remaining
PIN'Incorrect'K'‘n’'attempts'remaining
EncipherPIN(Guess)
GetChallenge'()
Card'Unpredictable'Number
 
Figure 35 - Verify PIN Protocol Sequence 
The full protocol sequence, Figure 35, is designed to guess the PIN without locking the card; locking 
occurs when all of the available PIN attempts are used (i.e.  PIN attempts remaining > 1).  The Verify 
Pin protocol uses the minimum number of commands possible so that it can be completed quickly 
(<500ms) to avoid arousing the suspicions of the cardholder.  The protocol sequence is limited to a 
maximum of two guesses each time the cardholder uses the door.  However, over time the attack has 
multiple chances to run the protocol sequence as the person will regularly return to the door access 
reader and each time the card is used in a POS terminal or ATM, the PIN attempt counter is reset 
giving more chances. 
The PIN verify protocol sequence described above ensures that at least one PIN attempt is left on the 
card.  However, the logic can be changed to create a nuisance attack which wipes out all of the 
available PIN attempts on all of the EMV payment cards in the wallet.  This would not yield any 
financial gain, but there are many malicious attacks performed purely for the nuisance value.  A card 
that has zero PIN attempts remaining cannot be reactivated at the POS terminal and the cardholder 
must go to a bank ATM. 
! Reading Multiple Cards 
The scenario requires reader software capable of distinguishing between multiple NFC cards in a 
wallet, allowing it to locate the EMV payment cards (implementation details can be found in section 
7.3.1).  This also gives the potential to look for additional data such as the cardholder’s birthday on 
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the other cards in the wallet, such as loyalty cards which may hold personal data unencrypted.  
Bonneau et al. [69] shows that knowing the person’s birthday increases the chances of guessing their 
PIN within 6 guesses from 1.94% to 8.23%. 
! PIN Guessing Strategy 
The attack scenario presented accesses the card each time the cardholder enters the building.  This 
gives it potentially unlimited guesses at the PIN over time, two guesses each time the door access is 
used.  Bonneau et al. [69] presents a survey containing a study of 1,351 respondents, 805 of which 
detailed the respondents choice of PIN and their reason for choosing it.  The survey shows that 23% 
of respondents chose a memorable date (birthday and anniversary) as their PIN.  The paper goes 
further and identifies a list of PINs which are statistically more likely; using this list, the paper 
calculates that given 6 guesses, the chance of correctly guessing the PIN is 1.94%, which rises to 
8.23% if the birthday of the cardholder is known.  This research is backed up by a recent news story 
[71] where a burglar stole a wallet in which he found a driving licence and two ATM cards, he 
correctly guessed the PIN from the date of birth on the driving licence and was able to obtain £1,000 
from a nearby ATM. 
7.3! Software Implementation 
The experimental work in preparing this chapter includes (i) an implementation of the verify PIN 
protocol sequence which makes multiple attempts to guess the PIN of any EMV payment card 
detected in the wallet (ii) a multiple card reader implementation which will identify and communicate 
with all of the contactless cards in the wallet. 
The experiments were performed using an ACR122-U contactless card reader [72] and the Java™ 
Smart Card I/O API [73]. 
! Verify PIN Implementation 
The UML sequence diagram, Figure 35, illustrates the protocol sequence required to perform the 
verify PIN attack sequence.  The sequence employs the minimum number of commands which 
achieve two contactless verify PIN attempts, this minimises total execution time (on average 457.2ms) 
for the sequence.  Minimising execution time is important to ensure that the attack is not easily 
detected by the cardholders using the door access. 
The protocol sequence is initiated when the multiple card reader, section 9.2.1, detects an EMV 
payment card in the wallet.  The protocols sequence therefore starts with the EMV payment card in 
the active state ready to accept commands, see Table 16 for a full explanation of the possible card 
states.  Once the reader has established communication with the card it reads the number of PIN 
attempts remaining using GetData(PIN$Attempts).  It then calls the verify PIN command in a loop.  
The card responds with 0x9000 if the PIN is correct or 0x63Cn if the PIN is incorrect, where ‘n’ is the 
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number of PIN attempts remaining.  The loop is repeated until the correct PIN is guessed or only one 
PIN attempt remains. 
We observed that the contactless PIN is the same as the contact PIN, this was confirmed by changing 
the card’s contact PIN using an ATM and verifying that the contactless PIN had also changed  
! Verify PIN Protocol Sequence 
Based on the data obtained in our tests the average time required to perform the PIN verify protocol 
sequence, Figure 35, was only 457.2ms; thereby strengthening the case that the door access reader 
attack scenario can be implemented without raising the suspicions of the users of the door access 
system. 
The time taken to perform each of the commands in the verify PIN protocol sequence is detailed in 
Table 11 which shows the average time and standard deviation calculated from 20 test runs performed 
using EMV payment cards issued by a UK bank. 
Table 11 - Verify PIN Command Execution Times 
Command average (ms) Std dev (ms) 
ListAvailableNFCApplications()$ 18.4 12.7 
SelectApplication(AID)$ 19.2 5.5 
GetData(PIN$attempts)$ 29.8 17.9 
GetChallenge()$ 24.6 7.0 
VerifyPIN(incorrect$PIN)$ 175.8 7.2 
GetChallenge()$ 12.2 6.8 
VerifyPIN(correct$PIN)$ 177.2 9.6 
Complete$Protocol$Sequence$ 457.2 24.9 
 
The results show that 77.2% of the total time was taken by the card responding to the VerifyPIN() 
command.  It is also interesting to note that there is no significant difference between a correct PIN 
(177.2ms) and an incorrect PIN (175.8ms).   
7.4! Summary 
The attack scenario described in this chapter exploits contactless verify PIN to give potentially 
unlimited attempts to guess the cardholder’s PIN without their knowledge.  The implementation work 
has successfully built and tested software that proves this attack scenario is technically viable.  The 
timing tests prove that the attack protocol sequence can be performed in less than 1 second, making it 
possible to access the payment cards in the wallet without arousing the suspicions of the cardholder.  
In the suggested scenario the attack protocol sequence can access a victim’s card multiple times over 
a number of days, this significantly increases the odds that the attack will guess their PIN correctly.   
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It is our assertion that the attack scenario and experimental implementation work presented in this 
chapter make a compelling case that contactless verify PIN can be misused in order to find out the 
PIN of the card without the knowledge of the cardholder.  This significantly impacts the underlying 
security assumption of the Chip & PIN payment system, that an attacker can only gain knowledge of 
the cardholder’s PIN through the negligence or collaboration of the cardholder.  Moreover, offline 
verify PIN is not required in the processing of contactless transactions and is therefore a redundant 
functionality.  These findings suggest that it would be prudent to remove the contactless verify PIN 
functionality.  It may also help if cardholders are educated about the risks of placing their whole 
wallet on a contactless reader rather than removing the card from the wallet prior to use. 
! Verification by Testing and Analysis 
Testing was performed using the specific protocol sequences developed for each card, the results of 
the tests were as follows 
•! Kernel 2 contactless credit and debit cards from several different UK banks were tested, all of 
the cards responded with an error code "command not available". 
•! Kernel 4 payment cards all responded with an error code "command not available". 
•! Kernel 3 contactless debit cards from a number of UK banks were tested which were based on 
the NXP Smart MX chipset, these cards responded with an error code "command not 
available". 
•! Kernel 3 credit and debit cards issued by a major UK bank, responded with PIN OK / PIN 
INCORRECT.  Indicating that the offline PIN verify command was accessible via the 
contactless interface.  It was noted that all of the cards that responded in this way were based 
on an Infineon Chipset. Corporate contactless cards issued by the same bank, with the NXP 
Smart MX chipset, were not affected by the verify PIN flaw. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from the experiments is that this is not a fundamental error in the 
EMV contactless specification, it is rather, an error in interpretation of the specification by a given 
UK bank and the card manufacturer.   
However, the error can be traced back to the specification being too ambiguous.  Kernel 2 clearly 
states offline PIN Verify is "not allowed".  The kernel 3 and kernel 4 specifications do not specifically 
state either way, and the general case for all card types given in [7] Book A only states offline PIN 
Verify is not suitable due to timing issues. 
EMV cards and POS terminals are implemented with maximum interoperability in mind, with the aim 
of never declining a transaction because the card and the POS terminal are not compatible.  The 
specification should always clearly state when functionality is undesirable for security reasons as the 
default assumption will always be to include functionality that is not necessarily required for future 
compatibility. 
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7.5! Conclusion 
This vulnerability shows that the contactless interface can allow unauthorised access to the secure 
contact Chip & PIN functionality of the card.  Therefore it can be argued that this shows that a 
usability feature of contactless payments impacts on the security of EMV Chip & PIN cards. 
As part of the responsible disclosure of this discovery several months before this chapter was 
published at Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2013, we have shared our findings and the test 
results to the UK Cards Association, Visa, MasterCard and the UK bank whose cards were affected. 
This led to a full discussion with the UK bank about how the problem with offline PIN verify was 
discovered and we provided the bank with the details of the results from the different card chipsets 
NXP and Infineon. 
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Chapter 8.! POS Authentication 
 
Several University research teams have demonstrated that the wireless interface makes EMV 
contactless cards vulnerable to new types of attack that were not possible for EMV Chip & PIN cards: 
skimming attacks [41], eavesdropping attacks [50], access the card’s secure functionality [27] and 
harvesting fraudulent transactions, Chapter 6.  These attacks are possible because the cards will 
communicate with any device equipped with an NFC reader that comes within range, even without 
the cardholder’s knowledge.  To address this vulnerability, this chapter presents a POS terminal 
authentication solution for EMV contactless payment cards.  Terminal authentication allows 
contactless cards to distinguish genuine POS terminals from other NFC readers and thereby restrict 
the access to its sensitive data and secure application functionality. 
The POS Authentication work was carried out in collaboration with Joseph Hannon.  We have 
implemented and tested a prototype transaction protocol. Our experiment shows that it was possible 
for the card to successfully authenticate the POS terminal and for the POS to authenticate the card.  
This was achieved using the existing kernel 3 (Visa) contactless transaction message sequence, Figure 
18.  We implemented our prototype transaction protocol with an Android mobile phone acting as the 
payment device and a PC acting as the POS terminal. 
The challenge was to create a method of preventing EMV cards from revealing sensitive data to 
unauthorised readers.  This must be performed within the constraints of  
•! completing the transaction in less than 1 second to make it compatible with a consumers 
expectation for a contactless transaction 
•! perform an additional cryptographic authentication process whilst keeping data volume within 
current EMV restrictions of 256 bytes 
•! maintain the cryptographic security of transaction  
•! compatibility with the existing EMV infrastructure 
Our solution combines several existing technologies in an innovative way to solve the complex issues 
related to adding functionality to a global payment system such as EMV.  The contribution of the 
solution is outlined below. 
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8.1! Outline of Proposed Solution  
The Chip & PIN technology on EMV payment cards have been proven relatively secure against card 
fraud since the introduction of DDA and CDA cards in 2009.  Contactless payment technology adds a 
wireless interface to EMV cards, which allows it to be accessed whilst it is still the cardholder’s 
wallet, even without their knowledge.   
In the current EMV payment system the cards must prove to POS terminals that they are genuine, the 
reverse is not true.  NFC enabled devices such as smart phones are becoming more common, these 
can mimic POS terminal’s behaviour.  The lack of terminal authentication could lead to cases where 
rogue terminals might carry out skimming and eavesdropping attacks, leading to fraudulent 
transactions. 
Our solution aims to address this imbalance by making it necessary for any NFC enabled device 
attempting to access the card to authenticate itself.  In other words, our solution will prevent the card 
from revealing sensitive information, unless the NFC reader can prove it is a genuine POS terminal 
issued by a bank. 
Any NFC reader attempting to access the card will be challenged by the card to authenticate itself as a 
genuine bank-issued POS terminal.  The card sends an unpredictable number (nonce) to the POS 
terminal, and the terminal must authenticate itself by producing an Elliptic Curve Digital Signature 
Algorithm (ECDSA) signature based on this nonce challenge Figure 39.  The card is able to validate 
the ECDSA signature, Figure 38, using a three-tier Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) based on the 
Certificate Authority public key.  Once POS authentication is complete the transaction can continue 
and card authentication is performed as per the current EMV protocol. 
Restricting Access to the Card’s Sensitive Data / Secure Functionality. 
The card will restrict access to sensitive data and secure functionality until POS authentication has 
taken place.  This is achieved using a state machine similar to that currently implemented by 
MasterCard [68].  The state machine, Figure 37, will control the sequence in which EMV commands 
can be called, and thereby the data that can be accessed. 
Integration with the Existing EMV Protocol Sequence. 
There are seven EMV contactless protocol sequences, kernel 1 - Visa, kernel 2 - MasterCard, kernel 3 
- Visa fDDA, kernel 4 - American Express, kernel 5 - JCB, kernel 6 - Discover and kernel 7 – 
UnionPay.  The POS authentication functionality has been designed so that it can be incorporated into 
all seven protocol sequences without changing the command sequence.  To achieve this, the solution 
adds new data fields, Table 13, to the two commands that occur at the start of all seven protocol 
sequences: Select() and GetProcessingOptions().  Figure 36 shows how the POS 
authentication functionality is incorporated into the kernel 3 protocol sequence. 
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Elliptic Curve Cryptography.   
The EMV protocol has a restricted message size of 256 bytes.  This does not cause problems in the 
existing RSA authentication of the card by the POS terminal, as the card can pass several 256-byte 
messages in response to a single POS terminal message.  However, this does cause a problem in the 
proposed POS authentication solution as the POS terminal must pass all of authentication information 
in a single 256-byte message.  The solution for this problem is to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
(ECC), which provides increased cryptographic strength over the existing RSA scheme [74] whilst 
allowing the authentication information to be passed in a single (256 byte) message.  The proposed 
ECC curve and algorithms are compliant with EMV’s proposed adoption of ECC [75]. 
8.2! Transaction protocol 
There are seven variations of the EMV contactless transaction protocol sequence.  The prototype 
implements the kernel 3 (Visa fDDA) transaction, Figure 18.  Kernel 3 was selected as it contains the 
least number of commands of any of the seven protocol sequences, and therefore it was the most 
challenging protocol for incorporation of the POS authentication functionality.  Given that we can 
incorporate the POS authentication protocol into kernel 3 we should therefore be able to incorporate 
POS authentication into any of the other kernels. 
In Figure 36, the additions to the protocol required for POS authentication are coloured blue:   
•! POS authentication uses the Select() command, Figure 36 - point 6.0, and the 
GetProcessingOptions() command, Figure 36 - point 8.0, since these command are 
common to all seven contactless protocols.  Select() and GetProcessingOptions() 
are also the first two commands in each of the protocol sequences which allow the protocol 
sequence to be halted before any sensitive data is divulged by the card.   
•! The request for POS authentication has been added to the PDOL returned by the Select() 
command, Figure 36 - point 6.3.  Details of the new structure of the PDOL are given in 
section 8.2.1.  The PDOL was chosen as the trigger for POS authentication as it is currently 
the way that the card requests information from the POS terminal. 
•! The nonce is also contained in the response to the Select() command, Figure 36 - point 
6.3.  The nonce is an 8-byte unpredictable number which the POS terminal must sign with its 
private key to produce the ECDSA authentication signature, Figure 38 - ECDSA Signed 
Nonce.  A nonce is used to ensure that the ECDSA signature cannot be recorded by an 
attacker and replayed to gain access to the card. 
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CardTerminal
1.0.InitiateTransaction()
3.0.PresentCardToTerminal()
4.0.ListAvailableNFCApplications()
4.1.List.of.available.applications
6.0.SelectApplication(AID)
6.3.Card.data,.PDOL.list.and.Nonce
4.2.Command.Error
6.4.Command.Error
8.0.GetProcessingOptions(PDOL.data,.
signed.nonce,.public.key.certificates)
8.9.Transaction.Approved.O.TC.+.SDAD.+.
plaintext.SDAD.+.AC.+.AFL
8.10.Transaction.Must.Go.Online.OARQC
8.12.Command.Error
8.11.Transaction.Declined.O.AAC
9.0.ReadAFLRecord(SFI,.Record)
9.1.AFL.record
[.for.each.AFL.SFI./.record.]
11.0.RemoveCard()
Loop
8.3.GenerateUPN()
8.4.GenerateSDAD()
8.5.GenerateAC()
8.6.UpdateTransactionCount()
8.7.DecrementNFCCount()
8.8.UpdateAvailableOffline()
10.0.ValidateTransaction()
Validating.the.transaction.
also.authenticates.the.card
7.1.PopulatePDOL()
Including.signature.and.
terminal.public.key.
certificates
2.0.WaitForCard()
5.0.ChooseAID()
5.1.SelectTheKernel(AID)
6.1.GenerateNonce()
6.2.Request.new.fields.in.PDOL
8.1.ValidatePOSSignature()
Using.CA.public.key.and.
terminal.public.keys.
8.2.On.error.return.“Other.Interface”
7.0.GenerateSignature()
 
Figure 36 - Prototype POS Authentication Transaction protocol Sequence 
 
The POS terminal generates the ECDSA authentication signature, Figure 36 - point 7.0, which is then 
returned in the message data contained in the GetProcessingOptions() command, Figure 36 - 
point 8.0.  The message also contains the Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone (ECQV) implicit certificates 
and other data required by the card to validate the ECDSA signature. 
If POS authentication fails, the card returns “Try Another Interface”, Figure 36 -  point 8.2, which will 
cause the POS terminal to request a Chip & PIN contact transaction.  This has the advantage that it 
ensures that the transaction is not lost if the POS terminal is not compatible with POS authentication.  
POS terminals which have not been updated to include POS authentication will follow the existing 
EMV protocol and continue the transaction in Chip & PIN mode [7]  
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! Processing Options Data Object List (PDOL) 
The PDOL is a list of data fields that the card requests from the POS terminal.  For POS 
authentication, the PDOL must contain all of the standard transaction fields, Table 12.  In addition, it 
must also contain the new fields required for POS authentication, Table 13. 
Table 12 - Transaction Data Fields in the Current kernel 3 PDOL 
TAG Length Description 
9F66 4 bytes Terminal Transaction Qualifiers (kernel 3 specific; this tag will need be changed for 
each of the different issuer card types) 
9F02 6 bytes Transaction amount 
9F03 6 bytes Amount other (used for cashback always zero) 
9F1A 2 bytes Terminal country code 
95 5 bytes Terminal verification results (always zero at this stage) 
5F2A 2 bytes Transaction currency code 
9A 3 bytes Transaction date 
9C 1 bytes Transaction type (always 00 for purchase) 
9F37 4 bytes POS terminal nonce 
 
Table 13 - Fields Required for POS Authentication 
TAG Length Description 
9F81 64 bytes  ECDSA signed nonce  
9F82 64 bytes  Acquirer implicit certificate (Figure 38 - Aic) 
9F83 9 bytes  Acquirer ID data 
9F84 64 bytes  Terminal implicit certificate (Figure 38- Tic) 
9F85 9 bytes  Terminal ID data (Figure 38- Tid) 
! Acquirer ID (Aid) and Terminal ID (Tid) Information 
The Aid and Tid contain the plain-text data which is used to calculate the ECQV Acquirer implicit 
certificate (Aic) and Terminal implicit certificate (Tic).  Details of the data contained in Aid and Tid 
are given in Table 14 
Table 14 - Acquirer and Terminal ID Information 
Field Length Data 
ID number 4 bytes Identity of the acquirer (Figure 38 – Aid)  
Identity of the terminal (Figure 38 – Tid) 
Expiry Date 2 bytes MMYY 
Serial Number 3 bytes Version number of implicit certificate 
Total 9 bytes  
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The format of the Aid and Tid data has been designed to follow the issuer information contained in 
the current EMV RSA public key certificates [6] (i.e.  4-byte issuer ID, 2-byte expiry date, and 3-byte 
serial number). 
! Controlling Access to the Card’s Data and Functionality 
The cards will require a state machine similar to that currently implemented by MasterCard, Figure 37.  
The MasterCard state machine is relevant to the proposed solution in that the two major control points 
used there are the Select() and GetProcessingOptions() commands. 
 
Figure 37 - MasterCard State Machine (source [17]) 
When the card is “IDLE”, Select() is the only command that can be called.  Successful 
completion of Select() places the card into the “SELECTED” state.   
Being in the “SELECTED” state allows access to GetProcessingOptions() which puts the 
card into the “INITIATED” state.  In turn, this state gives full access to the card. 
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In order to make our proposed solution work, there is a need to alter the existing state machine, 
whereby the ReadRecord() command is moved to after the “INITIATED” state, which prevents 
the card’s sensitive information from being read prior to POS authentication being completed. 
! Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) 
A 512-bit ECC scheme has been selected for the proposed solution as it provides a higher 
cryptographic bit-strength than EMV’s current 1984-bit RSA scheme.  The shorter ECC scheme also 
allows the extra data required for POS authentication to fit into the GetProcessingOptions() 
PDOL message. 
The solution utilises two elliptic curve schemes, ECQV and ECDSA, which perform different tasks in 
the implementation.  The CA public key stored on the card and the two ECQV implicit certificates 
supplied by the POS terminal form a three-tier Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which is used to 
verify the ECDSA digital signature generated by the POS terminal, Figure 38.  Brown et al., 2011 
[76] describes a scheme for ECQV-certified ECDSA such as the one implemented in the prototype. 
With ECQV implicit certificates, the CA public key is used to generate a public key from the implicit 
certificate, which in turn is used to generate the public key from the implicit certificate on the 
subsequent tier of the PKI [77]. 
! Elliptic Curve POS Authentication Process 
CardTerminal
Acquirer/ECQV/implicit/certificate/(Aic)
CA/public/key/index/(CAind)
CA/public/key/(CApk)
Random/Nonce
Compute(the(ECDSA(
signature(of(the(Nonce
Terminal/ECQV/implicit/certificate/(Tic)
Terminal/private/key/(Tsk)
Card(computes(the(Acquirer(public(key
Select(Terminal(private(
key(that(matches(the(CA(
public(key(of(the(card
ECDSA/Signed/Nonce
Acquirer/identification/data/(Aid)
Terminal/identification/data/(Tid)
Acquirer/Public/Key/(Apk)
Card(computes(the(Terminal(public(key
Terminal/Public/Key/(Tpk)
Card(validates(the((signature(of(the(Nonce
Signature/Authenticated
 
Figure 38 - POS Authentication by Card 
The POS terminal authenticates itself by creating an ECDSA signature of the nonce produced by the 
card, Figure 38, using its private key (Tsk).  The card validates the ECDSA signature using the CA 
public key (CApk) and the two ECQV implicit certificates: the Acquirer (Aic) and Terminal (Tic).  
The card generates the Acquirer public key (Apk) and Terminal public key (Tpk) from the ECQV 
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implicit certificates (Aic) and (Tic).  The card authenticates ECDSA signature using the Acquirer 
public key (Apk) and Terminal public key (Tpk) and the card’s copy of the nonce produced by the 
card. 
The solution depends on the POS terminal signing a nonce generated by the card; the nonce ensures 
that the ECDSA signature is fresh each time the card requests authentication.  The three-tier Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI) links the ECDSA signature produced by the POS to the CA public key 
(CApk), which proves that the Terminal’s private key was issued by an authorised Acquirer bank. 
The POS terminals keys will be stored on the Secure Access Module  (SAM), the SAM protects the 
keys from being read by brute force.  The SAM also allows additional cryptographic functionality to 
be added to the POS without requiring an upgrade.  Distributing the keys on the SAM avoids 
transmitting the keys to the POS terminal and thereby risking interception. 
! Elliptic Curve Generation of POS Terminal Keys  
To perform the POS authentication process detailed in Figure 38 the POS terminal must have two 
ECQV implicit certificates: the Acquirer implicit certificate (Aic) and the Terminal implicit certificate 
(Tic), as well as a Terminal private key (Tsk).  These are generated in the process detailed in Figure 
39. 
Certificate)AuthorityTerminal)Acquiring)Bank
Acquirer)ECQV)implicit)certificate)(Aic)
CA)public)key)index)(CAind)
CA)public)key)(CApk)
CA#computes(G,r1,Aid)#to#
create#Implicit#Certificate#
CA)private)key)(CAsk)
Acquirer)private)key)(Ask)
Acquirer)identification)data)(Aid)
Random)number)(r1)
CA#sends#Issuer#
private#key#
reconstruction#data
Acquirer#computes(G,r2,Tid)#
to#create#Implicit#Certificate
Terminal)ECQV)implicit)certificate)(Tic)
Terminal)identification)data)(Tid)
Acquirer#computes##their#own#private#key
Random)number)(r2)
Elliptic)curve)base)point)(G)
Terminal)private)key)(Tsk)
Acquirer#computes#
Terminal#private#key#
reconstruction#data#
 
Figure 39 - Generation of POS Terminal Keys 
Figure 39 shows that the Acquirer implicit certificate (Aic) and Acquirer private key (Ask) are 
generated by the Certificate Authority based on the data supplied by the Acquiring bank.  The 
Acquiring bank generates the Terminal implicit certificate (Tic) and Terminal private key (Tsk) using 
the Acquirer keys (Aic) and (Ask). 
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The Certificate Authority, Acquirer and Terminal keys form a three-tier Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI) that enables the card to validate the ECDSA digital signature produced by the POS terminal 
based on the Certificate Authority public key (CApk) stored on the card. 
In the current EMV PKI, there is a CApk for each of the six card issuers (Visa, MasterCard, American 
Express, JCB, Discover and UnionPay).  The POS terminal will have to store a set of keys (CApk, 
Aic, Tic and Tsk) for each card issuer that the POS terminal wants to accept. 
! Elliptic Curve Card Authentication 
Based on the current EMV specification, the card authenticates itself by producing an RSA signature 
of the transaction data, referred to as the Signed Dynamic Application Data (SDAD), Figure 36 - 
points 8.4 and 8.9.  The POS terminal validates the SDAD RSA signature and thereby the card, Figure 
36 - point 10.  In the proposed solution, the SDAD has been altered to be an ECDSA signature rather 
than RSA.  This alteration means that all of the cryptography used in the proposed solution is based 
on elliptic curve. 
8.3! Prototype Implementation 
The prototype implementation consists of a prototype POS terminal and a prototype payment device.  
The payment device is a mobile phone emulation of a kernel 3 contactless card which incorporates the 
POS authentication functionality. 
! Prototype Payment Device 
The payment device has been implemented as a card emulation on a Nexus S Android mobile phone.  
Implementation on Java Card would have been preferred, however, this was not practical since Java 
Card does not support ECQV natively using the card’s cryptographic co-processor.  The current 
version of Java Card 2.2.2 does support ECDSA and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) natively 
[78], it is therefore assumed that EMV payment cards could support ECQV in the future if the 
demand from the banks was great enough. 
The Nexus S Android mobile phone was selected for prototype development as it provides both 
contactless (NFC) communication and the functionality required to generate the ECQV public key 
certificates and verify the ECDSA signature. 
The ECQV and ECDSA cryptography software for the Android mobile phone platform has been 
implemented from scratch as the Android SDK does not natively support ECQV implicit certificates.  
This required the implementation of the methods for elliptic curve point addition and multiplication. 
To ensure compatibility with future implementations of EMV, the prototype uses the NIST elliptic 
curve P-256 defined by EMV in their ECC proposal document [75]. 
For consistency the payment device application also uses ECDSA to generate the SDAD signature, 
which the POS terminal uses to authenticate the card. 
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! Prototype POS Terminal 
The prototype POS terminal is implemented on a PC with an ACR-122U contactless reader.  The POS 
terminal implements the Kernel 3 fDDA protocol sequence outlined in Figure 36 with some additional 
data fields detailed in Table 13.  The Kernel 3 fDDA protocol was chosen because it is the shortest 
(i.e.  it has the most stringent requirements regarding size) of the contactless protocol sequences and 
thereby demonstrates that the prototype can be implemented in any of the other contactless protocol 
sequences. 
The prototype POS terminal implements the Kernel 3 fDDA transaction protocol sequence as defined 
in the EMV Contactless Specification Book C-3 [7].  Should POS authentication fail, the prototype 
payment device (Android phone) will return a “Try Another Interface” as the transaction outcome 
(see Book C-3 [7] Section 5.2.2.2).  This will cause the POS terminal to initiate Chip & PIN 
completion of the transaction. 
The prototype POS terminal implements ECQV and ECDSA cryptographic functionality required to 
generate the ECDSA POS authentication signature and verify the SDAD ECDSA signature produced 
by the prototype payments device. 
8.4! Prototype Test Results 
We have carried out initial experiments of running the prototype solution using a Nexus S Android 
mobile phone as a card emulation.  For now, we have to use this emulation method because the 
current Java Card 2.2.2 does not support ECQV.  However, it is envisaged that the ECDSA signature 
verification process will be faster when ECQV support is available on payment cards’ cryptographic 
co-processor. 
! Prototype Transaction Timings 
Table 15 shows a comparison between the average time to complete the current kernel 3 transaction 
protocol and the average time to complete our prototype bilateral authentication transaction protocol.  
The detailed breakdown shows each stage of the transaction protocol, as per Fig.  1.  Steps shared by 
the two protocol sequences are shown in black and the new steps added for bilateral authentication are 
shown in blue. 
The timings provided are average timings from five executions of kernel 3 transaction protocol 
sequence and five of the bilateral authentication.  For the timing experiments we used an Android 
mobile device with a 1.3GHz quad core processor, 1Gb RAM, 16GB Storage, NFC chip PN544 by 
NXP, running the Cyanogenmod CM10.1.3 version of the Android operating system. 
The total transaction time of our bilateral authentication prototype is 1,521 milliseconds, i.e.  adding 
just over a second to the time taken for a typical kernel 3 contactless transaction (431 milliseconds).  
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Contactless transactions are by definition designed to be fast so in this context 1.5 seconds is not fast 
enough. 
Table 15 – Comparison of Transaction Time Current kernel 3 Contactless vs. New Protocol 
Protocol Sequence Activity  Kernel 3 
transaction  
POS 
authentication  
2PAY message (card and POS)  28ms 28ms 
Read Next Record message (card and POS)  11ms 11ms 
Select kernel 3 message (card and POS)  21ms 21ms 
Get Processing Options message (card and POS)  22ms 22ms 
Card validates the issuer public key  -- 210ms 
Card validates the terminal public key  -- 257ms 
Card verifies the terminal ECDSA signature  -- 527ms 
Card constructs the authorisation message (SDAD)  4ms 4ms 
Card generates hash of transaction data  16ms 16ms 
Card generates RSA signature on SDAD  247ms -- 
Card generates ECDSA signature on SDAD  -- 343ms 
Terminal reads AFL records from card  82ms 82ms 
Total transaction time  431ms 1,521ms 
 
However, our efforts at optimising the code, combined with the understanding that increasing the 
RAM available on the Android device would give better performance, have allowed us to reduce the 
overall transaction time significantly from 4 seconds to 1.5 seconds.  It would therefore be safe to 
assume that performance improvements in the software and hardware will make terminal 
authentication practicable in the foreseeable future.  For instance it may also be possible to speed up 
the ECDSA signature verification process using the technique outlined by Antipa et al., 2005 [79], 
which claims to speed up the process by 40%, although due to time constraints we were not able to 
investigate the benefits of their techniques further. 
! Prototype Payment Device Log File 
Verifying the POS authentication ECDSA signature requires a number of calculations to (i) derive the 
issuer public key from the EQCV implicit certificate; (ii) derive the terminal public key from the 
EQCV implicit certificate; (iii) calculate the ECDSA POS authentication signature; (iv) compare the 
calculated ECDSA signature with the POS authentication sent by the POS terminal. 
8.5! Technical Issues of Implementation of POS Authentication 
The solution is designed to prevent attacks on contactless cards using devices with NFC readers, such 
as mobile phones.  During the process of designing the solution, the following challenges and possible 
modes of attack on the solution were identified and solved. 
! Integration with the Existing EMV Infrastructure  
Challenge:  Globally there are 23.8 million EMV POS terminals and 1.6 billion EMV credit / debit 
cards [5].  Therefore any change to the EMV protocol has a major financial impact across many 
organisations.  It is therefore essential that any change to EMV can be implemented as a gradual 
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replacement program rather than an enforced step change.  This requires that cards and POS terminals 
which implement the new functionality must be capable of running in parallel with existing cards and 
POS terminals for many years. 
Solution:  The POS authentication solution was designed to deal with the two scenarios without the 
loss of the transaction or the customer having to use a different card (i) an existing card making a 
payment at a POS terminal with the new functionality; (ii) a card with the new functionality making a 
payment at an existing POS terminal.  Note: the other two potential scenarios (existing card – existing 
POS terminal and new card – new POS terminal) do not have any issue here. 
In the first scenario, the new POS terminal will perform the existing kernel 3 contactless protocol. 
In the second scenario the card will perform the modified kernel 3 protocol with POS authentication.  
It does this by requesting specific data fields in the PDOL as described in Table 12.  An existing POS 
terminal will not be able to supply the fields required Table 13 and will therefore exit the transaction 
with transaction outcome of “Try Another Interface” [7].  In all of the contactless protocols, the 
outcome of “Try Another Interface” causes the POS terminal to request that the transaction is 
completed in Chip & PIN mode.  This allows the transaction to continue with minimum interruption. 
! Integration with Existing EMV Contactless Protocol Sequence 
Challenge:  There are 23million POS terminals globally [5] therefore the cost of any change to EMV 
is very large.  The POS authentication process must therefore be incorporated into the existing 
contactless protocols without changing the command sequence. 
Solution:  The solution is integrated into the Select() and GetProcessingOptions() 
commands which are the first two commands in all seven contactless protocol sequences.  In the 
Select() command, the card requests the fields required for POS authentication, Table 13.  In 
GetProcessingOptions(), the POS terminal returns the ECDSA signature that authenticates it 
as genuine. 
The solution takes advantage of EMV’s existing Data Object List functionality, which allows the card 
to request a flexible list of data fields from the POS terminal.  In other words, we are using 
mechanisms that are already there, without the necessity of changing the protocol, Figure 18. 
To perform POS authentication, it is necessary to return a digital signature and two key certificates in 
a single 256-byte GetProcessingOptions() message.  This is not possible under the current 
EMV scheme (1984-bit RSA).  The solution implements a 512-bit ECC scheme which is 
cryptographically stronger than the current RSA scheme.  It allows two ECQV implicit certificates 
and an ECDSA signature to form a POS authentication to be sent in a single 
GetProcessingOptions() message. 
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! Revocation of POS Terminal Keys 
Challenge:  The ability to revoke POS terminals keys is an essential part of the design.  This is 
because the cards have no way of communicating with the outside world apart from through a 
connection with a terminal.  This creates a situation where a single compromised POS terminal could 
result in every EMV card being potentially compromised. 
Consider the following two scenarios: (i) a POS terminal’s private key was compromised and used to 
generate ECDSA signatures; (ii) a genuine POS terminal is stolen or misused to generate ECDSA 
signatures.  In both cases, the ECDSA signatures produced will appear to be genuine to every EMV-
compliant contactless card, since the card has no means of directly receiving and storing information 
about revoked POS terminal keys. 
Informing every EMV card of the revoked keys is impractical, as the bank’s backend servers can only 
communicate with the card when it is connected to a POS terminal or ATM.  In addition, there is 
insufficient storage on the cards to store the revoked keys. 
The keys must therefore be revoked at the POS terminal.  However, it is too late for the acquiring 
bank to send a message to tell the POS to revoke its key once the POS key is compromised or the POS 
has been stolen. 
Solution:  The proposed solution forces the POS terminal to regularly request a “stay alive” 
authorisation message from the acquiring bank’s backend servers.  The POS terminal will only be 
allowed to issue a limited number of ECDSA signatures (e.g.  50) before it must request another “stay 
alive” authorisation.  Limiting the number of ECDSA signature produced by a stolen / compromised 
POS does not entirely prevent contactless attacks but it does prevent large scale attacks, as these 
would produce unusually high numbers of POS authorisation requests that could be detected by the 
bank and shut down accordingly. 
The “stay alive” requests would be made in between contactless transactions when the POS terminal 
was inactive thereby not impacting on the speed of a contactless transaction. 
To prevent the private keys being read directly from the POS terminal’s storage, the proposed solution 
recommends the storage of the private keys on the SAM which is the current method of providing safe 
key storage for EMV POS terminals. 
The “stay alive” protocol is a workable solution, however, it could lead to legitimate POS terminals 
being locked out until they receive a new update of ECDSA signatures. 
! Safe Storage of POS Terminal Keys 
Challenge:  Given that there is monetary impact associated with the loss of POS terminal keys, it is 
important to protect them.  There are 23.8 million EMV POS terminals in circulation worldwide [5]; 
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you can even buy POS terminals on eBay.  This gives criminals easy access to POS terminals from 
which they could attempt to extract the POS terminal keys. 
Solution:  The POS keys must therefore be stored in secure storage.  Modern POS terminals already 
have secure storage for their cryptographic keys, in the form of the Secure Access Module (SAM).  
The proposed solution will make use of SAM to store the keys required for POS authentication. 
8.6! Conclusion 
Our prototype implementation of the protocol was successful, proving that it was possible to integrate 
POS authentication into the existing contactless transaction protocol and have the cards recognise 
genuine POS terminals and ignore NFC readers not issued by an authorised bank. 
Our prototype also clearly demonstrated that the protocol was pushing limits of what was possible 
within the constraints of the existing EMV payment system.  The prototype highlighted the following 
issues: 
•! ECC gave us much shorter cryptographic signatures and allowed us to fit the required data 
into EMV’s 256byte message size.  The drawback of ECC is that it takes significantly more 
processing time than RSA which was a major contribution to the threefold increase in 
transaction time 431ms to 1,521ms, this can be clearly seen in the blue rows in Table 15. 
•! The POS authentication protocol requires the significant change to the software and storage of 
new cryptographic keys on the POS terminals.  This is a major issue as there are 23 million 
EMV POS terminals worldwide [5] which represents a very large investment in POS 
terminals by the acquirer banks and merchants. 
•! Large numbers of POS terminals in countries such as the UK are connected to the internal 
networks of large supermarket merchants rather than directly to the payments networks.  This 
makes the distribution and revocation of cryptographic keys extremely problematic. 
! Feedback on the Proposed POS Authentication Protocol 
Feedback from academia and feedback from the payments industry made it clear that modification of 
the existing EMV contactless protocol is not the answer to the current contactless skimming and relay 
issues.  What is required is a radical redesign and in section 10.2 Future Work, I outline a design for a 
new contactless transaction protocol which could resolve many of these issues. 
The POS authentication solution taught us some valuable lessons from the feedback we received from 
academia or by the payment industry.  The academic opinion was that although it was a good 
technical solution it presented nothing new, rather the solution combined several existing elements in 
a novel way.  The payment industry opinion was that although interesting, the solution could not be 
implemented due to the difficulties associated with managing a centralised Public Key Infrastructure 
for existing the POS terminal network. 
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In addition; the POS Authentication protocol does not protect against relay attacks and man-in-the-
middle attacks as these attacks sit in between an authorised POS terminal and the contactless card.  To 
protect against man-in-the-middle attacks we would add end-to-end encryption into the protocol.  This 
would require the addition step at the beginning of the protocol in which the card and POS terminal 
perform a symmetric key exchange.  Protecting against relay attacks is more problematic.  The 
distance bounding techniques used to prevent relay attacks require both very precise timing of the 
message time of flight and encryption of the message by the card.  The time required by card to 
encrypt a message is much larger than the time added by the relay to the time of flight, in our practical 
experiments, Chapter 9, this was approximately 200ms for encryption vs 10ms added by the relay. 
From this we concluded that although our strategy was valid to attempt to build a solution which was 
designed to work within the existing bounds of the EMV protocol, it did not fulfil the academic 
requirement, nor did it meet the current priorities of the payment industry. 
A more productive line of research would be to completely redesign the protocol, rather than creating 
a compromise solution that fitted into the existing EMV framework. This would allow us to take into 
consideration the three issues identified in this PhD, vulnerabilities created by the wireless interface, 
vulnerabilities created by the removal of the PIN in the contactless protocol and vulnerabilities 
deriving from the complexity of the EMV authentication process. 
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Chapter 9.! Practical Experimental Research 
 
The research presented in this PhD thesis focuses on the EMV protocol as defined by the EMV 
specifications [6] [7].  The physical instantiation of the EMV specifications are the POS terminals and 
EMV payments cards we see in our everyday lives.  This chapter presents the practical experiments 
carried out during the course of my PhD research which investigated the reality of the EMV protocol 
as it is implemented in EMV cards and POS terminals. 
•! Practical Attack on Contactless Payment Cards. This was a practical experiment presented as 
a workshop paper at HCI 2011.  This experiment was carried out to ascertain if the contactless 
interface made it easier to skim the card details of an EMV card, “has usability been 
improved at the cost of security?”.  This experiment clearly showed this to be the case. 
•! Contactless Identity Theft.  This was a lightning talk paper presented at SOUPS 2013.  The 
theme of the talk was, what are the potential security risks of the increasing number and 
diversity of contactless cards we are all carrying in our wallet?.  It led me to ask two questions 
"what information can we extract from all of the different ISO 14443 contactless cards in a 
cardholder’s wallet?" and "how does that impact the cardholder's security?". 
Given that a malicious attacker can read all of the contactless cards in your wallet, EMV 
cards, Oyster cards, ITSO cards etc, what can they find out about us?  My practical 
experiment looked at what data was available from each of the cards in my wallet and could 
we combine data from several other cards to compromise the EMV payments cards.  This 
turned out to be the case as some ITSO travel cards contained the cardholder’s date of birth 
which creates a problem as it is one of the security questions associated with EMV cards. 
•! Malicious Multiple Card Reader Software.  This software implementation allows us to read 
all of the contactless cards in a wallet in less than a second.  It is not an attack in itself, it is an 
enabling technology making it possible to exploit vulnerabilities such as the contactless PIN 
verify, Chapter 7, and the foreign currency flaw, Chapter 6. 
•! Mobile Phone Attack Platform Demonstrations.  Our analysis methodology identifies 
vulnerabilities in the EMV protocol.  With the software emulator we are able to perform 
exhaustive testing upon the vulnerability to find out the practical impact on EMV cards and 
POS terminals.  These are very much lab based experiments, so to make the impact of the 
vulnerability visible to the EMV card carrying public, we have developed a number of 
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Android mobile phone based attack scenarios.  The use of an everyday mobile phone clearly 
demonstrates that this is not just applicable to lab based experiments. 
9.1! Practical Attack on Contactless Payment Cards 
The intention of this demonstration is to highlight a potential vulnerability in the new contactless 
payments system and to propose a workable / low cost solution that addresses the issue. 
The most disturbing feature of this demonstration Figure 40 is that it is low tech, low cost and 
relatively easy to implement.  The simplicity of the attack is what makes it both accessible and 
attractive to criminals. 
The sophistication required to skim data from EMV Chip & PIN cards is reflected in news reports of 
card fraud attacks in the UK [80].  Criminals posing as repair engineers in order to replace legitimate 
Chip & PIN terminals in unsuspecting shops [81] gangs recruiting members of staff in shops and 
petrol filling stations to replace Chip & PIN terminals [82] gangs building skimming devices which fit 
over the top of legitimate ATM machines. 
This practical experiment shows that I was able to build a working attack scenario which utilised 
contactless technology to skim the EMV card details and a USB camera to capture the CVV2 from the 
rear of the card.  This is enough information to make online purchase on many websites. 
All of the hardware required for this experiment was off-the-shelf costing around £50 and all of the 
software was downloadable from the internet.  In reality this means that the level of sophistication 
required to commit fraud against contactless cards is significantly lower than that required for EMV 
Chip & PIN cards. 
The specific weakness exploited in this demonstration is that the contactless cards will divulge the (i) 
card number (ii) cardholder name (iii) expiry date (iv) issue date, unencrypted to any NFC reader that 
requests the data. 
This is not an error, the functionality is fully compliant with the EMV specification for contactless 
cards.  It is assumed that the maximum read range of 10cm makes it difficult to get close enough to 
read the card without arousing suspicion.  This assumption is incorrect. 
The demonstration is a mock-up of a counter top, Figure 40, on which a Chip & PIN terminal has 
been set up to accept legitimate payments from EMV cardholders.  It replicates the design of counters 
found in many UK filling stations and shops, with a display area for sweets immediately adjacent to 
the POS. 
A hidden NFC reader has been set up to capture the details of any contactless card which is inserted 
into the EMV Chip & PIN terminal.  Data capture takes place before card is fully inserted into the 
terminal so it does not affect the legitimate Chip & PIN transaction. 
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The CVV2 (Card Verification Value) is the 3 digit security code printed on the back of the card.  The 
purpose of the CVV2 is as a security check value for card-not-present (online and telephone) 
transactions.  Note: not all online retailers require the CVV2. 
The demonstration captures the CVV2 using a hidden camera, this technique was selected as it is low 
cost, easy to implement and it is technology that the criminals are already using in their current 
attacks. 
The aim of the attack is to capture the data required to purchase high value (easy to resell) items 
online.  Many websites will allow the customer to specify a delivery address which is different from 
the cardholder address registered with the bank (gifts for friends and family), this allows the criminals 
to receive the stolen goods without raising suspicion. 
The £15 transaction limit which is designed to protect contactless cards does not apply as the data is 
being used to make online purchases. 
 
Figure 40 - Point Of Sale (POS) Mock-up with EMV Terminal 
! Conclusions from “Practical Attack on Contactless Payment Cards” 
This project proved that it was relatively easy to skim data from a contactless card and use that data to 
purchase goods from an online retailer.  I built the demonstration for this project for just £50 and 
developed the software in 2 weeks with no previous knowledge of the EMV protocol; thereby proving 
that this type of attack is easily within reach of the talented amateur. 
Shortly after this chapter was published Channel 4 News broke the news that Amazon online retailer 
were not applying the recommended security checks [48] for online payments.  Specifically, Amazon 
do not require the 3 digit CVV2 from the reverse of the card.  The CVV2 security check is an extra 
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precaution designed to ensure that electronic data alone, from the magnetic stripe, the contact chip or 
the contactless chip, cannot be used to make a card-not-present purchase. 
9.2! Malicious Multiple Card Reader Software 
EMV contactless payment cards are compliant with the ISO 14443 standard for contactless cards.  In 
the UK and in many other countries millions of us now regularly carry several contactless cards in our 
wallets, the most common being contactless travel cards and building access control cards. 
The multiple card reader software utilises the functionality described in ISO-14443 Part 3, Contactless 
integrated circuit cards: Initialization and anti-collision [83], to identify all of the cards in a wallet and 
communicate with the cards in turn.   
During our research we observed that it was common practice for cardholders to present their entire 
wallet to a card reader rather than taking the relevant card out of the wallet before presenting it.  The 
malicious multiple card reader software can exploit this behaviour to read all of the cards in the wallet 
at once.  In his book The Art of Deception [84, 23] Kevin Mitnick looks at different strategies for an 
attacker to socially engineer victims into giving up their security information Mitnick postulates that 
the best strategy is to "just ask for it".  In this case we take advantage of the victim’s every day actions 
in using the door reader, to get the victim to bring his cards to our reader. 
The malicious multiple card reader is a flexible attack platform which we have used to demonstrate 
the impact of vulnerabilities such as, contactless PIN verify (FC 2013) and high value foreign 
currency attack (CCS 2014). 
! Multiple Card Reader Implementation 
Initialization and anti-collision [83] involves obtaining the Unique Identifiers (UID) of each of the 
cards in the NFC field.  Once this is complete, the UID is used to activate each card individually.  The 
card is then ready to accept commands.  For successful communication only one card can be 
active at any one time.  Table 16 describes the transitions between the different states idle,$
ready,$active and halt$which allow the reader to successfully communicate with an individual 
card when there are multiple cards in the field. 
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Table 16 - ISO-14443 Card State Transitions 
State Description 
Idle$ Upon entry to the NFC field all cards will power up into the idle 
state. 
Ready$ The reader transmits REQA / WUPA command putting the cards into the 
ready state.  Once all of the cards are in the ready state the anti-
collision loop sequence can begin. 
Active$ The anti-collision loop sequence is an iterative process used by the 
NFC reader to find the UID of the next card in the field.  The anti-
collision command is repeatedly sent to all cards until only one card 
answers with a complete UID and no collisions.  The UID is then used 
in the Select command which moves that card into the active state.  
At this point the reader can communicate with the card using the card 
type specific protocol (EMV, MIFARE etc.) or instruct the card to 
halt and store the UID for future use. 
Halt$ To communicate with the next card in the NFC field the reader must 
halt the currently active card.  Cards can be re-awakened from the 
halt$state using the WUPA. 
 
The process of communicating with multiple cards is as follows: 
•! the anti-collision loop finds the UID of each card in turn  
•! Select(UID) moves the card with the given UID into the active state  
•! the active card is now ready for communication with the reader, only one card at a time 
can be active 
•! halt is used to stop communicating with the card and move to the next card 
Once anti-collision is complete each card type has its own specific communication protocol.  We have 
implemented protocol sequences for three commonly available card types; EMV payment cards, 
MIFARE classic door access cards and MIFARE DESFire travel pass cards.  Communication with the 
implemented card types is not affected if an unknown card type is also present in the NFC field, the 
unknown card type is simply ignored once the anti-collision process has identified its UID.  The 
software utilises hardware commands specific to the NXP PN532 chipset [85] to perform the anti-
collision loop, initialisation and card selection. 
! Results 
The test results in this section focus on the time taken to perform each of the steps involved in 
performing the attack scenarios presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.  These results are presented to 
support our assertion that the delay introduced by the attack would not arouse the suspicions of the 
users of the door access system. 
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9.2.2.1! Multiple Card Identification 
For the multiple card identification tests we used three of the more popular contactless card types; 
EMV payment cards, MIFARE classic door access cards and MIFARE DESFire travel pass cards.  
The test results in Table 17 show the average time (over 60 test runs) to identify each card, when there 
are multiple cards in the NFC field.  Results of the tests show the identification of each card takes 
longer when more cards are in the field. 
Table 17 - Multiple Card Identification Times 
Cards in NFC Field 2 cards 3 cards 4 cards 5 cards 
Identification of Each Card (ms) 214.36 285.82 305.95 358.30 
Standard Deviation (ms) 16.91 16.66 72.54 53.87 
 
The maximum number of cards that the ACR-122U reader (used in our tests) can identify in the NFC 
field varies by card type.  Table 18 shows the maximum number of each card type that the reader 
could identify and communicate with.  The first three rows show tests with a single card type in the 
NFC field.  The following three rows represent wallets containing a mixture of card types, with at 
least one EMV payment card and one MIFARE classic door access card. 
Table 18 - Maximum Cards in NFC field 
 EMV payment  MIFARE classic  MIFARE DESFire 
 2 cards   
Single card type  5 cards  
   4 cards 
 2 cards 1 card  
Multiple card 
types  
1 card 1 card 1 card 
 1 card 3 cards  
 
9.2.2.2! Total Attack Time 
Table 19 illustrates the total time taken by the verify PIN attack, Chapter 7, on two example wallets 
wallet 1 containing one MIFARE classic door access card and one EMV payment card and wallet 2 
containing one MIFARE classic, one EMV and one MIFARE DESFire travel pass.  The complete 
sequence identifies all of the cards present in the wallet and then performs two PIN guesses on the 
EMV payment card for the contactless verify PIN attack. 
 
Chapter 9 Practical Experimental Research 
120 
Table 19 - Multiple Card Identification and Communication Time 
Scenario Identify Card 
(ms) 
Communication 
(ms) 
Total (ms) 
wallet 1 428.73 457.20 855.93 
wallet 2 643.09 457.20 1070.29 
 
In summary the test results Table 18 show that it is possible to attack a wallet containing multiple card 
types.  Moreover Table 19 shows that for both wallet 1 and wallet 2 the total attack time of around 1 
second is fast enough to avoid detection by the cardholder. 
! Conclusions from “Malicious Multiple Card Reader Software” 
In this demonstration we use the ISO14443-Part 3 Anti Collision functionality to identify all of the 
contactless cards in a wallet and interact with the cards individually.  This software provides a 
powerful platform which can be used to attack any vulnerabilities discovered by our analysis 
methodology.  This could result in a situation where a malicious individual places a multiple card 
reader on top of a legitimate rapid transport barrier such as the turnstiles at the London underground, 
giving the attacker access to thousands of card skimmed transactions [29] [42] or thousands of 
skimmed card details [47] [50] [51]. 
9.3! Contactless Identity Theft 
This research looked at the threats posed by multiple different contactless card types being presented 
at the same time in a single wallet.  The data contained on each individual card is no threat, however, 
multiple data fields from multiple cards potentially provide the correct combination of data to enable a 
malicious attack.  For instance, EMV contactless cards do not contain the cardholder name, ITSO 
travel cards contain both the cardholder name and cardholder date of birth.  Therefore, the 
combination of these fields being available at the same time creates a security risk to the cardholder. 
We also found that some contactless cards gave out personal information such as; the Japanese Suica 
contactless travel card which made available the individuals travel history (dates time and locations) 
and kernel 2 contactless cards which revealed the individuals purchase history in the form of the last 
10 transaction on the card. 
! Conclusion from “Contactless Identity Theft” 
The conclusion to this work is that there is a significant risk to the security of an individual when 
multiple contactless cards are held in a single wallet and the entire wallet is placed on the reader. 
9.4! Mobile Phone Attack Platform Demonstrations 
We have included in our work a number of practical experiments that allow the general public to 
visualise the results of our research. 
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We deliberately created our practical experiments using everyday technology that would be available 
to the criminals and we also avoided using technology and techniques that would only be accessible in 
a University lab.  This demonstrates to the public and to the payment industry that the work we do is 
applicable to the real world and not just lab based experiments.  Figure 41 shows our practical mobile 
phone : 1. Card Data Skimming, 2. Transaction Relay, 3. High Value Foreign Currency Flaw, 4. 
Contactless PIN Verify. 
    
Figure 41 - Practical Experiments for General Public 
1. Card Data Skimming; this demonstration uses the Android phone’s NFC capability to capture 
the 16 digit card number, expiry date and cardholder name from the contactless card; this is 
enough information make purchases on Amazon because Amazon do not require the CVV2 
security code printed on the back of the card [48].  We were able to show that the we can (i) 
skim details from a contactless card inside a closed wallet (ii) use those details to create a new 
Amazon account (iii) buy items from the Amazon store and have them delivered to an address 
which is different from the address registered for the card.  This is a concrete demonstration of 
the card’s vulnerability which members of the public can easily understand. 
2. Transaction Relay; which uses off-the-shelf mobile phones to relay a contactless transaction 
from a POS terminal to a contactless card which is still in the victim’s wallet.  Our practical 
experiments expanded upon research carried out by Francis et al. (2012) [42].  We implemented 
our relay over the Internet rather than Bluetooth as used by Francis et al.  This extends the 
attack from one where the attacker must be in the same room into one where the attacker can be 
in a different country.  We used our practical implementation as shown in Figure 41 (2) to carry 
out timing experiments with the POS terminal in the Computing Science building of Newcastle 
University campus and the victim card in another building on the campus.  The standard 
transaction time of a kernel 3 contactless transaction is approximately 450milliseconds, 
relaying the transaction across the University campus increased that time to around 
1,100milliseconds which is well within the acceptable contactless transaction time.  The fact 
that our relay works over the Internet would allow an attacker to relay the transaction to another 
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country, which, when combined with our contactless foreign currency flaw, would allow an 
attacker to take high value transactions from a victim’s card in the UK. 
3. High Value Foreign Currency. This is the practical demonstration for the research described in 
Chapter 6.  It shows that the attack can be performed using a hardware platform that is readily 
available, designed to be portable and which would not look suspicious being carried, if 
challenged by the police; thereby demonstrating the impact of the vulnerability on the millions 
UK consumers who carry contactless cards. 
4. Contactless PIN Verify. This is the practical demonstration for the research described in 
Chapter 7.  It is hard to explain in words why the protocol allowing access to the PIN verify 
command over the contactless interface is detrimental to the security of the card.  However, in 
our demonstration we show an Android phone placed on a closed wallet and correctly guessing 
the PIN number of the contactless card inside the wallet, which allows people to easily visualise 
the impact of the flaw. 
! Conclusions from “Mobile Phone Attack Platform Demonstrations” 
When moving our research from the lab to real life scenarios we decided to use mobile phone for the 
following reasons: 
•! Our intended audience (the general public) have their own mobile phones and therefore can 
visualise the impact of the research. 
•! NFC enabled mobile phones are very accessible 
•! The Android NFC SDK is comprehensive and easy to use 
•! The mobile phone is a very portable platform 
•! Android phones have mobile internet connectivity 
9.5! Conclusion 
From our practical experiments we learned that it was very easy to attack an EMV contactless card 
without the cardholder’s knowledge.  We showed that we could do this with off-the-shelf easy to 
access hardware and software, demonstrating that the attacks we identified were within the 
capabilities of malicious individuals.  We developed several plausible attack vectors; the hidden 
reader in the sweetshop, the multiple card reader in the rapid transit system and the Android mobile 
phone platform. 
Unfortunately it is the usability of the wireless interface on EMV contactless cards that makes them 
vulnerable to these attack vectors whilst the cardholder remains unaware of the attack. 
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Chapter 10.!Conclusion 
 
EMV contactless payments “has usability been improved at the cost of security?”.  The research 
presented in this PhD thesis and the literature review show that the functionality that makes 
contactless payments more convenient (wireless interface and no PIN) can be directly linked to 
vulnerabilities which have a negative impact on the security of the EMV payments system.   
Specifically: 
•! the wireless interface makes EMV contactless cards vulnerable to new physical attack 
scenarios whereby the card remains in the cardholder’s wallet and the cardholder is unaware 
of the attack until their bank statement arrives. 
•! contactless payments do not require a PIN to authorise the transaction, this removes the 
security step that prevented transactions being made without the explicit consent of the 
cardholder. 
•! contactless payments introduce additional complexity to the EMV authentication processes, 
Figure 9.  Our experimental research has shown one specific instance where the difference in 
the authentication process between the kernel 3 (Visa) and kernel 2 (MasterCard) contactless 
protocols causes an exploitable vulnerability in kernel 3. 
These three factors combine to introduce several new categories of exploitable vulnerability to the 
EMV payment system, which were not present in Chip & PIN.  The new vulnerabilities include, but 
are not limited to, contactless transaction capture [29] [26] (our primary research interest), contactless 
skimming [51] [50] [47] contactless eavesdropping [49] [50] contactless transaction relay [42] [46]. 
At the core of my research is the analysis methodology developed with the assistance of Dr Leo 
Freitas.  We have successfully used the methodology to identify two previously undocumented 
vulnerabilities in the EMV contactless protocol, being, the foreign currency flaw [29] and contactless 
PIN verify [27].  We have used practical demonstrations to communicate the impact of our research to 
the general public and the payments industry.  Our collaboration with the payments industry has also 
helped to increase the impact of research, in that the contactless PIN verify functionality is being 
removed from UK contactless credit and debit card issued after 2013. 
Over the next few years there will be significant security changes in the global card payments system 
due to the phasing out of magnetic stripe payment cards and the introduction of new payments 
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technologies, such as mobile phone and wearable device based payments.  My future research will 
continue to use our analysis methodology to examine the new mobile phone based contactless 
payments technologies, when they are released in the UK.  We also need to work on innovative 
alternatives to the existing transaction protocols in order that they enhance both usability and security 
together. 
10.1! Summary of Contributions 
Contributions from my PhD research are:  
•! an analysis methodology for transaction protocols 
•! the creation of the protocol emulator 
•! the identification of two previously undocumented vulnerabilities in the EMV contactless 
transaction protocol 
•! a literature review which analyses the security impact of EMV contactless payments in the 
context of the wider EMV payment system 
! Analysis Methodology for Contactless Transaction protocols 
The analysis methodology developed during my PhD research consists of three elements (i) the 
protocol emulator which allows us to run practical experiments on the EMV protocol and to inject 
specific errors into the transaction protocol sequence and test our theories about vulnerabilities (ii) the 
abstract model of the protocol sequences which highlights any potential security vulnerability in the 
protocols (iii) UML sequence diagrams and reference tables which precisely document the linkage 
between our models and the original protocol descriptions in the EMV specifications [6] [7].   
The documented linkage to the EMV specifications is the key to our methodology because it 
demonstrates the difference between a fundamental flaw in the protocol specification and simple 
implementation errors in the software of EMV cards or POS terminals / ATMs. 
The results of the analysis have highlighted a number of significant exploitable flaws (detailed below 
10.1.3 and 10.1.4) which allow attackers to subvert the operation of the EMV protocol and thereby 
compromise the payment system.  Exploitable flaws in the EMV payment system fall into a number 
of different categories our research methodology identifies flaws inherent in the protocol design and 
ambiguities in the protocol design. 
! Contribution of the Protocol Emulator 
The protocol emulator is fundamental in its contribution and is the cornerstone of my research.  It 
provides a working model of the EMV contactless protocol.  It includes both a POS emulation and a 
card emulation which allows us to model and observe all aspects of the protocol sequence.  Its 
contributions are: 
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•! the protocol emulator code encapsulates our knowledge of the EMV contactless protocol 
sequences. This is achieved using structured comments embedded in the code which link the 
running code to the EMV specifications.  This creates a knowledge base which can be 
expanded upon in future research. 
•! it provides an experimental environment which can execute EMV contactless protocol 
sequences created to target the vulnerabilities identified by our research.  This gives us the 
ability to demonstrate that these vulnerabilities are exploitable in the real-world. 
•! the detailed log trace files, generated by the protocol emulator, provide the evidence for the 
vulnerability being exploitable.  They record both the particular parameters that triggered the 
vulnerability and the UML references which provide a link to its origins in the EMV 
specifications. 
! Contactless Foreign Currency Vulnerability 
The abstract model highlighted the gap in the specification in EMV specification [6] page 163, which 
states “If transaction is in the application currency and is under X value”, where X is the card offline 
transaction limit.  The specification does not state what to do when the transaction is in a foreign 
currency.  We used the protocol emulator to test UK issued cards, running transactions in GB pounds 
(the card’s native currency) and running in various foreign currencies i.e. US dollars, Euros, 
Australian dollars. 
From these experiments we were able to conclude that it would be possible to build an attack scenario 
that would allow an attacker with an NFC enabled Android mobile phone to harvest US$999,999.99 
transaction approvals from kernel 3 (Visa) cards whilst the card was still in the cardholder’s wallet. 
Our research also highlighted a fundamental difference between the kernel 3 contactless protocol and 
the kernel 2 contactless protocols.  Kernel 2 has an additional cryptographic request for approval from 
the card’s Issuing bank.  This additional check prevents kernel 2 cards from being exploited using the 
foreign currency vulnerability. 
! Contactless PIN Verify 
Our analysis method highlighted ambiguities in the description of cardholder PIN verification, 
contained in kernel 3 contactless specification [7] Book C-3.  It allows for PIN entry on mobile 
devices but does not specifically state the correct operation for contactless cards; kernel 3 contactless 
specifications are ambiguous on the inclusion of the PIN verify from the protocol whereas the kernel 
2 specification [68] specifically prohibits PIN verify on contactless cards. 
We used the protocol emulator to find which, if any, UK issued kernel 3 cards would allow us to 
access the Verify PIN functionality over contactless interface.  We found that millions of UK issued 
kernel 3 cards issued were affected by this problem [31].  Further investigation showed that the issue 
affected cards manufactured with a specific chipset independent of the issuing bank. 
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! Contribution of the Literature Review  
The literature review expands our knowledge of the exploitable security vulnerabilities within the 
EMV payment system.  It contributes to the understanding of the common factors which lead to 
vulnerabilities in the EMV contactless payments.  It establishes a link between the existing research 
and our research themes: 
•! exploitation of the wireless interface to gain unauthorised access to the contactless card 
•! no cardholder verification required, this allows unauthorised transactions to be processed 
without cardholder interaction. 
•! the complexity of the authentication process contributes to make vulnerabilities exploitable. 
10.2! Future Work 
The EMV payments system continues to evolve as new payments technologies are introduced and 
legacy technologies are retired.  We are currently in a period of rapid change with new payments 
technologies being introduced every few years rather than decades. 
! Continuing Protocol Analysis Research 
Analysis of mobile phone payments technologies, such as Google Wallet, will present many 
interesting new challenges as many of these technologies are based on the magnetic stripe contactless 
transaction protocol currently prevalent in the USA.  Research by Roland and Langer (2013) shows 
that there are vulnerabilities in the magnetic stripe contactless protocol, it also shows that EMV 
contactless cards are affected by this vulnerability as the EMV specification requires them to be 
compatible with magnetic stripe.  Future research should therefore look at the magnetic stripe 
contactless protocol and its impact on the EMV contactless protocol.  
! New Payments Technologies 
There are a number of emerging NFC enabled smart device payment technologies (e.g.  mobile phone 
wallets, rechargeable festival wristbands and smart watches), these technologies utilise the EMV 
contactless transaction protocol.  There are also new technologies for receiving payments using your 
mobile phone such as iZettle and PayPal POS terminal.  These terminals make it much easier for a 
small trader to take payments on the move, unfortunately they also make it easier for fraudsters to 
create money mule accounts to receive fraudulent payments.  Future research should look at the 
potential security implications of these new POS terminal technologies. 
! Continuous Authentication 
Future research will look at the benefits, drawbacks and the accuracy of biometric continuous 
authentication technologies, such as MasterCard payments wristband which continuously monitors the 
wearer’s heart beat ECG [16] [17].  Can continuous authentication be integrated into a more secure 
and more useable transaction protocol? 
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Appendix A.! Analysis Methodology Example 
 
This appendix illustrates the how the elements of our analysis methodology are linked together.  It 
takes as the example of the Kernel 3 fDDA contactless transaction protocol sequence (kernel 3).  The 
example focuses on a single command in protocol sequence showing its representation in the UML 
diagram, the reference table, the protocol emulator Java code and the Z abstract model. 
A.1 UML Diagram – Kernel 3 Kernel 3 fDDA Contactless Transaction 
Payment(CardPOS(Terminal
1.0(InitiateTransaction()
3.0(PresentCardToTerminal()
4.0(ListAvailableNFCApplications()
4.1(List(of(available(applications
7.0(SelectApplication(AID)
7.1(Transaction(setup(data(inc.(PDOL(list
4.2(Command(Error
7.2(Command(Error
9.0(GetProcessingOptions(PDOL(data)
9.7(Transaction(Approved(L(TC(+(SDAD(+(
Application(Cryptogram((AC)(+(AFL
9.8(Transaction(Must(Go(Online(LARQC
9.10(Command(Error
9.9(Transaction(Declined(L(AAC
10.0(ReadAFLRecord(SFI,(Record)
10.1(AFL(record
[(for(each(AFL(SFI(/(record(]
12.0(RemoveCard()
Loop
9.1(GenerateUPN()
9.2(GenerateSDAD()
9.3(GenerateAC()
9.4(UpdateTransactionCount()
9.5(DecrementNFCCount()
9.6(UpdateAvailableOffline()
11.0(ValidateTransaction()
8.0(PopulatePDOL()
2.0(WaitForCard()
5.0(ChooseAID()
6.0(SelectTheKernel(AID)
 
Figure 42 – UML Diagram - Kernel 3 fDDA Contactless Transaction 
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A.2 Reference Table – Kernel 3 fDDA Contactless Transaction 
Table 20 - Reference Table – Kernel 3 fDDA Contactless Transaction 
Descriptive*Text* References*
"$1.0$InitiateTransaction()$
$
The$terminal$initiates$the$transaction$by$
setting$the$required$transaction$data,$this$will$
typically$include:$
$
•! transaction$amount$$
•! transaction$date$
•! transaction$currency$
•! country$code$for$the$merchant$/$transaction$
•! unpredictable$number$generated$by$the$POS$
terminal,$$
•! the$terminal$qualifiers$which$specify$the$
capabilities$of$the$POS$terminal$
$
The$Terminal$Transaction$Qualifiers$(TTQ)$is$a$
data$structure$is$a$list$of$the$capabilities$
supported$by$the$POS$terminal$(i.e.$$online,$
offline,$Magnetic$Stripe,$EMV,$Contactless.$$PIN$
authorisation,$signature$authorisation).$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p8$$
2.1$EMV$Mode$Configuration$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p106$
A.2$Data$Elements$by$Name$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p127$
Annex$C$Fast$Dynamic$Data$Authentication$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$A$,$p23$
5.6.5$Kernel$and$Entry$Point$Configuration$Data$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$A$,$p25$
5.7$Transaction$Data$$$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$p91$$
10.1$Initiate$Application$Processing$$$
$ $
"$2.0$WaitForCard()$
$
The$POS$terminal$powers$up$its$NFC$reader$and$
waits$for$a$contactless$card$to$come$into$the$
NFC$field.$$The$reader$software$performs$the$
ISO,14443:Part$3$Initialization$and$anti,
collision$sequence.$$The$device$driver$then$
notifies$the$host$software$of$the$UID$and$
historical$bytes$from$the$card.$$This$process$is$
handled$in$the$device$driver$of$the$NFC$reader.$
ISO/IEC$14443,3:2011$–$p5$
6$Type$A$Initialization$and$anti,collision$$$
$
ISO/IEC$14443,4:2008$–$p4$
5$Protocol$Activation$of$PICC$Type$A$$$
$ $
!$3.0$PresentCardToTerminal()$
$
When$the$card$enters$the$NFC$field$it$is$powered$
up$and$supplies$it’s$UID$to$the$reader$in$
response$to$the$ISO,14443:Part$3$Initialization$
and$anti,collision$sequence.$$The$card$is$now$
active$and$ready$to$communicate$with$the$
terminal.$
ISO/IEC$14443,3:2011$p5$
6$Type$A$Initialization$and$anti,collision$
$
ISO/IEC$14443,4:2008$–$p4$
5$Protocol$Activation$of$PICC$Type$A$
$ $
"$4.0$ListAvailableNFCApplications()$
$
Terminal$will$use$the$Proximity$Payment$System$
Environment$(PPSE)$command$to$list$the$valid$
payment$application$on$the$card.$$The$terminal$
sends$the$SELECT(“2PAY.SYS.DDF01”)$command$to$
the$card.$$$
EMV$v2.2$Book$B$–$p16$
3.3$Combination$Selection$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$B$–$p17$
3.3.1$PPSE$Data$for$Application$Selection$$p17$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$1$–$p127$
11.3$SELECT$Command,Response$APDUs$$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$1$,$p133$
12.$$Application$Selection$$$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$1$,$p135$
12.2.2$Structure$of$the$PPSE$$
$ $
!4.1$List$of$available$applications$
$
EMV$compliant$contactless$payment$card$will$
respond$with$a$list$of$all$of$the$available$
applications$(AIDs)$on$the$card.$$The$list$also$
includes$the$associated$priority$values$(which$
define$the$order$which$the$AID$should$be$used$by$
the$terminal)$and$the$Kernel$ID$(which$for$
contactless$transactions$defines$the$protocol$
sequence$required).$
EMV$v2.2$Book$B$,$p18$
Table$3,2:$SELECT$Response$Message$Data$Field$
(FCI)$of$the$PPSE$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$B$,$p24$
3.3$Combination$Selection$(3.3.25)$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$B$,$p19$
Table$3,3:$Format$Application$Priority$Indicator$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$B$,$p20$
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Table$3,4:$Format$Kernel$Identifier$$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$1$,$p127$
11.3$SELECT$Command,Response$APDUs$$$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$1$,$p144$
12.3$Building$the$Candidate$List$$$
$
IS0$7816,4$,$p65$
8.2.1.2$Application$identifier$,$$
$ $
!4.2$Command$Error$
$
For$all$cases$where$the$card$does$not$support$
the$PPSE$command$it$will$return$a$failure$status$
code1,$in$this$case$the$outcome$of$the$
transaction$is$set$to$“End$the$Application”$and$
the$POS$terminal$exits$the$transaction.$
$
1$The$success$status$code$is$0x9000$all$other$
status$codes$are$failure$codes.$
EMV$v2.2$Book$B$,$p23$
3.3$Combination$Selection$(Step$1)$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$B$,$p28$
3.3$Combination$Selection$(Step$3)$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$B$,$p33$
3.5$Outcome$Processing$(3.5.1.5$Other)$$
$ $
#$5.0$ChooseAID$
$
The$terminal$selects$the$contactless$Kernel$and$
Application$Identifier$(AID)$to$be$used$for$the$
transaction.$$The$application$selected$should$be$
the$highest$priority$application$supported$by$
both$the$card$and$the$POS$terminal.$$The$
applications$supported$by$the$card$is$returned$
by$“4.1$List$of$available$applications”,$the$
list$contains$Application$Identifier$(AID),$the$
Application$Priority$Indicator,$the$Kernel$ID$
and$the$name$of$the$application.$
EMV$v4.3$Book$1$,$p144$
12.3$Building$the$Candidate$List$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$B$,$p16$
3.3$Combination$Selection$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$B$,$p19$
Table$3,2:$Format$Application$Priority$Indicator$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$B$,$p20$
Table$3,4:$Format$of$the$Kernel$Identifier$$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$B$,$p31$
3.4$Kernel$Activation$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$A$,$p30$
5.8.2$Application$Selection$&$Kernel$Activation$$$
$ $
#$6.0$SelectKernel(AID)$
$
The$kernel$is$selected$based$on$Kernel$ID$(“03”$
Visa,$“02”$MasterCard,$“04”$Amex$or$“05”$JCB)$
returned$by$the$card$in$“4.1$List$of$available$
applications”.$$If$the$Kernel$ID$is$not$included$
in$the$list$then$the$POS$terminal$will$select$
the$kernel$based$on$the$Registered$Application$
Provider$Identifier$(RID)$contained$in$the$first$
five$digits$of$the$AID.$
$
"7.0$SelectApplication(AID)$
$
The$fDDA$transaction$sequence$is$specific$to$
Visa$cards$for$which$the$usual$AID$will$be$
A0000000031010,$the$command$would$therefore$be$
SELECT(A0000000031010)$to$select$the$Visa$
application.$
EMV$v2.2$Book$B$,$p29$
3.3.3$Final$Combination$Selection$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$B$,$p31$
3.4$Kernel$Activation$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$B$–$p16$
3.3$Combination$Selection$$p16$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$1$,$p127$
11.3$SELECT$Command,Response$APDUs$$$
$ $
!7.1$Transaction$Setup$Data$including$PDOL$list$
$
If$the$Visa$application$is$successfully$selected$
the$card$will$return$the$data$that$the$terminal$
requires$to$set$up$the$transaction$including$the$
PDOL$list.$$The$Processing$Data$Objects$List$
(PDOL)$is$a$list$of$data$elements$the$card$
requires$to$complete$the$transaction,$the$
terminal$returns$the$populated$PDOL$data$in$the$
Get$Processing$Options$command.$$Typically$the$
data$fields$requested$by$the$card$wuill$include$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$–$p12$
2.4.1$Initiate$Application$Processing$$$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$p91$
10.1$Initiate$Application$Processing$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$B$,$p33$
3.5$Outcome$Processing$(3.5.1.5$Other)$$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$4$,$p115$
Annex$A$,$Coding$of$Terminal$Data$Elements$$$
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the$transaction$amount,$currency,$date,$country$
and$TTQ$
$ $
!7.2$Command$Error$
$
SelectApplication(AID)$will$fail$if$the$
application$AID$was$not$on$the$list$of$available$
list$of$available$applications$(4.1)$or$the$
application$AID$is$not$valid$for$contactless$
operation.$
EMV$v2.2$Book$B$,$p23$
3.3$Combination$Selection$(Step$1)$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$B$,$p28$
3.3$Combination$Selection$(Step$3)$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$B$,$p33$
3.5$Outcome$Processing$(3.5.1.5$Other)$$
$ $
#$8.0$PopulatePDOL()$
$
The$Processing$Options$Data$Objects$List$(PDOL)$
is$the$list$of$data$elements$that$the$card$
requires$to$approve$the$transaction.$$The$
terminal$populates$the$PDOL$with$data,$the$data$
elements$would$usually$include$transaction$
amount,$currency,$unpredictable$number,$
transaction$date.$
EMV$v2.2$Book$B$,$p34$
3.6$Data$Element$Processing$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p12$
2.4.1$Initiate$Application$Processing$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p40$
5.1$Initiate$Application$Processing$$$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$3$–$p38$
5.4$Rules$for$Using$a$Data$Object$List$(DOL)$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$4$,$p115$
Annex$A$,$Coding$of$Terminal$Data$Elements$$$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$3$–$p163$
Annex$C3$Cardholder$Verification$Rule$Format$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p110$
Annex$A.2$Data$Elements$by$Name$(9F66)$$
$
EMVv2.2$$Book$C,3$,$p127$
Annex$C$Fast$Dynamic$Data$Authentication$$$
$ $
"9.0$GetProcessingOptions(PDOL$data)$
$
In$the$Kernel$3$fDDA$transaction$Get$Processing$
Options$(GPO)$is$used$to$request$completion$of$
the$transaction.$$The$PDOL$data$must$contain$all$
of$the$data$elements$requested$by$the$card$
otherwise$the$transaction$will$be$rejected.$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p12$
2.4.1$Initiate$Application$Processing$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p40$
5.2$Initiate$Application$Processing$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p40$
5.2.1$Get$Processing$Options$(GPO)$Command$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p40$to$p46$
5.2.2$Initiate$Application$Processing$$$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$p60$
6.5.8.4$Data$Field$Returned$in$the$Response$$$
$ $
#$9.1$GenerateUPN()$
$
The$card$generates$a$4$byte$unpredictable$number$
(UPN)$??"8$byte"GenerateAC"??.$$The$card$UPN$is$
incorporated$into$the$signed$transaction$data$
SDAD$and$Application$Cryptogram$(AC).$$This$
injects$random$data$into$the$SDAD$signature$and$
the$MAC$of$the$AC$thereby$protecting$them$from$
partial$oracle$attacks$on$the$cryptography.$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p89$
A.2$Data$Elements$by$name$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p109$
A.2$Data$Elements$by$name$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p127$
Annex$C$Fast$Dynamic$Data$Authentication$
$ $
#$9.2$GenerateSDAD()$
???$MJE$to$Complete$???$
$
$ $
#$9.3$GenerateAC()$ $
$ $
#$9.4$UpdateTransactionCount()$ $
$ $
#$9.5$DecrementNFCCount()$ $
$ $
#$9.6$UpdateAvailableOffline()$ $
$ $
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!9.7$Transaction$Approved$,$TC,$SDAD,$
Application$Cryptogram$(AC),$AFL$
$
If$the$card$approves$the$completion$of$the$
transaction$in$offline$mode,$it$will$return$
Transaction$Cryptogram$$(TC)$in$the$Cryptogram$
Information$Data$(CID).$$The$card$also$returns$
all$of$the$data$elements$required$by$the$
terminal$to$complete$the$transaction:$
Signed$Dynamic$Application$Data$(SDAD)$used$by$
the$terminal$to$verify$that$the$card$has$
approved$the$same$transaction$that$the$terminal$
sent.$
Application$Cryptogram$(AC)$used$in$the$
completion$of$the$transaction$with$the$Bank$to$
validate$that$a$valid$card$completed$the$
transaction.$
Application$File$Locator$(AFL)$contains$the$
location$in$the$card’s$file$structure$where$the$
terminal$can$read$the$data$elements$required$to$
complete$the$transaction.$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p50$
5.4.3$Determine$the$Card$Disposition$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p43$
5.2.2.2$GPO$Response$SW1$SW2$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p46$
5.2.2.3$Contactless$Path$Determination$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p97$
A.2$Data$Elements$by$Name$$$
$
EMVv2.2$$Book$C,3$,$p127$
Annex$C$Fast$Dynamic$Data$Authentication$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p128$
C.1$Dynamic$Signature$Verification$$$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$p59$
6.5.8$Get$Processing$Options$APDUs$$$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$p60$
6.5.8.4$Data$Field$Returned$in$the$Response$$$
$ $
!$9.8$Transaction$Must$Go$Online$–ARQC$$
$
If$the$card$requires$online$completion$of$the$
transaction$it$will$return$ARQC$in$the$
Cryptogram$Information$Data$(CID).$$Online$
completion$is$required$when$the$amount$of$the$
transaction$exceeds$the$cards$offline$
transaction$limit$or$offline$cumulative$limit$or$
when$the$number$of$offline$transactions$exceeds$
the$number$of$consecutive$offline$transactions.$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p50$
5.4.3$Determine$the$Card$Disposition$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p97$
A.2$Data$Elements$by$Name$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p14$
2.4.7$Online$Processing$(EMV$Mode)$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p15$
2.4.8$Completion$(EMV$Mode)$$$
$ $
!$9.9$Transaction$Declined$,$AAC$$
$
If$the$card$declines$the$transaction$it$returns$
AAC$in$the$CID.$$The$card$declines$the$
transaction$when$it$cannot$be$completed$as$
requested$by$the$terminal.$$$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p50$
5.4.3$Determine$the$Card$Disposition$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p97$
A.2$Data$Elements$by$Name$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p14$
2.4.7$Online$Processing$(EMV$Mode)$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p15$
2.4.8$Completion$(EMV$Mode)$$$
$ $
!$9.10$Command$Error$
$
The$possible$error$codes$returned$by$Get$
Processing$Options$are:$
6984,$Try$Another$Interface.$$The$transaction$
should$be$reattempted$using$either$the$contact$
interface$or$the$magnetic$stripe$interface.$$$
6985$,$Select$Next.$$The$transaction$should$be$
reattempted$using$the$next$combination$of$Kernel$
/$AID$(if$any).$
6986$,$Try$Again,$reattempt$the$transaction$with$
the$same$parameters.$$The$card$must$be$
represented,$this$may$occur$if$the$card$is$
removed$too$early.$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p43$
5.2.2.2$GPO$Response$SW1$SW2$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p15$
2.4.8$Completion$(EMV$Mode)$$$
$
EMV$v2.2$Book$B$,$p24$
3.3$Combination$Selection$$$
$ $
Loop$[$for$each$AFL$SFI$/$record$]$
"10.0$ReadAFLRecord(SFI,$Record)$
$
The$Application$File$Locator$(AFL)$returned$in$
the$GPO$response$contains$the$location$of$the$
data$records$which$contain$the$data$elements$
that$the$terminal$will$require$to$complete$the$
transaction.$$The$AFL$contains$a$range$of$SFI$/$
Records.$$The$data$the$AFL$points$to$will$
include$the$public$keys$required$to$decrypt$the$
SDAD$returned$in$the$GPO$response.$$$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p47$
5.3$Read$Application$Data$$$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$p93$
10.2$Read$Application$Data$$$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$p65$
6.5.11$Read$Record$Command,Response$APDUs$$$
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$ $
!10.1$AFL$record$
$
The$card$will$return$the$requested$SFI$/$Record.$
EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$p93$
10.2$Read$Application$Data$$$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$p65$
6.5.11$Read$Record$Cmd,Response$APDUs$$$
$ $
"11.0$ValidateTransaction()$
$
If$the$card$has$approved$the$transaction$Offline$
Data$Authentication$is$performed$by$the$terminal$
to$verify$the$dynamic$signature$and$authenticate$
the$data$returned$by$the$card$in$response$to$the$
GPO$command.$$The$terminal$verifies$the$DDA$
dynamic$signature$contained$in$the$SDAD$using$
the$CA$public$key,$issuer$public$key$and$the$
card’s$public$key.$$The$resulting$data$packet$is$
a$SHA,1$hash$of$the$terminal$unpredictable$
number,$the$card$unpredictable$number,$the$
transaction$amount,$the$currency$and$the$date.$$
This$process$ensures$that$the$card$has$verified$
the$transaction$without$altering$any$of$the$
values$in$the$transaction.$$The$unpredictable$
numbers$are$used$to$ensure$that$transactions$
cannot$be$recorded$and$replayed.$$If$the$signed$
data$in$the$SDAD$passes$the$validation$$the$
transaction$is$deemed$valid$and$the$terminal$
will$approve$the$transaction.$
EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$p58$
5.6$Offline$Data$Authentication$$$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$2$,$p51$
6$Offline$Dynamic$Data$Authentication$$$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$2,$p60$
6.2$Retrieval$Certification$Authority$Public$Key$$$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$2,$p60$
6.3$Retrieval$of$Issuer$Public$Key$$$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$2,$p63$
6.3$Retrieval$of$ICC$Public$Key$$$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$2,$p66$
6.5$Dynamic$Data$Authentication$(DDA)$$$
$
EMV$v4.3$Book$2,$p68$
6.5.2$Dynamic$Signature$Verification$$$
$ $
!12.0$RemoveCard()$
$
When$the$last$record$listed$in$the$AFL$has$been$
successfully$returned,$the$terminal$will$
indicate$to$the$cardholder$that$the$card$can$be$
removed$from$the$reader.$
EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$p48$
5.4$Card$Read$Complete$$$
$ $
 
 
  
Appendix A Analysis  
140 
A.3 Protocol Emulator Code – Kernel 3 fDDA Contactless Transaction 
Table 21 – Protocol Emulator Code - Kernel 3 fDDA Contactless Transaction 
public$class$Kernel3$extends$Kernel$
{$
$
/**$$
$*$Kernel$3$,$Visa$EMV$Mode$Contactless$Transactions$(fDDA)$
$*$UML$diagram$–$Kernel$3$(Visa)$fDDA$Protocol$Sequence$
$*$This$Method$performs$steps$8.0$PopulatePDOL()$to$11.0$ValidateTrasnaction().$
.*$This$method$starts$once$the$payment$application$has$been$selected,$$
$*$steps$1.0$InitiateTransaction()$to$7.0$SelectApplication()$are$performed$by$
.*$the$common$Kernel$processes.$
$*$Concrete$implementation$of$abstract$methods$for$EMV$mode$transactions.$
$*$UK$issued$cards$should$operate$in$EMV$mode$and$US$issued$cards$should$$
$*$operate$in$Magnetic$Stripe$Mode$$$
$*$References$
$*$EMV$v2.2$Book$B$,$3.6$Data$Element$Processing$,$p34$
$*$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$2.4.1$Initiate$Application$Processing$,$p12$
$*$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.1$Initiate$Application$Processing$,$p40$
$*$EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$5.4$Rules$for$Using$a$Data$Object$List$(DOL)$
$*$EMV$v4.3$Book$4$,$Annex$A$,$Coding$of$Terminal$Data$Elements$,$p115$
$*$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$A.2$Data$Elements$by$Name$(9F66)$,$p110$
$*$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$Annex$C$Fast$Dynamic$Data$Authentication$,$p127$
$*$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.2.1$Get$Processing$Options$(GPO)$Command$,$p40$
$*$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.2.2$Initiate$Application$Processing$,$p40$to$p46$
$*$EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$6.5.8.4$Data$Field$Returned$in$the$Response$,$p60$
$*$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.4.3$Determine$the$Card$Disposition$,$p50$
$*$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.2.2.2$GPO$Response$SW1$SW2$,$p43$
$*$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.2.2.3$Contactless$Path$Determination$,$p46$
$*$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$A.2$Data$Elements$by$Name$,$p97$
$*$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$C.1$Dynamic$Signature$Verification$,$p128$
$*$EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$6.5.8$Get$Processing$Options$APDUs$,$p59$
$*$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.3$Read$Application$Data$,$p47$
$*$EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$10.2$Read$Application$Data$,$p93$
$*$EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$6.5.11$Read$Record$Command,Response$APDUs$,$p65$
$*$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$2.4.2$Read$Application$Data$p13$
$*$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.6$Offline$Data$Authentication$,$p58$
$*$EMV$v4.3$Book$2$,$6$Offline$Dynamic$Data$Authentication$,$p51$
$*$EMV$v4.3$Book$2,$6.2$Retrieval$Certification$Authority$Public$Key$,$p60$
$*$EMV$v4.3$Book$2,$6.3$Retrieval$of$Issuer$Public$Key$,$p60$
$*$EMV$v4.3$Book$2,$6.3$Retrieval$of$ICC$Public$Key$,$p63$
$*$EMV$v4.3$Book$2,$6.5$Dynamic$Data$Authentication$(DDA)$,$p66$
$*$EMV$v4.3$Book$2,$6.5.2$Dynamic$Signature$Verification$,$p68$
$*$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$A.2$Data$Elements$by$Name$,$p97$
$*$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$2.4.7$Online$Processing$(EMV$Mode)$,$p14$
$*$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$2.4.8$Completion$(EMV$Mode)$,$p15$
$*$EMV$v2.2$Book$B$,$3.3$Combination$Selection$,$p24$
$*$$
$*$Additional$References$and$coding$comments$
$*$EMV$Contactless$Book$A$,$5.8.2$Application$Selection$and$Kernel$Activation$
$*$EMV$Contactless$C,3$,$2.4$New$Transaction$Processing$Sequence$p12$
$*$EMV$Contactless$C,3$,$5.2$Initiate$Application$Processing$p41$
$*$EMV$Contactless$C,3$,$C.1$Dynamic$Signature$Verification$p132$
$*$EMV$Contactless$C,3$,$Figure$C,1:$Fast$DDA$(fDDA)$EMV$Mode$Example$p134$
$*$EMV$v4.2$Book$2$,$10.1$Initiate$Application$Processing$p92$
$*$EMV$v4.2$Book$2$,$10.2$Read$Application$Data$p95$
$*$EMV$v4.2$Book$3$,$10.3$Offline$Data$Authentication$(AFL$&$AIP$operation)$
$*$Describes$the$AFL$&$AIP$data$is$to$be$used$in$the$validation$of$Signed$Data.$
$*$EMV$Contactless$Book$C,3$,$2.4$New$Transaction$Processing$Sequence$p12$
$*$EMV$v4.2$Book$3$,$10.3$Offline$Data$Authentication$(AFL$&$AIP$operation)$
$*$The$above$2$references$indicate$that$the$AFL$&$AIP$data$is$to$be$used$in$the$
$*$validation$of$the$Hash$of$the$signed$data,$HOWEVER$Visa$fDDA$only$works$if$
$*$the$AFL$and$AIP$are$left$empty.$
$*$@return$Transaction$Outcome$Code$
$*/$
@Override$
protected$Outcome$EMVTransaction()$
{$
$ Log.Write("UML$8.0$PopulatePDOL()",$Log.PROTOCOL);$$$
$ //$UML$8.0$PopulatePDOL()$
$ //$The$Processing$Options$Data$Objects$List$(PDOL)$is$the$list$of$data$elements$that$$
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$ //$the$card$requires$to$approve$the$transaction.$$The$terminal$populates$the$PDOL$$
$ //$with$data,$the$data$elements$would$usually$include$transaction$amount,$currency,$
$ //$unpredictable$number,$transaction$date.$
$ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$B$,$3.6$Data$Element$Processing$,$p34$
$ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$2.4.1$Initiate$Application$Processing$,$p12$
$ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.1$Initiate$Application$Processing$,$p40$
$ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$5.4$Rules$for$Using$a$Data$Object$List$(DOL)$–$p38$
$ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$4$,$Annex$A$,$Coding$of$Terminal$Data$Elements$,$p115$
$ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$Annex$C3$Cardholder$Verification$Rule$Format$–$p163$
$ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$A.2$Data$Elements$by$Name$(9F66)$,$p110$
$ //$EMVv2.2$$Book$C,3$,$Annex$C$Fast$Dynamic$Data$Authentication$,$p127$
$ byte[]$dol$=$this.PopulatePDOL();$
$ Log.Write("UML$9.0$GetProcessingOptions(PDOL)$",$Log.PROTOCOL);$$$
$ //$UML$9.0$GetProcessingOptions(PDOL$data)$$
$ //$In$the$Visa$fDDA$transaction$Get$Processing$Options$(GPO)$is$used$to$request$completion$
$ //$of$the$transaction.$$The$PDOL$data$must$contain$all$of$the$data$elements$requested$by$
$ //$the$card$otherwise$the$transaction$will$be$rejected$
$ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$2.4.1$Initiate$Application$Processing$,$p12$
$ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.2$Initiate$Application$Processing$,$p40$
$ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.2.1$Get$Processing$Options$(GPO)$Command$,$p40$
$ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.2.2$Initiate$Application$Processing$,$p40$to$p46$
$ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$6.5.8.4$Data$Field$Returned$in$the$Response$,$p60$
$ ResponseAPDU$response$=$this.Reader.GetProcessingOptions(dol);$
$ if$(response.getSW()$==$Const.SW_SUCCESS)$
$ {$
$ $ //$Split$the$HEX$string$response$from$the$card$into$individual$fields$with$a$TAG$and$Value$
$ $ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$Annex$B$Rules$for$BER,TLV$Data$Objects$p155$
$ $ //$Or$if$it$isn't$TLV$decode$it$as$a$Format$1$object$–$$
$ $ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$6.5.8.4$Data$Field$Returned$in$the$Response$Message$
$ $ if(!this.CardData.DecodeResponse(response))$
$ $ $ this.CardData.FormatGPOResponse(response.getData());$
$ $ byte$[]$iad$=$this.CardData.FindData(Const.TAG_IAD);$
$ $ Log.Write("UML$9.7$Transaction$Approved",$Log.PROTOCOL);$$$
$ $ //$UML$9.7$Transaction$Approved$
$ $ //$Application$Cryptogram$(AC),$AFL$
$ $ //$If$the$card$approves$the$completion$of$the$transaction$in$offline$mode,$it$will$
$ $ //$return$Transaction$Cryptogram$$(TC)$in$the$Cryptogram$Information$Data$(CID).$
$ $ //$The$card$also$returns$all$of$the$data$elements$required$by$the$terminal$to$
$ $ //$$complete$the$transaction:$$
$ $ //$Signed$Dynamic$Application$Data$(SDAD)$used$by$the$terminal$to$verify$that$the$
$ $ //$card$has$approved$the$same$transaction$that$the$terminal$sent.$$
$ $ //$Application$Cryptogram$(AC)$used$in$the$completion$of$the$transaction$with$the$$
$ $ //$Bank$to$validate$that$a$valid$card$completed$the$transaction.$$
$ $ //$Application$File$Locator$(AFL)$contains$the$location$in$the$card’s$file$$
$ $ //$structure$where$the$terminal$can$read$the$data$elements$required$to$complete$$
$ $ //$the$transaction.$$
$ $ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.4.3$Determine$the$Card$Disposition$,$p50$
$ $ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.2.2.2$GPO$Response$SW1$SW2$,$p43$
$ $ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.2.2.3$Contactless$Path$Determination$,$p46$
$ $ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$A.2$Data$Elements$by$Name$,$p97$
$ $ //$EMVv2.2$$Book$C,3$,$Annex$C$Fast$Dynamic$Data$Authentication$,$p127$
$ $ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$C.1$Dynamic$Signature$Verification$,$p128$
$ $ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$6.5.8$Get$Processing$Options$APDUs$,$p59$
$ $ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$6.5.8.4$Data$Field$Returned$in$the$Response$,$p60$
$ $ //$TC$Returned$by$Get$Processing$Options$(9F10)$
$ $ if$(Util.BitCompare(iad[4],$Const.IAD_VISA_STATUS_MASK,$Const.IAD_VISA_TC))$
$ $ {$
$ $ $ Log.Write(",,,,,,,,,$TC$Returned$by$Get$Processing$Options$(9F10)$,,,,,,,",$Log.PROTOCOL);$$$
$ $ $ Log.Write("UML$10.0$ReadAFLRecord(SFI,$Record)",$Log.PROTOCOL);$$$
$ $ $ //$UML$10.0$ReadAFLRecord(SFI,$Record)$
$ $ $ //$The$Application$File$Locator$(AFL)$returned$in$the$GPO$response$contains$
$ $ $ //$the$location$of$the$data$records$which$contain$the$data$elements$that$
$ $ $ //$the$terminal$will$require$to$complete$the$transaction.$$The$AFL$contains$
$ $ $ //$a$range$of$SFI$/$Records.$$The$data$the$AFL$points$to$will$include$the$$
$ $ $ //$public$keys$required$to$decrypt$the$SDAD$returned$in$the$GPO$response.$$
$ $ $ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.3$Read$Application$Data$,$p47$
$ $ $ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$10.2$Read$Application$Data$,$p93$
$ $ $ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$6.5.11$Read$Record$Command,Response$APDUs$,$p65$
$ $ $ //$UML$10.1$AFL$record$
$ $ $ //$The$card$will$return$the$requested$SFI$/$Record$
$ $ $ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$3$,$10.2$Read$Application$Data$,$p93$
$ $ $ //$EMV$Contactless$Book$C,3$,$2.4.2$Read$Application$Data$p13$
$ $ $ byte[]$afl_data$=$this.GetAFLData();$//$Fields$already$added$to$CardData$
$ $ $ byte[]$sda_data$=$this.GetSDAData();$
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$ $ $ Log.Write("UML$11.0$ValidateTransaction()",$Log.PROTOCOL);$$$
$ $ $ //$UML$11.0$ValidateTransaction()$
$ $ $ //$If$the$card$has$approved$the$transaction$Offline$Data$Authentication$$
$ $ $ //$is$performed$by$the$terminal$to$verify$the$dynamic$signature$and$$
$ $ $ //$authenticate$the$data$returned$by$the$card$in$response$to$the$GPO$$
$ $ $ //$command.$$The$terminal$verifies$the$DDA$dynamic$signature$contained$in$$
$ $ $ //$the$SDAD$using$the$CA$public$key,$issuer$public$key$and$the$card’s$$
$ $ $ //$public$key.$$The$resulting$data$packet$is$a$SHA,1$hash$of$the$terminal$$
$ $ $ //$unpredictable$number,$the$card$unpredictable$number,$the$transaction$$
$ $ $ //$amount,$the$currency$and$the$date.$$This$process$ensures$that$the$card$$
$ $ $ //$has$verified$the$transaction$without$altering$any$of$the$values$in$the$$
$ $ $ //$transaction.$$The$unpredictable$numbers$are$used$to$ensure$that$$
$ $ $ //$transactions$cannot$be$recorded$and$replayed.$$If$the$signed$data$in$$
$ $ $ //$the$SDAD$passes$the$validation$$the$transaction$is$deemed$valid$and$$
$ $ $ //$the$terminal$will$approve$the$transaction.$$
$ $ $ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.6$Offline$Data$Authentication$,$p58$
$ $ $ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$2$,$6$Offline$Dynamic$Data$Authentication$,$p51$
$ $ $ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$2,$6.2$Retrieval$Certification$Authority$Public$Key$,$p60$
$ $ $ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$2,$6.3$Retrieval$of$Issuer$Public$Key$,$p60$
$ $ $ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$2,$6.3$Retrieval$of$ICC$Public$Key$,$p63$
$ $ $ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$2,$6.5$Dynamic$Data$Authentication$(DDA)$,$p66$
$ $ $ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$2,$6.5.2$Dynamic$Signature$Verification$,$p68$
$ $ $ byte[]$sdad$=$this.CardData.FindData(Const.TAG_SDAD);$//$TAG_SDAD$0x9F4B$
$ $ $ if$(sdad.length$>$0)$$
$ $ $ {$
$ $ $ $ //$EMV$Contactless$C3$–$C.1$Dynamic$Signature$Verification$,$p132$
$ $ $ $ //$EMV$Contactless$C3$–$Table$C,1:$Terminal$Dynamic$Data$for$Input$to$DDA$Hash$
Algorithm$,$p132$
$ $ $ $ byte[]$ddol$=$this.TerminalTags.FindData(Const.TAG_UNPREDICTABLE_NUMBER);$$
$ $ $ $ ddol$=$Util.ByteInsert(ddol,$this.TerminalTags.FindData(Const.TAG_TRANSACTION_AMOUNT),$
,1);$$$$$
$ $ $ $ ddol$=$Util.ByteInsert(ddol,$this.TerminalTags.FindData(Const.TAG_CURRENCY_CODE),$,1);$$$$$
$ $ $ $ ddol$=$Util.ByteInsert(ddol,$this.CardData.FindData(Const.TAG_CARD_AUTH_DATA),$,1);$
$ $ $ $ Log.Write("DDOL$=>$"$+$Util.HexString(ddol),$Log.PROTOCOL);$
$ $ $ $ Log.Write(",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$Validating$SDAD$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,",$
Log.PROTOCOL);$
$ $ $ $ Log.Write("9F4B$=>$"$+$Util.HexString(sdad),$Log.PROTOCOL);$
$ $ $ $ //$Generate$the$Issuer$Public$Key$from$the$CA$Public$Key$
$ $ $ $ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$2,$6.3$Retrieval$of$Issuer$Public$Key$,$p60$
$ $ $ $ if$(GenerateIssuerMod())$
$ $ $ $ {$
$ $ $ $ $ //$Generate$the$ICC$Public$Key$from$the$Issuer$Public$Key$
$ $ $ $ $ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$2,$6.3$Retrieval$of$ICC$Public$Key$,$p63$
$ $ $ $ $ if$(GenerateICCMod(afl_data,$sda_data))$
$ $ $ $ $ {$
$ $ $ $ $ $ //$UML$11.0$ValidateTransaction()$
$ $ $ $ $ $ //$Decrypt$and$validate$the$SDAD$using$the$ICC$Public$key$
$ $ $ $ $ $ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$2,$6.5$Dynamic$Data$Authentication$(DDA)$,$p66$
$ $ $ $ $ $ //$EMV$v4.3$Book$2,$6.5.2$Dynamic$Signature$Verification$,$p68$
$ $ $ $ $ $ byte[]$icc_dynamic_number$=$this.Crypto.DynamicSignatureVerification(ICCMod,$
ICCExp,$sdad,$ddol);$
$ $ $ $ $ $ if$(icc_dynamic_number.length$>$0)$
$ $ $ $ $ $ {$
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ //$Insert$the$result$into$Terminal$TAG_ICC_DYNAMIC_NUM$9F4C$
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ this.TerminalTags.Update(Const.TAG_ICC_DYNAMIC_NUM,$icc_dynamic_number);$
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ //$EMV$Contactless$C,3$,$2.4.8$Completion$(EMV$Mode)$
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ outcome$=$Outcome.APPROVED;$
$ $ $ $ $ $ }$
$ $ $ $ $ }$
$ $ $ $ }$
$ $ $ }$
$ $ $ if$(outcome$==$Outcome.APPROVED)$
$ $ $ {$
$ $ $ $ Log.Write("Application$Cryptogram$"$+$
Util.HexString(this.CardData.FindData(Const.TAG_APPLICATION_CRYPTOGRAM)),$Log.PROTOCOL);$
$ $ $ $ Log.Write(",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$TRANSACTION$SUCCESSFUL$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,",$
Log.PROTOCOL);$$$
$ $ $ }$
$ $ $ else$
$ $ $ {$
$ $ $ $ Log.Write(",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$SDAD$CRYPTOGRAM$ERROR$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,",$
Log.PROTOCOL);$$$
$ $ $ }$
$ $ }$
Appendix A Analysis  
143 
$ $ else$Log.Write("ERROR$,$Kernel3.DoTransaction()$,$Signed$Dynamic$Data$Missing",$Log.ERROR);$
$ }$
$ //$Check$if$PDOL$returned$AAC$(Application$Authentication$Cryptogram)$
$ else$if$(Util.BitCompare(iad[4],$Const.IAD_VISA_STATUS_MASK,$Const.IAD_VISA_AAC))$$
$ {$
$ $ Log.Write(",,,,,,,,$ACC$Returned$by$Get$Processing$Options$(9F10)$,,,,,,,",$Log.PROTOCOL);$$$
$ $ Log.Write("UML$9.9$Transaction$Declined$,$AAC$",$Log.PROTOCOL);$$$
$ $ //$UML$9.9$Transaction$Declined$,$AAC$$
$ $ //$If$the$card$declines$the$transaction$it$returns$AAC$in$the$CID.$$The$card$declines$the$$
$ $ //$transaction$when$it$cannot$be$completed$as$requested$by$the$terminal.$$$
$ $ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.4.3$Determine$the$Card$Disposition$,$p50$
$ $ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$A.2$Data$Elements$by$Name$,=$p97$
$ $ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$2.4.7$Online$Processing$(EMV$Mode)$,$p14$
$ $ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$2.4.8$Completion$(EMV$Mode)$,$p15$
$ $ outcome$=$Outcome.DECLINED;$
$ $ Log.Write(",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$TRANSACTION$DECLINED$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,",$Log.PROTOCOL);$$$$$$$
$ }$
$ //$Check$if$PDOL$returned$ARQC$(Authorisation$Request$Cryptogram)$
$ else$if$(Util.BitCompare(iad[4],$Const.IAD_VISA_STATUS_MASK,$$Const.IAD_VISA_ARQC))$$
$ {$
$ $ Log.Write(",,,,,,,$ARQC$Returned$by$Get$Processing$Options$(9F10)$,,,,,,,",$Log.PROTOCOL);$$$
$ $ Log.Write("UML$9.8$Transaction$Must$Go$Online$–ARQC",$Log.PROTOCOL);$
$ $ //$UML$9.8$Transaction$Must$Go$Online$–ARQC$$
$ $ //$If$the$card$requires$online$completion$of$the$transaction$it$will$return$ARQC$in$the$
$ $ //$Cryptogram$Information$Data$(CID).$$Online$completion$is$required$when$the$amount$of$the$$
$ $ //$transaction$exceeds$the$cards$offline$transaction$limit$or$offline$cumulative$limit$or$$
$ $ //$when$the$number$of$offline$transactions$exceeds$the$number$of$consecutive$offline$$
$ $ //$transactions.$
$ $ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.4.3$Determine$the$Card$Disposition$,$p50$
$ $ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$A.2$Data$Elements$by$Name$,$p97$
$ $ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$2.4.7$Online$Processing$(EMV$Mode)$,$p14$
$ $ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$2.4.8$Completion$(EMV$Mode)$,$p15$
$ $ outcome$=$Outcome.REQUEST_ONLINE;$
$ $ Log.Write(",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$TRANSACTION$MUST$GO$ONLINE$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,",$Log.PROTOCOL);$$$
$ }$$$
$ else$//$PDOL$returned$invalid$IAD$status$code$
$ {$
$ $ Log.Write(",,,$Invalid$IAD$returned$by$Get$Processing$Options$(9F10)$,,,,",$Log.PROTOCOL);$$$
$ $ Log.Write("UML$9.10$Command$Error$",$Log.PROTOCOL);$
$ $ //$UML$9.10$Command$Error$
$ $ //$The$possible$error$codes$returned$by$Get$Processing$Options$are:$$
$ $ //$6984,$Try$Another$Interface.$$The$transaction$should$be$reattempted$using$either$the$$
$ $ //$contact$interface$or$the$magnetic$stripe$interface.$$$
$ $ //$6985$,$Select$Next.$$The$transaction$should$be$reattempted$using$the$next$combination$$
$ $ //$of$Kernel$/$AID$(if$any).$$
$ $ //$6986$,$Try$Again,$reattempt$the$transaction$with$the$same$parameters.$$The$card$must$$
$ $ //$be$represented,$this$may$occur$if$the$card$is$removed$too$early.$
$ $ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$5.2.2.2$GPO$Response$SW1$SW2$,$p43$
$ $ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$C,3$,$2.4.8$Completion$(EMV$Mode)$,$p15$
$ $ //$EMV$v2.2$Book$B$,$3.3$Combination$Selection$,$p24$
$ $ Log.Write("IAD$status$code$(9F10)$:$"$+$Util.HexString(iad),$Log.ERROR);$
$ $ Log.Write(",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$TRANSACTION$DECLINED$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,",$Log.PROTOCOL);$$$$$$$
$ }$
$ return$outcome;$
}$
$
};$
$
*
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A.4 Protocol Emulator Trace Log – Kernel 3 fDDA Contactless Transaction 
$
[24,05,2015$18:58:14.164]$Card$Reader$Type$Selected:$PC/SC$terminal$ACS$ACR1222$3S$PICC$Reader$PICC$
0$
[24,05,2015$18:58:20.388]$EntryPoint:$Set$Interface$to$NFC$
[24,05,2015$18:58:20.419]$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$Wait$for$Card$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.65]$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$Card$Detected$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.252]$ATR:$19$bytes$=>$3B8E800180318066B08412016E018300900003$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.252]$Historical$Bytes$=>$80318066B08412016E0183009000$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.268]$Hash$Code$=>$1DFB2774$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.268]$Card$Name$=>$Contactless$Barclaycard$Visa$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.268]$sendAPDU$=>$80CA9F7F00$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.299]$respAPDU$<=$
9F7F2A409063611291810101002006BEFAC5ECDE4F100220064193200641942006000C0059424531570000FFFF${9000}$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.299]$ICC$Maker$/$Type$=>$0x4090$/$0x6361$
$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.299]$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$Start$Transaction$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.299]$UML$(kernel)$4.0$ListAvailableApplications()$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.315]$CardReader:$PPSE$=>$2PAY.SYS.DDF01$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.315]$sendAPDU$=>$00A404000E325041592E5359532E4444463031$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.361]$respAPDU$<=$
6F20840E325041592E5359532E4444463031A50EBF0C0B61094F07A0000000031010${9000}$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.361]$sendAPDU$=>$00B2010C00$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.377]$respAPDU$<=$${6A82}$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.377]$UML$(kernel)$4.1$List$of$Available$Applications$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.377]$EntryPoint:$Kernel$ID$=>$3$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.377]$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$Kernel3$Selected$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.377]$UML$(kernel)$7.0$SelectApplication(A0000000031010)$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.393]$sendAPDU$=>$00A4040007A0000000031010$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.439]$respAPDU$<=$
6F3D8407A0000000031010A5325010424152434C41594341524420564953419F38189F66049F02069F03069F1A0295055F2A
029A039C019F37045F2D02656E${9000}$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.439]$UML$(kernel)$7.1$Trasnaction$Setup$data$inc$PDOL$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.439]$UML$(kernel3)$8.0$PopulatePDOL()$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.455]$UML$(kernel3)$9.0$GetProcessingOptions(PDOL)$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.455]$sendAPDU$=>$
80A800002383213A20800000000000010000000000000008260000000000082615052400179C6A9E$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.767]$respAPDU$<=$
7781C29F4B8180184F20039A940B5D7D887EBC88ADE42A95A6042429FF0988EF25AC0FD98BF571F98B51E8039C4100AD0251
9348A5A7617D412148F3A95E0BFD82CF267978ACA9398263DA86E6FF9327325C7253510F4E28918126DB3719FADC23A66E3D
589FB6D4B9DF0718B0B7B1859F12095BDB65FF0FC81C59315003C50C6359356660E9519404100203009F1007060B0A039000
0057134929xxxxxxxx4037D16112010363500000001F820220009F360201C39F2608FCF9E2AC71DE56219F6C021000$
{9000}$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.767]$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$EMV$Mode$Processing$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.767]$UML$(kernel3)$9.7$Transaction$Approved$,$
TC+SDAD+ApplicationCryptogram(AC)+AFL$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.767]$,,,,,,,,,$TC$Returned$by$Get$Processing$Options$(9F10)$,,,,,,,$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.767]$UML$(kernel3)$10.0$ReadAFLRecord(SFI,$Record)$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.767]$sendAPDU$=>$00B2021400$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.876]$respAPDU$<=$
7081C08F010790819066658CBCE38531130ADC606433713E2FCBCA77F8C07E222D08B61B72C49168B8A64A0BF77D72E896F6
BCD1D5386605C0798C55EEB14481F5ED3103296DD90D1F06D67EFB7DAA26D18960FD74B13862A9B26F9EAF61A1BB55000440
128547B9C05D262DDBD64A3FB53CFA54DE8FF17AFCBEA65C5BF8ED1BF610F05E8D90AB9CEFBB7670A9F30A010E115B51F9F5
E85B599224313E45081DF97177B20BBB1C8505393FEB07C81E3A6AD4E9F6FDDFE23E6D323763D560E99F320103${9000}$
[24,05,2015$18:58:27.876]$sendAPDU$=>$00B2031400$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.1]$respAPDU$<=$
7081D19F46819027F4178D281BFC2A3CA7E0EFAE6FA4515848FA27940DAF58B61D66D1487901806B286944C3489C26506772
D9339EC6C2A8797BA6E35D71D30BDF5B8F3C35F2B881263B0C0A1E4A755F75862AB46C62BE5E80537774C6F8FF592B066FFF
FAA3900525DA711DFA0A7537EE686AB3AF77A0971D39D530C1C36CA5468EF32DEADA510F1621E2F723473804A9F12CD7D9EC
C49F4701039F481A3B332E4D800610E88F140F0E0F5B073D17F92073BA3360E88EC55A084929xxxxxxxx40375F3401305F24
031611309F69050151738D3A${9000}$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.17]$EMVTerminal.GetSDAData()$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.17]$UML$(kernel3)$11.0$ValidateTransaction()$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.17]$DDOL$=>$179C6A9E00000000010008260151738D3A$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.17]$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$Validating$SDAD$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.17]$9F4B$=>$
184F20039A940B5D7D887EBC88ADE42A95A6042429FF0988EF25AC0FD98BF571F98B51E8039C4100AD02519348A5A7617D41
2148F3A95E0BFD82CF267978ACA9398263DA86E6FF9327325C7253510F4E28918126DB3719FADC23A66E3D589FB6D4B9DF07
18B0B7B1859F12095BDB65FF0FC81C59315003C50C6359356660E951$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.32]$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$Recovered$Issuer$Key$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.32]$Header$$$$$$6A$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.32]$Cert$Format$02$
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[24,05,2015$18:58:28.32]$Issuer$ID$$$492949FF$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.32]$Cert$Expiry$1217$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.32]$Cert$Serial$014DC2$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.32]$Hash$Algo$$$01$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.32]$Key$Algo$$$$01$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.32]$Key$Length$$90$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.32]$Exp$Length$$01$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.32]$ICC$Key$$$$$
C639B9467B9E56D9C6395E6B934CD2ACFBEC953C6CE8D31923130F2046384EFD5BDE921C3ED12505B1BFE7DDF488E62CA475
AAFC1A6919C944F658BA0230C4894CA5E5E2AA0262B09A5B3CB7ECB6CD93AF0D717C40642E5B14B070B0BE7181CECDB79396
C89C36414C8EF21D$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.32]$Hash$$$$$$$$8652C1B69B5255D28CB7C2F741873D77FC8E52B3$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.32]$Trailer$$$$$BC$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.32]$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$Recovered$Issuer$Key$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.32]$CryptographyRSA.RetrieveIssuerPublicKey()$,$SUCCESSFUL$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.48]$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$Recovered$ICC$Key$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.48]$Header$$$$$$6A$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.48]$Cert$Format$04$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.48]$PAN$$$$$$$$$4929xxxxxxxx4037FFFF$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.48]$Cert$Expiry$1116$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.48]$Cert$Serial$3A6B02$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.48]$Hash$Algo$$$01$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.48]$Key$Algo$$$$01$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.48]$Key$Length$$80$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.48]$Exp$Length$$01$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.48]$ICC$Key$$$$$
D95D3658164C174E64056D72B2B34147BA26D7AADAC5731B01F52E7799FA099278748CB99424D906DA2F9E59D86BC8BD72C3
2E5DF772A4DC9F0149C2DB82B41374A7EC4BD1560CFA9B42646AC8394ECF85B573C7AC399D22CCA4429D9442CA02EF83122C
5D91$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.48]$Hash$$$$$$$$$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.48]$Trailer$$$$$BC$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.48]$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$Recovered$ICC$Key$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.48]$CryptographyRSA.RetrieveICCPublicKey()$,$SUCCESSFUL$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.48]$CryptographyRSA.DynamicSignatureVerification()$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.48]$CryptographyRSA.DynamicSignatureVerification()$,$SUCCESSFUL$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.48]$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$Recovered$SDAD$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.48]$Header$$$$6A$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.63]$Format$$$$05$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.63]$Algorithm$01$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.63]$Length$$$$03$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.63]$Data$$$$$$0201C3$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.63]$Padding$$$
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.63]$Hash$$$$$$EB8880140A352EAD82370FA47F6F4F52623068F9$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.63]$Trailer$$$BC$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.63]$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$Dynamic$Data$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.63]$Length$$$$$$$$$02$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.63]$Dynamic$Number$01C3$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.63]$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$Dynamic$Data$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.63]$Application$Cryptogram$FCF9E2AC71DE5621$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.63]$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$TRANSACTION$SUCCESSFUL$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$
[24,05,2015$18:58:28.63]$$
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$TRANSACTION$Approved$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$
Application$$A0000000031010$,$BARCLAYCARD$VISA$
Amount$$$$$$$000000000100$
Currency$$$$$0826$
Date$$$$$$$$$150524$
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$TRANSACTION$Approved$,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,$
$
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A.5 Abstract Model – Kernel 3 fDDA Contactless Transaction 
 
Figure 43 - Example Section of Z Abstract Model 
The Z abstract model is 90 pages and therefore too large to be added as an appendix to this thesis.  
The Z abstract model can be read in the technical report Freitas and Emms 2014 [61] which contains 
the Z specification and the proofs. 
